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arrived.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's creation of an equal protection claim for racial
gerrymandering in Shaw v. Reno2 has left defenders of minority voting
rights in much the same position as the proverbial Dutch boy-trying to
stop too many leaks without enough fingers. Over the past quarter
century, civil rights advocates have built a dike in the form of majority-
minority single-member districts3 to stem the tide of racial bloc voting,
the practice by which White voters in a particular district consistently
vote in a manner that thwarts minority voters' attempts to elect their
1. Richard H. Pildes & Kirsten A. Donoghue, Cumulative Voting in the United States,
1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241 (1995) (quoting Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,916 (1995)).
2. 509 U.S. 630 (1993) ("Shaw F') (holding that irrational reapportionment schemes
that are meant to segregate voters on the basis of race are unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause).
3. That is, districts electing a single representative in which racial, ethnic, or language
minorities comprise a majority of the population. See DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN,
CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 159-60
(1992) (defining "majority minority districts" and "single-member district").
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candidate of choice.When the Shaw Court initially punched a hole in this
dike by striking down a district map designed to create a majority Black
district,4 minority voting rights groups responded by attempting to plug
the opening with settled principles of constitutional law. But the Court
remained undeterred, side-stepping' its own precedents and rupturing the
dike anew with each passing decision.6 The deluge of the Court's
reasoning threatened to breach the dike in its entirety and again dilute the
ability of minority voters to have the same opportunity as "other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice' 7 Like the Dutch boy, many civil
rights advocates believe they do not have enough fingers to fill all of the
holes in the crumbling dike of majority-minority single-member districts.
4. Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 633,644.
5. Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 659 (White,J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997) (finding the district court's redis-
tricting plan for Georgia did not violate the Voting Rights Act's retrogression provision
because the appropriate benchmark was the current plan containing one majority-Black
district and not proposed plans creating two majority-Black districts that had never been
in effect and were found to be unconstitutional); Bush v.Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (con-
cluding that evidence supported findings that racially motivated gerrymandering had
greater influence on drawing ofTexas congressional district lines than political gerryman-
dering and was accomplished in large part by use of race as proxy for political data such as
precinct general election voting patterns, precinct primary voting patterns, and legislators'
experience); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) ("Shaw Ii') (holding that remedying racial
discrimination in redistricting is not a compelling state interest unless discrimination is
identified and the redistricting jurisdiction has a strong basis in evidence to conclude that
remedial action was necessary before it embarked on affirmative-action program); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (holding that a Shaw claim could be stated by alleging that
race was the predominant factor in the creation of district boundaries); United States v.
Hayes, 515 U.S. 737 (1995) (holding that a person residing in an allegedly racially gerry-
mandered district has standing to bring a Shaw claim because that person has been denied
equal treatment through use of racial criteria and accordingly has suffered special harm not
experienced by persons residing outside the district).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). For an extended critique of these decisions, see James
Thomas Tucker, Affirmative Action and [Mis representation: Part II-Deconstructing the Obstruc-
tionist Vision of the Right to Vote, 43 How LJ. 405 (2000) [hereinafter Deconstructing the
Obstructionist Vision] (deconstructing what is described as the "Obstructionist vision of the
right to vote' or the belief that protection of minority voting rights is limited to the right
of individuals to cast a ballot and have it counted, but not a broader right of minorities to
enjoy equal opportunities for political participation).
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Faced with this rather bleak prospect, a growing number of minority
voting rights commentators,' congressional representatives,9 and state leg-
8. See, e.g., Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 1 (describing the advantages and disadvan-
tages of cumulative voting in Chilton County, Alabama to show the feasibility of
implementing alternative voting systems not subject to Shaw claims of racial gerrymander-
ing); LANi GUINIER, Foreword to REFLECTING ALL OF Us: THE CASE FOR PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION ix, xii (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999) [hereinafter REFLECTING
ALL oF Us] (positing that proportional representation alternatives to winner-take-all elec-
tions, such as the party list system and cumulative voting, can increase voter turnout and
diversity, eliminate reliance on race-based redistricting, and allow voters to "form their
own constituencies and choose candidates who best represent their interests and values");
Robert Richie & Steven Hill, Reply, in REFLECTING ALL OF Us, supra, at 81, 82-83 (con-
cluding that "PR systems may be the best way-both legally and politically--out of
current battles over theVoting Rights Act: a way to combat vote dilution and achieve fair-
ness for minorities without relying on race-conscious districting," particularly "with harsh
critics of traditional winner-take-all remedies like Clarence Thomas expressing openness
to it"); Steven J. Mulroy, Alternative Ways Out:A Remedial Road Map for the Use ofAlternative
Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Act Remedies, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1867, 1876, 1890-91 (1999)
[hereinafter Alternative Ways Out] (asserting that the quandary posed by the race-neutral
premise of Shaw and the race-conscious requirements of the Voting Rights Act may be
avoided by adopting alternative electoral systems such as limited voting, cumulative voting,
and preference voting); Steven J. Mulroy, The Way Out:A Legal Standard for Imposing Alterna-
tive Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Remedies, 33 HAtv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 333 (1998)
[hereinafter The Way Out] (arguing that federal courts have authority to order alternative
voting systems into effect where a plaintiff has demonstrated vote dilution that violates the
Voting Rights Act, even if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the minority group is
compact enough to form a majority in a single member district, as long as the group does
not fall below the threshold of exclusion); Richard L. Engstrom & Robert R. Brischetto, Is
Cumulative Voting Too Complex? Evidence from Exit Polls, 27 STETSON L. REv. 813 (1998)
(maintaining that alternative voting systems such as cumulative voting have "become even
more attractive to those concerned with retaining or expanding ... opportunities" for
minority voters after Shaw); Samuel Issacharoff, Racial Gerrymandering in a Complex World:A
Reply to Judge Sentelle, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 1257, 1267-68 (1996); Samuel Issacharoff, Su-
preme Court Destabilization of Single-Member Districts, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL E 205 (1995)
[hereinafter Supreme Court Destabilization] (suggesting that "redistricting pressures will
force states to move away from redistricting in favor of alternative voting systems" to avoid
litigation under both the Voting Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause by addressing
"minority concerns without the pressures of racial line-drawing that would arouse the
scrutiny of Shaw and Miller"); Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American
Nationalities Policy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL E 83 (1995) (describing the advantages of alterna-
tive voting systems such as limited voting and cumulative voting to avoid the problems of
balkanization and separation described by the Supreme Court in its Shaw jurisprudence);
DOUGLAS J. Amy, R CHOICEs/NEw VOICES: ThE CASE FOR PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTA-
TION ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 121-33 (1993) (positing that proportional
representation avoids pitfalls of "affirmative gerrymandering" of single-member majority-
minority districts including the underrepresentation of minorities, cracking or fragmenta-
tion of minority groups, "bleaching" of districts to minimize the power of minority
elected representatives, and claims of reverse discrimination by Whites).
9. See, e.g., States' Choice ofVoting System Act, H.R. 1173, 106th Cong. (1999) (pro-
viding that states may use redistricting systems for Congressional districts other than
single-member districts);Voters' Choice Act of 1997, H.R. 3068, 105th Cong. (1997) (pro-
[VOL. 7:357
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islators10 have advocated building new dams that will withstand the
Court's jurisprudential torrent. According to these proponents, alternative
voting systems" that secure proportional or semi-proportional representa-
tion1 2 are the best way to stem the tide of this "tyranny of the judiciary" 3
viding that a State may use a proportional voting system for multimember Congressional
districts); Voters' Choice Act of 1995, H.R. 2545, 104th Cong. (1995) (providing that a
State that uses a system of limited voting, cumulative voting, or preference voting may
establish multimember Congressional districts). The States' Choice of Voting System Act
was introduced by Representative Mel Watt of North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional
District, which had been the subject of numerous constitutional challenges since originally
being drawn in 1992. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 121 S. Ct. 1452 (2001) ("Cromartie 11") (up-
holding constitutionality of District 12 under 1997 redistricting plan); Shaw II, 517 U.S. at
899 (striking down District 12 under 1992 redistricting plan); Pope v. Blue, 809 F Supp.
392 (WD.N.C.) (rejecting claim that North Carolina's redistricting plan was an unconsti-
tutional partisan gerrymander), aff'd, 506 U.S. 801 (1992). The Voters' Choice Acts were
introduced by Representative Cynthia McKinney of Georgia's Eleventh Congressional
District, which had been struck down by the Court in Miller, 515 U.S. at 900, and was
redrawn in Abrams, 521 U.S. at 74.
10. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 9, 2000 Reg. Sess., 414th Sess. (Md. 2000) (establishing a
commission to study proportional representation and single-member legislative districting
for the House of Delegates of the General Assembly); H.B. 473,145th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess.
(Ga. 1999) (providing for the election of Congressional representatives by means of cumu-
lative voting from multimember districts); H.B. 464, 145th Gen.Ass., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1999)
and H.B. 1093, 144th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1997) (providing for the election of mem-
bers of the State House of Representatives by means of preference voting from
multimember districts); H.B. 1161, 141st Gen. Ass., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1996) and S.B.
1121, 141st Gen. Ass., 2d Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1996) (adding cumulative voting and preference
voting to the modes of election that may be chosen locally for city and county govern-
ments); H.B. 1397, 140th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1993) (authorizing the Legislative
Research Commission to study alternative voting systems such as multimember and pro-
portional methods of election). But see H.B. 827, 1995 1st Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1995) and S.B.
750, 1995 1st Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1995) (prohibiting the practices of limited voting and ex-
tension of terms).
11. This Article uses "alternative voting systems" to refer to methods of election that
depart from winner-take-all elections in geographically based single-member or multi-
member districts commonly used in the United States.
12. Proportional or semi-proportional systems "strive for proportionality in allocating
the contested seats" with the overall goal of a political party or group of voters "to be
represented in ... proportion to its share of the vote." AMY, supra note 8, at 14. The single
transferable vote is an example of a proportional voting system. Id. at 230-31. Semi-
proportional systems include limited voting and cumulative voting "because they achieve
more proportionality than single-member or multimember plurality or majority elections,
but less than complete proportionality." Edward Still, Alternatives to Single-Member Districts,
in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 249, 258 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1989). See AMY, supra note
8, at 232-33; Bernard Grofinan, Criteria for Districting:A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA
L. REv. 77, 163 (1985). In the context of the discussion herein, references to proportional
and semi-proportional systems at times will be used interchangeably, although it is impor-
tant to keep in mind the differences between the two.
13. James Thomas Tucker, Tyranny of the Judiciary: Judicial Dilution of Consent Under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 443 (1999) [hereinafter Tyr-
anny of the Judiciary]. The term "judicial tyranny" describes how the Supreme Court and
SPRING 2002]
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that threatens to drown out political opportunities for racial, ethnic, and
language minority groups. The three most commonly suggested methods
include cumulative voting,14 limited voting,"s and the single-transferable
vote, or "preference voting"16
Cumulative voting uses multimember districts, which are districts
from which more than one member of a representative body are elected.
Voters are allowed to
cast the same number of votes as seats to be filled, but they
may combine those votes in any way they wish. Thus in a
contest to fill three seats, a voter could cast all three votes for
one candidate, two for one and one for another, or one for
each of three candidates.
17
A minority group is guaranteed representation under cumulative voting if
it limits the number of candidates it runs and exercises voter discipline.
18
Under limited voting, candidates can be elected either at-large (that
is, all members of a representative body are elected from the entire juris-
diction) or from multimember districts.19 "[E]ach voter is allowed to vote
for fewer candidates than the total number of seats contested.A voter may
choose three candidates on a five-seat city council, five candidates on a
seven-seat council, and so on."2 Limited voting does not prevent a disci-
plined majority from winning all seats if it evenly divides its votes among
certain lower federal courts have disregarded their constitutional role in striking "an ap-
propriate balance ... between respect for majority rule and the protection of minorities
from the tyranny of majority factionalism" in favor of "an inconsistent judicial view of
what 'voting' means in the American democratic system." Id. at 454-55.
14. AmY, supra note 8, at 186.
15. Id. at 14, 232.
16. Id. at 18.
17. Id. at 186.
18. Id. For example, in a contest for three seats, a minority group can achieve repre-
sentation by running only one candidate and encouraging all voters in that minority
group to cast all of three of their individual votes for that one candidate, if the minority
group's strength is greater than the following formula, expressed as a percentage:
x100
1 + Number of Seats
See Still, supra note 12, at 255-58; Richard L. Engstrom et al., Limited and Cumulative Voting
in Alabama:An Assessment After Two Rounds of Elections, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION 180,
184 (Georgia A. Persons ed., 1997) [hereinafter Limited and Cumulative Voting in Alabama].
19. AMY, supra note 8, at 14,232.
20. Id. at 186.
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candidates on its slate and the number of votes cast by the minority group
is smaller than the minimum threshold needed for election.
2'
The single-transferable vote ("STV") uses multimember districts in
which each party runs several different candidates. A STV process works
in the following manner:
Candidates are listed individually on the ballot, and voters
rank the various candidates, putting 1 by their first choice, 2
by their second choice, and so on.... The unique aspect of
the STV counting system is the transference of votes to en-
sure that most voters contribute to the election of a
candidate.*Two kinds of transfers take place. First, once a
candidate reaches the threshold [the minimum number of
first-choice votes a candidate must receive to get elected]
and is elected, any surplus ballots beyond that threshold are
redistributed to the next available preferred candidate indi-
cated on the ballot. After the redistribution of surplus ballots,
the votes are recounted to see if any remaining candidates
have reached the threshold. If no candidates reach the
threshold during a counting round, the last place candidate
is eliminated, and those votes are redistributed to the sec-
ond-choice candidates and another count is made. The
redistribution continues until all seats are filled.
22
For example, if six candidates are running for five seats, any candidate
receiving more than one-sixth of the votes will be elected.
23
21. See Still, supra note 12, at 253-55. The formula for determining the threshold in
limited voting systems, expressed as a percentage, is:
Number of Votes
X100
Number of Votes + Number of Seats
See Limited and Cumulative Voting in Alabama, supra note 18, at 183.
22. AMy, supra note 8, at 18.To ensure election under STV, a candidate needs to re-




Still, supra note 12, at 258-62; see also Enid Lakeman, The Case for Proportional Repre-
sentation, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 41, 44 (Arend
Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds., 1984).
23. Id.
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Unlike single-member districts, which are subject to the very sort of
geographically group-based, race-conscious classifications that the Court
has eschewed in its Shaw jurisprudence, these methods of election are
based upon varying forms of individual choices to collectively exercise
political power.24 Hence, alternative voting systems are said to offer "the
way out" of the Shaw dilemma by providing all voters with equal access to
the political process without creating majority-minority districts vulner-
able to charges of racial gerrymandering.
But do alternative voting systems come at an unacceptable price to
American democracy,25 replacing the drawbacks of race-conscious
redistricting with their own systemic shortcomings? The answer to this
question first requires an understanding of what representation means in
the United States. 26 Representation has many varying attributes, 2 but
most of all it "rests on the republican principle that the actions of
government must be based upon the consent of the governed."28 Under
the Madisonian model of democracy, consent has two key components:
representation that is derived from the bedrock principle of majority
24. See infia notes 216-28,352-58,437-41 and accompanying text.
25. The United States does not use a true democratic system, but instead "operates
under what Madison termed a 'republican government in which the people 'assemble and
administer [government] by their representatives and agents."' Tyranny of the Judiciary, supra
note 13, at 456 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 100 (James Madison) (Clinton Rositer
ed., 1961)). It is this type of government to which this Article refers by the term "democ-
racy.
26. In this limited sense, then, Justice Thomas is correct that answering this type of
question "depends upon the selection of a theory for defining the fully 'effective' vote-at
bottom, a theory for defining effective participation in representative government." Holder
v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874,897 (1994) (Thomas,J., concurring). Other Justices have made similar
observations in their evaluations of voting rights cases. See generally Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 633
(describing one of the issues before the Court as "the meaning of the constitutional 'right'
to vote"); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 88 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring judg-
ment) ("in order to decide whether an electoral system has made it harder for minority
candidates to elect the candidates they prefer, a court must have an idea in mind of how
hard it 'should' be for minority voters to elect their preferred candidates under an accept-
able system"); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962) (Frankfurter,J., dissenting) ("Talk of
'debasement' or 'dilution' is circular talk. One cannot speak of 'debasement' or 'dilution' of
the value of a vote until there is first defined a standard of reference as to what a vote
should be worth.").
27. See Tyranny of the Judiciary, supra note 13, at 456-58. See also James Thomas Tucker,
Affirmative Action and [Mislrepresentation: Part I-Reclaiming the Civil Rights Vision of the Right
to Vote, 43 How L.J. 343 (2000) [hereinafter Reclaiming the Civil Rights Vision] (describing
the civil rights vision of the right to vote as including the individual qualities of freedom,
citizenship, and empowerment, and the group traits of consent, protection, and power).
28. Tyranny of the Judiciary, supra note 13, at 458. See also Reclaiming the Civil Rights
Vision, supra note 27, at 381-87 (describing consent as an element of the civil rights vision
of the right to vote). One scholar has described this covenant as requiring the "continuing
consent of the governed in regular elections." David F Epstein, The Political Theory of the
Constitution, in COrNFROTING nT CONSTITUTION 77, 122 (Allan Bloom ed., 1990).
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rule, 29 subject to the countervailing principle that minorities must be
protected "from the untrammeled excesses of majority factionalism."3 At
the same time, representation has not developed in a theoretical vacuum
in this country. Consent traditionally has rested upon geographical
representation, which is used as a proxy for the political interests of groups
of individual voters.3 Representatives of political territories are expected
to be responsive to the needs of all of their constituents, including persons
who did not or could not give consent to their representation.32 A strong
two-party system also has evolved from the "winner-take-all" feature of
majority rule.33 Madison's vision for implementing a consent-based
republican form of government, while laden with many defects, 34 has
endured in large part because of the stability created by these features.
This Article explores whether alternative voting systems are com-
patible with the meaning of representation in the United States. Part II
begins by examining the role of geographical representation and the effect
it has on the ability of individuals and groups of voters to give or with-
hold their consent. Part III follows this inquiry by assessing the
relationship between representatives and constituents under majoritarian
and proportional systems to determine the consequences of moving away
from geographical representation towards models designed to enhance
opportunities for all voters to choose winning candidates.A description of
what a "majority" is and when and how it is attained to secure the peo-
ple's consent then is taken up in Part IV, providing some insight into the
extent to which departures from majority rule are consistent with the
American conception of representation. This discussion leads into Part V,
which evaluates the role of our two-party system and ascertains whether
proportional models of representation can cure the perceived defects of
winner-take-all elections without undermining the continued stability of
our Republic.
The focus of this inquiry is not merely on whether implementing
some form of alternative voting system would alter the meaning of the
right to vote and representation. Inevitably, any change in the method of
election does so. 3 Instead, it is necessary to also ask if proportional
29. See infra Part IV; Tyranny of the Judiciary, supra note 13, at 461-62.
30. Id. at 462. For an extended discussion of the role of the courts in protecting mi-
norities from the tyranny of the majority, see Id.
31. See infra Part II.
32. See infra Part III.
33. See infra PartV
34. The most obvious manner in which the constitutional model of consent was
defective was through the disenfranchisement of Blacks, women, men without property,
and Indians. See infra notes 282-86 and accompanying text.
35. Cf HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN,THE CONCEPT Or REPRESENTATION 10 (1967) ("[Tihe
single, basic meaning of representation will have very different applications depending on
what is being made present or considered present, and in what circumstances.").
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methods of representation modify the traditional meaning of consent in
such a fundamental manner that American "democracy" itself is redefined.
The article answers this question by concluding that some forms of
proportional representation may be reconciled with our conception of
representation, particularly in local government. At the same time,
however, alternative voting systems appear to be less well suited for
statewide political offices such as legislators and congressional
Representatives. Changes to our political system should not be taken
lightly. Nevertheless, some modifications to consent through proportional
models may be desirable and even necessary to provide continued vitality
to our Government and meaningful access to the ballot for minority
voters.
II. GEOGRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION: CONSENT
DEFINED BY TREES OR ACRES
Geographical representation occupies a preeminent position in how
Americans define democracy. Under a purely "corporate" system of repre-
sentation, consent is obtained not from individuals but instead from
representatives speaking for groups of persons whose political interests are
viewed as coterminous with the areas where they live.3 6 This feature of our
governmental landscape evokes a pastoral scene in which the political inter-
ests of citizens are indistinguishable from the geography of the areas that are
represented. Far too often, though, the tranquil picture has proven to be a
mirage. Throughout our history, territorial representation has been used not
to advance, but to thwart, the principle that government derive its "just
powers from the consent of the governed.'' 37 The following discussion
shows that while the United States technically has moved away from a
purely corporate method of representation, the so-called "objective" dis-
tricting criteria used by redistricting bodies and scrutinized by the courts
often renders this change of little consequence.
A. Geographical Representation: The Early American Framework
Geographical representation traces its origins to England and other
western cultures." England derived its territorial method of representation
36. See generally ROSEMAUE ZAGARRI, THE POLITICS OF SIZE: REPRESENTATION IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1776-1850, at 37-38 (1987) ("The corporate method of representation
presumed that physical proximity generated communal sentiment. Each geographic unit
was thought to be an organic, cohesive community, whose residents knew one another,
held common values, and shared compatible economic interests.").
37. THE DECLARATION OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
38. Medieval assembles in Europe initially were composed of representatives selected
by rank, status, or class, but gradually drew their members from towns or other settled
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from a feudal system in which members of the king's assembly included
townsmen and lords who represented themselves and the vassals who were
tied to their lands.39 As England evolved into a constitutional monarchy, it
developed a bicameral legislature in which members of the House of Lords
continued to represent class interests and representatives of the House of
Commons were chosen to represent the people from towns and boroughs.-°
Together, the king and members of Parliament were said to express the
collective consent of the nation.41 This form of "universal representation"
was used to explain how even persons who were not permitted to elect
representatives by geography, such as the American colonists, nevertheless
were represented as if they actually had given their consent to be
governed. 2
The British system of geographical representation subsequently was
brought to the American colonies. 43 Virginia elected the first legislative
assembly in America in 1619, with its House of Burgesses comprised of
members who "came from and represented various plantations, towns, and
areas of the colony"" The other colonial assemblies also relied on territorial
representation.45 By 1790, each of the original thirteen states elected
members of their legislatures on the basis of geography. Six states elected
their legislators entirely by either county or town.46 Six states chose their
areas. Kenneth C. Martis, Districts, in 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED STATES CON-
GRESS 651 (Donald C. Bacon et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA].
Representation solely on the basis of geographic place first was used in the kingdoms of
Aragon and Castile in the twelfth century, when representatives to the crown were selected
by town. KENNETH C. MARTIS, THE HIsTORIcAL ATLAs OF UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL
DISTRICTS, 1789-1983 2 (1982) [hereinafter HISTORICAL ATLAS].
39. HisTORICAl ATLAs, supra note 38, at 2.
40. Id.
41. BERNARD BAILYN,THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 163-
64, 166 (1967);JOHN PHILLIP REID,THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 26 (1989).
42. REID, supra note 41, at 79-82. "Universal representation" was tied closely to the
concept of "virtual representation' whereby interests and not individuals were represented,
"and as legislators were to reflect not the political wishes but the interests of their electors,
all who shared those interests were virtually represented." Id. at 57-58. See Tyranny of the
Judiciary, supra note 13, at 459-61. On the other hand, the absence of actual representation
deprived American colonials of the right to give instructions and petition their grievances.
See infra notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
43. HISTORIcAL ATLAS, supra note 38, at 2.
44. Id.
45. Id.; ZAGARRI, supra note 36, at 37.
46. Four states elected legislators by county alone: Delaware, with three Senators and
seven Representatives per county; Georgia, with one Senator and two to five Representa-
tives per county; New Jersey, with one member of the legislative council and three
members of the Assembly per county; and North Carolina, with one "Representative"
(Senator) and two Representatives per county. ROBERT G. DIXON,JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRE-
SENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 62-63 (1968). Rhode Island elected
its legislators by town alone, with one Assistant and between two and six Representatives
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legislators through a combination of Representatives elected by county or
town and Senators elected by district. 7 Connecticut elected up to two
Representatives from each town, with twelve Assistants (Senators) elected
at-large.18  The colonial experience firmly entrenched the use of
representation by place at the local level.
The Constitutional Framers also relied upon geographical representa-
tion as the touchstone for obtaining consent of "the people" for the new
federal government. 49 The "Connecticut Plan" or "Great Compromise" s°
used geography to choose members of both Houses of Congress: two Sena-
tors were to be elected from each state indirectly by the people through
their state legislatures;"1 and Representatives were to be "apportioned
among the several States ... according to their respective Numbers"52 and
elected directly by the people through popular elections. 3 Although the
per town. Id. South Carolina elected legislators by parish alone, with Charleston receiving
two Senators and fifteen Representatives and other parishes receiving one to three repre-
sentatives and one or two Senators either by themselves or in combination with other
parishes. Id.
47. Three states based representation on the number of taxable residents: Massachu-
setts and New Hampshire, elected their Representatives by town based upon ratable polls
and Senators by districts apportioned as to taxes paid; Pennsylvania elected Representatives
on the basis of taxable inhabitants with each county and Philadelphia to have at least one
Representative, and elected Senators from districts containing as many as four Senators. Id.
Maryland elected four Delegates per county plus two each from Annapolis and Baltimore,
with nine Senators chosen by electors from the Western Shore and six Senators chosen by
electors from the Eastern Shore. Id. New York elected seventy Representatives appor-
tioned every seven years by county on a voter basis, and twenty-four freeholders elected
from four districts apportioned every seven years on a freeholder basis. Id. Virginia elected
two Representatives per county and one each from Williamsburgh, Norfolk, and other
cities established by the Legislature, and elected Senators from twenty-four districts. Id.
48. Id.
49. "The 'consent of the governed' is ... a people-based concept." Id. at 16. Of course,
"the people" who have been eligible to give or withhold their consent has varied consid-
erably over time. See infra notes 282-86 and accompanying text.
50. The "Great Compromise' proposed by Roger Sherman of Connecticut, appeased
the large states by establishing proportional representation in the House of Representatives
based upon each state's total population and satisfied the small states by allocating each
state two seats in the Senate. CATsIERIE D. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 92-95, 185-
87 (1966). See also JAMES MADISON, ThE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVErION OF 1787
WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERIcA 84,88-89 (Gaillard
Hunt & James B. Scott eds., 1970) (1920) (June 11, 1787) (statement of Roger Sherman);
Id. at 254 (July 14, 1787) (statement of Roger Sherman); Id. at 259-60 (July 16, 1787)
(final passage).
51. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. .Voters could not elect Senators directly until 1913,
when the present at-large method of statewide elections was adopted. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XVII, cl. 1.
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
53. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. See also FEDERALIST No. 39, supra note 25, at 242
(James Madison) ("The House of Representatives, like that of one branch at least of all the
State legislatures, is elected immediately by the great body of the people.").
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Constitution does not require that members of the House represent "indi-
vidual, geographically defined districts" scholars generally agree that the
Constitutional Framers intended that Representatives be elected from dis-
tricts.14 This conclusion is supported both by the limited debate during the
Constitutional Convention over the method of electing Representatives,-"
as well as the subsequent writings of Federalists 6 and Anti-Federalists on the
subject.
5 7
54. ZAGARRI, supra note 36, at 107; HISTORICAL ATLAS, supra note 38, at 2; CONGRES-
SIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 38, at 652.
55. See generally 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEWrION or 1787, at 48-49
(Max Farrand rev. ed. 1966) (May 31, 1787) (George Mason) (suggesting that election of
"the larger branch by the people ... ought ... to be taken not only from different parts of
the whole republic, but also from different districts of the larger members of it, which had
in several interests ... different interests and views arising from difference of produce, of
habits," and so forth); Id. at 132-33 (June 6, 1787) (James Wilson) ("There is no danger of
improper elections if made by large districts. Bad elections proceed from the smallness of
the districts which give an opportunity to bad men to intrigue themselves into office.")
(emphasis in original); Id. at 179-80 (June 9, 1787) (James Wilson) (arguing that
"Representatives of different districts ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each
other, as their respective constituencies hold to each other"). Mason and Wilson made
similar arguments in their unsuccessful attempt to have Senators elected directly by the
people through districts. See id. at 134 (June 6, 1787) (Col. Mason) (maintaining that
"there was a better chance for proper elections by the people, if divided into large districts,
than by the State Legislatures"); Id. at 154 (June 7, 1787) (James Wilson) (supporting "an
election by the people in large districts which [would] be most likely to obtain men of
intelligence [and] uprightness; subdividing the districts only for the accommodation of
voters"). See also THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION:A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
26 (Michael Kammen ed., 1986) [hereinafter ORIGINS] (plan proposed by Charles
Pinckney to elect the Senate from "four great districts"); Id. at 37 (plan proposed by
Alexander Hamilton to have Senators chosen by electors of the people after the States
were "divided into election districts").
56. James Madison described how "each representative of the United States will be
elected by five or six thousand citizens," pointing to legislative districts in several states as
examples of how geographical representation would operate at the federal level. ThE FED-
ERALIST No. 57, supra note 25, at 354-56 (James Madison). For instance, "districts in New
Hampshire in which the senators are chosen ... are nearly as large as will be necessary for
her representatives in the Congress?' Id. at 356. Similarly, Madison concluded that Phila-
delphia "is supposed to contain between fifty and sixty thousand souls. It will therefore
form nearly two districts for the choice of federal representatives?' Id. Moreover, according
to Madison, districting was consistent with the belief that a representative elected from a
geographical area with a smaller number of people would be sufficiently familiar with his
constituents' interests to represent them adequately. See ThE FEDERALIST No. 56, supra note
25, at 347-48 (James Madison) ("Divide the largest State into ten or twelve districts and it
will be found that there will be no peculiar local interests in either which will not be
within the knowledge of the representative of the district."). See also infra part III (describ-
ing the relationship between representatives and their constituents).
57. For example, two well-known Anti-Federalist pieces criticized Article I, Section 4
of the Constitution, which permits Congress to regulate the elections of its members,
suggesting instead that the Constitution require elections of Representatives from districts.
See generally OBSERVATIONS LEADING TO A FAIR EXAMINATION O THE SYSTEM OF
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While the Constitutional Framers and states were advocating use of
geographically based districts, there was a growing movement away from
the accepted rationale for territorial representation. Westward expansion
and the growth of large cities weakened the basis for identifying the inter-
ests of represented persons with those of others who resided in the same
area."8 "[G]eographic units, such as counties and towns, came to be seen
more as random collections of individuals than as cohesive communities,"
with districts "'merely an arrangement for the general convenience" not
political communities with a life of their own." 9 States could account for
the increasingly transient nature of the American population by shifting
districts with the people, regardless of whether or not they shared com-
mon interests. In this manner, it was possible to avoid the "unequal, unfair,
and unrepublican" problem of "rotten boroughs" that existed in Great
Britain under a pure form of territorial representation. 6° Even with "shift-
GOVERNMENT PROPOSED BY THE LATE CONVENTION; AND TO SEVERAL ESSENTIAL AND
NECESSARY ALTERATIONS IN IT. IN A NUMBER OF LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO
THE REPUBLICAN (New York, 1787) [hereinafter FEDERAL FARMER LETTERS], reprinted in
ORIGINS, supra note 55, at 276-77 ("where the elections ought to be regulated, otherwise
to secure a representation from all parts of the community, in making the constitution, we
ought to provide for dividing each state into a proper number of districts, and for
confining the electors in each district to the choice of some men, who shall have a
permanent interest and residence in it"); Essays of "Brutus" to the Citizens of the State of
New-York, NEW YORK JOURNAL (Oct. 18, 1787-April 10, 1788) [hereinafter Essays of
"Brutus'], reprinted in ORIGINS, supra note 55, at 330 ("Provision should have been made
for marking out the states into districts, and for choosing, by a majority of votes, a person
out of each of them of permanent property and residence in the district which he was to
represent.").
58. See ZAGARRI, supra note 36, at 57-60.
59. Id. at 58 (quoting South Carolina State Representative Joseph Alston) (emphasis
in original). See also id. ("The people of New-Jersey, and not the counties, were designed to
be represented in the legislature.") (quoting William Griffith of New Jersey) (emphasis in
original). James Wilson's criticism of allocating each state an equal number of Senators
without regard to population, used similar language: "Can we forget for whom we are
forming a Government? Is it for men, or for the imaginary beings called States?" 1 Farrand,
supra note 55, at 483 (emphasis in original).
60. ZAGARRI, supra note 36, at 36-37. Unfettered corporate representation in Great
Britain without regard for the population of represented places allowed "rotten boroughs"
such as Old Sarum, with few inhabitants, to have as much parliamentary representation as
Yorkshire, with nearly one million people. Id. at 37; P.J. TAYLOR & R.J. JOHNSTON, GEOGRA-
PHY OF ELECTIONS 30 (1979); R.ICHARD L. MORRILL, POLITICAL REDISTRICTING AND
GEOGRAPHIC THEORY 342-44 (1981) [hereinafter POLITICAL REDISTRICTING]. The Con-
stitutional Framers sought to avoid similar problems in the new American republic by
adjusting representation periodically to account for population changes. See U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives ... shall be apportioned among the several States ...
according to their respective Numbers:' with decennial reapportionment and Represen-
tatives who "shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand"); THE FEDERALIST No. 56,
supra note 25, at 346-50 (James Madison) (contrasting the American and British meth-
ods of allocating representatives). See also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
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ing districts," however, representation remained grounded in geography,
but for different reasons.
B. Geographical Representation: The Rise of Political Gerrymandering
Districts could remedy population inequalities, 6 but their departure
from the categorical use of representation by permanent geographical
boundaries left legislative bodies without a principled method of allocat-
ing representatives. 62 If geographically based districts were "merely
arbitrary groupings of individuals" '63 then the contours of those districts
could be manipulated for political ends. Use of single-member districts
allowed the "normal majority party bias" to be "exaggerated by conscious
partisan line skewing.'"6 4 As a result, gerrymandering became widely prac-
ticed.65 An early example of gerrymandering occurred inVirginia in 1788,
when the Anti-Federalist majority in the Virginia assembly placed
Federalist James Madison's home county into a predominately Anti-
Federalist district in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent his election to
AMERICAN PEPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 170-72 (WW Norton & Co. 1972) (1969) (describ-
ing efforts in several states to ensure equal proportions of representatives).
61. Some scholars argue that the Framers intended geographical districts to be ap-
proximately equal in population. See ANDREW HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING: THE
ISSUE OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 5-14 (rev. ed. 1964); see generally ZAGARRI, supra note 36.
See also supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text (describing constitutional provisions and
support among the Constitutional Framers for districts of equal population). However, the
actual practices in the states frequently resulted in severely malapportioned districts that
were not corrected until the "one person, one vote" cases of the 1960s. See infra notes 97-
102 and accompanying text.
62. Political scientists have referred to this as the "districting problem:' in which "for a
single pattern of votes there will be several alternative election results in terms of seats, depend-
ing upon how constituency boundaries are drawn" TAYLOR & JOHNSTON, supra note 60, at 336.
See also PeterJ.Taylor et al., The Geography of Representation:A Review of Recent Findings, in ELEc-
TORAL LAWS AND TEIR POLMCAL CONSEQUENCES 183-92 (Bernard Grofinan & Arend Lijphart
eds., 1986) [hereinafter ELECTORAL LAWS] (summarizing the different effects of district bounda-
ries on the number of seats won by a party).
63. ZAGARRI, supra note 36, at 59.
64. DIXoN, supra note 46, at 462.
65. See ELMER C. GRI*frr-, THE RiSE AND DEvaoPMENT OF THE GERRYMANDER (Arno
Press 1974) (1907).The rise of political gerrymandering generally is attributed to the creation of
an irregular district in Essex County, Massachusetts in 1812, that was signed into law by Gover-
nor Elbridge Gerry. See, e.g., TAYLOR & JOHNSTON, supra note 60, at 30, 371-72; RICHARD L.
MOmLL, POLITICAL REDISTRICTING AND GEOGRAPHIC TmoRY 11 (1981) [hereinafter PoLrcAL
REDISTRICTING]; Frank R. Parker, Racial Gerrymandering and Legislative Reapportionment, in Mi-
NORrrYVOTE DILUTION, supra note 12, at 85. However, there is some evidence that districting for
partisan advantage was used as early as 1732 in North Carolina, when the governor split pre-
cincts in order to gain control of the colony's lower house. See GRIFFrTH, supra, at 28-29, 121.
Furthermore, even the customary selection of representatives from counties and towns during
the colonial period was not immune from the excesses of gerrymandering. As county and
township lines were created and adjusted to follow settlers, the lines frequently were manipu-
lated by colonial legislatures for partisan ends. See id. at 23-29.
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district in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent his election to Congress. It
soon became apparent that single-member districts lent themselves to
electoral abuses that were just as inconsistent with securing the consent of
the governed as purely geographical methods of representation.
67
The winner-take-all feature of American elections replicated the
"same bias in multi-member districts" which could be "exaggerated by
increasing the number of legislators elected in each district, e.g., use of
six-member districts, or higher, rather than two-member districts."6  Early
congressional districting practices in the states demonstrate the problems
created by multimember districts.
Many states used "general-ticket representation" or a single statewide
district to elect multiple members of the House of Representatives. 69 Under
a system of "general-ticket representation" all eligible voters in a state elect
the entire congressional delegation. 0 General-ticket elections were common
until well into the twentieth century, when they primarily were used on a
temporary basis for three reasons: (1) newly admitted states, (2) states with
only two or three representatives, and (3) states that lost representatives after
a decennial census and whose legislatures could not convene or agree upon
a new districting plan.71 Federal law still seems to permit the use of general-
ticket representation under certain circumstances until a state is redistricted
following a decennial reapportionment.72
Other states had election systems for Representatives that were at
least partially based upon geographical representation, including "at-large
66. GaIFFIT , supra note 65, at 31-42; ZAGtAcm, supra note 36, at 122.
67. Shortly after the creation of the Essex County district from which the term "gerry-
mander" originated, a local newspaper referred to the party leaders responsible for the district
and asked, "Would not such persons as readily profit by rotten boroughs as ever any British
minister did?" GRiFr, supra note 65, at 9.
68. DIXON, supra note 46, at 462-63. See also infra notes 304-38 and accompanying text
(describing winner-take-all rules).
69. HIsTOIucAL ATLAS, supra note 38, at 2. During the first fifty years under the Constitu-
tion, general-ticket elections were used for the election of an average often to twenty percent
of all Representatives, with the zenith coming in the Third Congress, when 33 out of 105
members from six states were elected by general-ticket. CONGRESSIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra
note 38, at 652. See also HIsTosucAI ATLAS, supra note 38, at 4-5 (listing states using general-
ticket method). Small states usually used the general-ticket method because their representatives
typically came from the same party and were more unified than representatives elected from
politically fractured large states, giving the small states more political clout in Congress. See ZA-
GARRI, supra note 36, at 126-27.
70. HIsTORicAL ATLAS, supra note 38, at 2.
71. See ZAGARI, supra note 36, at 4.
72. See 2 U.S.C. § 2a (1994). However, at least one federal court in a decision affirmed by
the Supreme Court has concluded that the more recently enacted Apportionment Act of 1967,
2 U.S.C. § 2c, demonstrates congressional intent to eliminate all uses of at-large congressional
elections, even where a state fails to reapportion its districts. See Shayer v. Kirkpatrick, 541 F
Supp. 922,926 (WD. Mo. 1982), affd sub nom. Schatzle v. Kirkpatrick, 456 U.S. 966 (1982).
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representation"7 3 and "plural district representation." 74 Each of these
methods of election often were used not to effectuate representation by
place or to achieve equal population, but instead were manipulated to
deny the consent of disfavored political groups.7- For example, general-
ticket representation could negate political opportunities for minority
parties that had sufficient power to be competitive in single-member
districts by allowing a majority party to win most, if not all, seats through
a statewide election7 6 In a similar vein, politically powerful cities and
73. "At-large" elections in this context "refers to cases in which the majority of a state
congressional delegation is elected from single-member, geographically defined districts but one,
two, three, or four additional representatives are elected statewide" CONGRESSIONAI ENCYCLOPE-
DIA, supra note 38, at 652. At-large representation therefore differs from general-ticket
representation because in the former system at least some Representatives are elected from
districts. Id. Mississippi was the first state to use the at-large system, with voters statewide elect-
ing one of its five Representatives to the 33rd Congress (1853-1855). HsromcL ATLAs, supra
note 38, at 5.The practice typically was used on a temporary basis and was included in many
federal apportionment laws beginning with the Apportionment Act of February 2, 1872, 17
Stat. 28, until Maryland, Ohio, and Texas elected the last three at-large Representatives to the
89th Congress in 1965. See id. at 6.At-large elections "usually occurred when the state legisla-
ture either (1) could not convene in time to perform redistricting, (2) could not agree on a new
redistricting plan, (3) used this representative method in its new redistricting plan, or (4) decided
not to redistrict: CONGREssION. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 38, at 652.
74. "Plural district representation or "multimember" representation occurs when a "geo-
graphically defined district elects more than one person" CONGRESSiONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra
note 38, at 652. "In most cases this was an attempt to keep the county unit as the entity of legal
description and yet recognize the more populous areas that deserved greater representation' and
was particularly useful in states with large urban areas and "vast areas of virtual wilderness."
HisTomlcA ATLAs, supra note 38, at 4. This method of election was used for the first time
in the Third Congress (1793-1795), when Massachusetts used multimember districts for
the only time to elect 13 out of its 14 Representatives. Id. at 4-5. New Jersey used plural
representation once during the Twelfth Congress (1811-1813) to elect all six of its Repre-
sentatives. Id. at 5. Maryland elected two Representatives from a multimember district in
every election except one between 1803 and 1843. Id. Pennsylvania used the method
extensively between 1795 and 1843, electing as few as two and as many as fourteen Rep-
resentatives from multimember districts. Id. Between 1805 and 1843, New York used
plural districts to elect as few as two and as many as twelve of its Representatives. Id.
75. New Jersey's use of general-ticket representation for its congressional elections
illustrates how a party could attempt to manipulate the method of election for its own
political ends. In 1796, a general-ticket election resulted in the majority Federalist Party
winning all five congressional seats despite the presence of a large minority Republican
Party. See ZAGAmR, supra note 36, at 115-16, 126. In 1798, the Federalists feared the grow-
ing power of the Republican Party and pushed through a gerrymandered plan of five
single-member districts, resulting in the election of only two Federalists. Id. In 1800, the
Federalists restored general-ticket elections, but all five congressional seats went to Repub-
licans, who had become the majority party. Id.
76. HismTOIC ATLAs, supra note 38, at 2; CONGIassxoNtA. ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 38,
at 652; DIxoN, supra note 46, at 17. Similar reasoning applies to the use of at-large repre-
sentation. See CoNGRtEssio, L ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 38, at 652-53; HIsTOICA ATLAS,
supra note 38, at 5. One example illustrates this point. Although fewer than one thousand
votes separated the top Democrat from the lowest Republican in New Jersey's six
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counties abused plural district representation by creating multimember
districts that diluted the political strength of other areas which otherwise
had a sufficient population to elect a representative from their own single-
member district.
77
Congress initially was unable to pass legislation to end these anti-
democratic impulses. Although Congress has authority to mandate
districting through its powers to regulate the election of its members
under the Times, Places and Manner Clause,7 it failed to do so during the
first fifty years after the Constitution was ratified. 9 To a minimal degree,
congressional inaction reflected deference given to the policy choices of
the state legislatures.' Political considerations were even more important.
Beginning in 1800, large states sought to impose the "more fair and
congressional seats in the 1832 and 1834 elections, the Democrats won all of the seats
under the state's general-ticket method of election. See Robert Richie, Full Representation:
The Future of Proportional Election Systems, 87 NAT'L CIVIC Rav. 85, 91 (1998).This was the
very sort of political manipulation that Ant-Federalists had feared when the Constitutional
Framers failed to include a specific requirement for elections from single-member districts.
See FEDERAL FARMER LETTERS, supra note 57, at 276-77; Essays of "Brutus" supra note 57, at
329-31. See also ORGINS, supra note 55 (describing Anti-Federalist support for single-
member districts).
77. HisTORicAL ATLAS, supra note 38, at 4; CoNGRassioL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 38,
at 652.
78. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elec-
tions for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof, but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such regulations, except as
to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators."). One commentator has concluded that Congress
has no authority to "commandeer" the states into using single-member districts under the
Times, Places, and Manner Clause. See Paul E. McGreal, Unconstitutional Politics, 76 NOTRE
DAME L. RE. 519 (2001). Professor McGreal's conclusion is undermined by evidence
showing the Framers' clear intent for districts to be used to elect Representatives. See supra
notes 55-57 and accompanying text. See also supra note 58 (describing Anti-Federalist
arguments against ratification of the Constitution because the Times, Places and Manner
Clause gave Congress authority to mandate the type of federal elections held by the
states). The political circumstances preventing the adoption and enforcement of federal
districting requirements renders his reliance on the failure of Congress to require single-
member districts prior to 1842 of little utility in evaluating the constitutionality of those
requirements. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
79. The first five Apportionment Acts adopted after ratification of the Constitution
did not require use of single-member districts for congressional elections. See Apportion-
ment Act of Apr. 14, 1792, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 253;Apportionment Act of Jan. 14,1802, ch. 1, 2
Stat. 128; Apportionment Act of Dec. 21, 1811, ch. 9, 2 Stat. 669; Apportionment Act of
Mar. 7, 1822, ch. 10, 3 Stat. 651;Apportionment Act of May 22, 1832, ch. 91, 4 Stat. 516.
Each of these laws only provided for the size of the House of Representatives and appor-
tionment based upon a system of fixed ratios with rejected fractions. See HIsToRICAL ATLAS,
supra note 38, at 7.
80. See generally ZAGAM, supra note 36, at 106 ("Whether the electors should vote by
ballot or viva voce, should assemble at this place or that place; should be divided into dis-
tricts or all meet at one place, shd. all vote for all the representatives; or all in a district vote




equitable" requirement of uniform single-member districting for elections
of federal Representatives."' Small states, using general-ticket and at-large
elections to wield undue political power, repeatedly rebuffed large states'
attempts to impose the fair and equitable requirement. 2 Electoral abuses
present in the states were replicated in the halls of Congress.
C. Geographical Representation: Attempts to
Reform Discriminatory Districting Practices
In 1842, the changing political tide permitted the first federal dis-
tricting requirements to be adopted. The Whigs were concerned that
continued use of general-ticket representation would cost them their
majority in both Houses of Congress in the upcoming elections.1
3
Likewise, many of the small states supported use of single-member dis-
tricts when it became apparent that the large states might adopt the
general-ticket method at their expense. 4 The resulting legislation, the
Apportionment Act of 1842, for the first time specified that states use
geographically based, contiguous,"' single-member districts for congres-
sional elections .6 Despite the Act's mandate to provide "fairer
81. Id. at 128.
82. See id. at 128-29 (noting that at least thirty-six resolutions to abolish at-large
elections were introduced between 1800 and 1826, but small states successfully blocked
their passage to maintain their enhanced political power).
83. See McGreal, supra note 78, at 607-09. In 1840, Democrats in Alabama switched
from district to general-ticket elections because they believed it would allow them to elect
most, if not all, of the State's representatives to Congress. ZAGARRI, supra note 36, at 131.The
Whigs feared that a Democratic sweep under statewide elections Alabama would cost them
their majority in the House. See id. In the 1842 and 1843 congressional elections, the Whigs
still ended up losing over one third of their congressional seats after Democratic controlled
legislatures and Democratic Governors drew single-member districts that favored their own
party. See McGreal, supra note 78, at 618-19.
84. McGreal, supra note 78, at 610; ZAGARRI, supra note 36, at 131-32.
85. "Contiguity" requires "[a]U parts of a district being connected at some point with
the rest of the district" BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 3, at 157. The contiguity requirement
adopted in the Apportionment Act of 1842 was intended to reduce the number of districts
with "geographically separate portions" CONGREssioNAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 38, at 653.
86. See generally Apportionment Act of June 25, 1842, ch. 47, § 2, 5 Stat. 491, 491 (cur-
rent version at 2 U.S.C. 5 2c (1994)) (providing that "in every case where a State is entitled to
more than one Representative, the number to which each State shall be entitled ... shall be
elected by districts composed of contiguous territory equal in number to the number of
Representatives to which said State may be entitled, no one district electing more than one
Representative ").
The single-member district requirement was not renewed in 1850. See Apportion-
ment Act of May 23, 1850, ch. 11, § 24-26, 9 Star. 428, 432-33;Act ofJuly 30, 1852, ch. 74,
10 Stat. 25.The requirement reappeared in the Apportionment Act ofJuly 14, 1862, ch. 170,
12 Stat. 572, and other apportionment laws prior to 1929. See HISTOIcAL ATIAS, supra note
38, at 5-6.
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representation and a chance for the minority"' 7 through single-member
districts, some states still used general-ticket and at-large representation
for their congressional delegations."8 These practices were not ended
effectively until 1967, when the current districting law was adopted.
8 9
Congress later included two additional limitations on purely geo-
graphical methods of districting that had been subject to widespread abuse.
In 1872, it prescribed that each district contain "as nearly as practicable an
equal number of inhabitants."'0 In 1901, federal legislation directed districts
to be comprised of "compact territory."91 To meet these requirements, states
continued to use geographic political units such as counties or towns as the
"basic building block" of compact congressional districts.92 Some larger,
more urban states also relied on other political features such as wards or
man-made features including streets to achieve population equality.93 In the
end, however, legislating specific redistricting criteria for congressional elec-
tions did not end gerrymandering,94 and actually may have increased it.9s At
least one scholar has posited that the Apportionment Act of 1842 may have
been responsible for increasing gerrymandering by compelling states that
previously used the general-ticket or at-large methods of election to switch
to single-member districts that were susceptible to the practice of gerry-
mandering.
87. GRIFFITH, supra note 65, at 10 (citation omitted).
88. See HIsTORicAL ATLAs, supra note 38, at 4-6 (describing the persistent use of at-large
and general ticket representation). Although these practices plainly violated federal law, Con-
gress continued to seat representatives elected from the offending states after election contests
regularly failed by partisan votes. See McGreal, supra note 78, at 618-30.
89. Act of Dec. 14, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-196, 81 Stat. 581 (codified as amended at 2
U.S.C. § 2c) (providing that "there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to
the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled, and Representatives shall be
elected only from districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative").
90. Apportionment Act of Feb. 2, 1872, ch. 11, § 2, 17 Stat. 28, 28 (current version at 2
U.S.C. 5 2c (1994)).
91. Apportionment Act ofJan. 16, 1901, ch. 93, § 3, 31 Stat. 733, 734 (current version at
2 U.S.C. § 2c (1994)).The compactness requirement "targeted the practice of gerrymander-
ing, that is, the drawing of congressional districts with odd or peculiar shapes, so as to favor
the party or group in power, with results that seem to defy geography." CoNGRssioNA EN-
CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 38, at 653. See also BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 3, at 157
("Compactness is seen as one of the main defenses against gerrymandering."). Compactness
was not required after passage of the Apportionment Act of June 18, 1929, 46 Stat. 21. See
HisTORicAL ATLAs, supra note 38, at 7.
92. See HIsTonic ATLAs, supra note 38, at 6.
93. Id. at 6-7.
94. The McKinley districts in Ohio that were created between 1878 and 1890 as a re-
stlt of largely unsuccessful efforts to defeat then-Representative (and later President) William
McKinley are a good example of how it still was possible to gerrymander a compact and
contiguous district that complied with the requirements of the Apportionment Act of 1842.
TAYLOR & JOHNSTON, supra note 60, at 372,374.
95. See GRIFFTI, supra note 65, at 12; see also supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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Gerrymandering abuses were confounded further by the limited
use of reapportionment to address changing populations in districts. At
the federal level, the failure of Congress to renew the mandate of equal
population, districting, compactness, and contiguity in the Apportion-
ment Act of 192996 allowed the states to return to a system of unbridled
geographical representation for election of members of the House of
Representatives. 9 7 Similar problems existed in the state legislatures, where
rural areas increasingly were unwilling to give up their political power to
the growing cities. 98 Omitting population as part of the basis for geographi-
cal districting led to two results that violated the basic principle of consent.
The first defect was the same problem that could be created by general-
ticket, at-large, and plural district representation: 99 "majority tyranny,
whereby a majority group gives itself disproportionate voting power in
both the general election and the legislative body at the expense of the mi-
nority group' 10° The second defect was "minority tyranny, whereby a
minority group has disproportionate voting power--sometimes as high as
one hundred times the voting power of other voters--allowing the minor-
ity group to elect a majority of representatives in the general election and
to control the legislature.' °10
96. Apportionment Act of June 18, 1929, ch. 28, 46 Stat. 21. In Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S.
1, 7-8 (1932), the Supreme Court held that the districting criteria from legislation predating
the Apportionment Act of 1929 had lapsed. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788,791-
92 (1992) (describing the legislative history of the 1929 Act).
97. By 1960, half of the 42 states with at least two Representatives contained districts in
which the voting power of a citizen in the smallest district was at least twice as great as the
voting power of a citizen in the largest district. HACKER, supra note 61, at 2-3. Michigan had the
greatest population deviation with 802,994 people in the 16th Congressional District, more
than four and a half times the voting power of the 177,431 people in the 12th Congressional
District. Id. at 1.
98. See CHARLES W EAGLES, DEMocRAcY DELAYED: CONGRESSIONAL REAPPORTIONMENT
AND URBAN-RuRAL CoNLIcT IN THE 1920s (1990); RICHARD C. CORTNER,TE APPoRONMENT
CASES 3 (1970). By 1955, equal population alone formed the basis for representation in the
upper chambers of twenty-two states and in the lower houses of twelve states. Id. at 4.
99. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
100. Tyranny of the Judiciary, supra note 13, at 513.
101. Id. For example, the Alabama districts invalidated by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 550, 575 (1964), allowed just twelve percent of the population to elect a
majority to the lower house and thirty-two percent of the population to elect a majority to the
upper house, with a ratio between the most-favored and least-favored citizen of 424 to 1.
HACKER, supra note 61, at 44-46. In 1962, New Hampshire and Vermont had been last redis-
tricted prior to 1900, leading to ratios between the smallest and largest populated districts of
1,081.3 to 1 and 987 to 1, respectively. See id. at 23. See also Gordon E. Baker, Whatever Hap-
pened to the Reapportionment Revolution in the United States?, in ELECTORAL LAWS, supra note 62, at
258 (citing additional statistical evidence of substantial population disparities between rural and
urban areas).
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In Baker v. Carr '2 and its progeny,"3 the Supreme Court entered the
"political thicket' ' .4 to address the inequities of malapportioned districts.
The Court relied on the principle of"one person, one vote": 0 1 the right of
each individual to an equally weighted vote.10 6 A majority of the Court ex-
plained in Reynolds v. Sims 0 7 that "l] egislators represent people, not trees or
acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic in-
terests," with legislatures serving as "instruments of government elected
directly by and directly representative of the people. "'0 However, the
Court's characterization is somewhat misleading. Baker and the other "one
person, one vote" cases did not repudiate group-based geographical repre-
sentation."° Rather, those cases merely rejected strict geographic districting
of communities and regions without regard to population, which resulted
in malapportioned districts that denied citizens of their right to "fair and
effective representation." '"0 In this respect, the equal population principle in
Baker is consistent with the intent of at least some of our
102. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
103. See, e.g., Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989) (applying one person, one vote
to NewYork City's Board of Estimates, comprised of elected presidents from the city's five bor-
oughs, which had disparate populations, and three city officials elected at-large); Hadley v.Junior
Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (applying one person, one vote to local government apportion-
ment of administrative body); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (applying one
person, one vote to local government apportionment of legislative body); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at
534 (applying one person, one vote to state legislative districts); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964) (applying one person, one vote to congressional districting).
104. Colegrove v. Green, 328 US. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion). See also Reynolds,
377 U.S. at 556, 566 (citing Robert B. McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Reapportion-
ment and Equal Protection, 61 MICH. L. REv. 645 (1963)).
105. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (striking down Georgia's county-unit
system as unconstitutional and ordering the use of one person, one vote system).
106. The Court has required that "as nearly as is practicable one man's vote ... is to be
worth as much as another's" in congressional districts, Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7-8, with even "de
minimis level of population differences" requiring a sufficient justification. Karcher v. Daggett,
462 U.S. 725, 731 (1983) (upholding the concept that absolute population equality remain
the utmost objective in reapportionment cases). State legislative districts follow a more leni-
ent "substantially equal" standard, Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568, permitting total variations from
an "ideal" district as high as 16.4%. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 319 (1973). But
see,Conner v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977) (holding that state legislature districts are still sub-
ject to the one person, one vote rule and reapportionment and probably will be struck
down it the derivations exceed 10%).
107. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
108. Id. at 562.
109. See Tyranny of theJudiciary, supra note 13, at 507-13.
110. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565-66; see also id. at 562 (describing population disparities
among districts whereby "the votes of citizens in one part of the State would be multiplied
by two, five, or 10 times while the votes of persons in another area would be counted only at
face value, could be constitutionally sustainable.").
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constitutional framers. 1 ' Conversely, to the extent that legislators in this
country have been elected by "the people" those voters have been grouped
together by their geography and political affiliations and not their individual
interests.
12
The Supreme Court's elevation of group-based geographical criteria
has not been limited to equal population cases. The Court also has relied
upon geographical representation as the touchstone for other alleged
violations of what the majority describes as the individual right to vote."'
For instance, Justice Stevens has suggested that a political gerrymandering
claim requires a showing that the group in question has a "geographical
distribution ... sufficiently ascertainable that it could have been taken into
account in drawing district boundaries."1 14 Similarly, a minority group
111. See supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text. But see Baker, 369 U.S. at 301 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) ("The notion that representation proportioned to the geographic spread
of population is ... 'the basic principle of representative government' is, to put it bluntly, not
true.").
112. See Deconstructing the Obstructionist Vision, supra note 7, at 452-69. The Court has
made its preference for geographical representation explicit by requiring that court-drawn
legislative reapportionment plans utilize single-member districts. See, e.g., Chapman v. Meier,
420 U.S. 1 (1975); Mahan, 410 U.S. at 333; Connor v.Johnson, 402 U.S. 690,692 (1971).
113. See generally Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 917 ("To accept that [a remedial] district may be
placed anywhere implies that the claim, and hence the coordinate right to an undiluted vote
(to cast a ballot equal among voters), belongs to the minority as a group and not to its
individual members. It does not."). But see Miller, 515 U.S. at 947 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("In adopting districting plans ... States do not treat people as individuals. Apportionment
schemes, by their very nature, assemble people in groups. States do not assign voters to
districts based on merit or achievement, standards States might use in hiring employees or
engaging contractors [i.e., individuals]. Rather, legislators classify voters in groups-by
economic, geographical, political, or social characteristics--and then 'reconcile the competing
claims of [these] groups. ") (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 147 (1986))); See also
Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 681-82 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("In districting ... the mere placement of
an individual in one district instead of another denies no one a right or benefit provided to
others .... 'Dilution' ... refers to the effects of districting decisions not on an individual's
political power viewed in isolation, but on the political power of the group); Davis v.
Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 167 (1986) (Powell,J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("The
concept of 'representation' necessarily applies to groups: groups of voters elect representatives,
individual voters do not."). For additional views on the whether the right to vote is an
individual right, group right, or both, see generally Deconstructing the Obstructionist Vision, supra
note 7, at 452-69; Tyranny of the Judidary, supra note 13, at 495-96 n.240.
114. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 754 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Supreme Court recognized a
constitutional claim for political gerrymandering in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 109. How-
ever, the viability of this type of gerrymandering claim is dubious. See generally Badham v. Eu,
694 F Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (three-judge court) (rejecting challenge of California's
1981 congressional redistricting plan by California Republicans because they had not been
"shut out" of the political process in the same manner as racial minorities who suffered dis-
criminatory effects), aff'd, 488 U.S. 1024 (1989). Only one successful Bandemer challenge has
been brought. See Republican Party v. Hunt, 841 E Supp. 722 (E.D.N.C.) (granting prelimi-
nary injunction to Republican party on claim that method of electing state superior court
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alleging vote dilution' 'I in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act'1 6
must "demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single-member district."' 7 The number of
jurisdictions that have departed from at-large systems to single-member
districts has soared as a result of the geographical standard applied to vote
dilution claims."18
Ironically, use of these race-conscious, geographically based districts to
remedy vote dilution actually may enhance the exclusion of minority
groups through gerrymandering susceptible to Shaw challenges." 9 When
majority-minority districts are struck down as violative of Shaw, minorities
may find themselves with less representation under the Court's "race neu-
tral" principles, or, possibly, with no representation at all.
The enduring reliance on geographical representation has led to what
has been described as the "unfinished reapportionment revolution:" a
"reinvigorated dimension of maldistricting [that] can dilute the effective
voting power of some individuals and magnify the real power of others,
depending on their geographic location" 20 Although the mathematical
judges diluted the voting fi-anchise of Republican voters), aff'd as modified, 27 F.3d 563 (4th
Cir. 1994).
115. See generally Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act:A Brief History, in CONTROVER-
siEs IN MINoRIrY VOTING: ThE VOTING RIGHTs ACT IN PERSPECTIVE 24 (Bernard Grofinan &
Chandler Davidson, eds., 1992) ("Ethnic or racial minority vote dilution may be defined as a
process whereby election laws or practices, either singly or in concert, combine with system-
atic bloc voting among an identifiable majority group to diminish or cancel the voting
strength of at least one minority group.").
116. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994) (providing that a denial or abridgement of right to vote "on
account of race or color" is established "if, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is
shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election ... are not equally open
to participation" to members of a protected minority group "in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and
to elect representatives of their choice").
117. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,50 (1986).
118. See, e.g., Arend Liphart & Bernard Grofinan, Choosing an Electoral System, in CHOOS-
ING AN ELEcToRAL SysTEm, supra note 22, at 3, 11 [hereinafter Choosing an Electoral System];
Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofinan, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Minority Representa-
tion: Black Officeholding in Southern State Legislatures and Congressional Delegations, in QuiET
REvoLuroN IN ThE SouTH: TI-E IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTs ACT, 1965-1990, at 344
(Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofinan eds., 1994); Lisa Handley et al., Electing Minority-
Preferred Candidates to Legislative Office: The Relationship Between Minority Percentages in Districts
and the Election of Minority-Preferred Candidates, in RACE AND REDISTICTING IN THE 1990s, at
13-38 (Bernard Grofinan ed., 1998).
119. See Tyranny of the Judiciary, supra note 13, at 575-85; Deconstructing the Obstructionist
Vision, supra note 7, at 462-69.
120. Gordon E. Baker, The Unfinished Reapportionment Revolution, in POLITICAL GERRY-
MANDERING AND THE CouRrs 11, 24 (Bernard Grofinan ed. 1990). Cf Tyranny of the Judiciary,
supra note 13, at 513 ("'one person, one vote' highlights the danger of the courts adopting
inflexible standards. It actually can exaggerate majority factionalism, leading to majority tyr-
anny in another form: the equipopulous gerrymander") (emphasis in original).
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standards established by the Supreme Court provide quantifiable measures
to ensure that districts are approximately equal in population, they leave the
most important question unanswered: How and where should districts be
drawn?121 A majority of the Justices has been unable to provide a reasoned
response to this intractable problem,' ostensibly because districting
practices vary from state to state" 3 and rest on inherently "political
judgments" that some Justices profess they are unwilling to make.'2 ' When
121. See generally City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 90 (Stevens, J., concurring)
("nothing comparable to the mathematical yardstick used in apportionment cases is available
to identify the difference between permissible and impermissible adverse impacts on the
voting strength of political groups"). See also ZAGARPJ, supra note 36, at 121 ("even with
population as a guide to creating districts, state legislators still lacked a rule that would help
them determine where within the state to draw district lines").
122. See generally Tyranny of the Judiciary, supra note 13, at 529-35 (discussing the problems
posed by "geography process" claims, which "allege that election districts have been devised
in a manner which prevents a group of voters from voting or having a meaningful say in the
selection of those representatives who would be most amenable to representing those voters'
interests.').
123. See Grofran, supra note 12, at 177-183; ALEXANDER J. BoTr, HANDBOOK OF UNITED
STAiEs ELECTION LAWS AND PRACTIcEs 222-27 (1990) (citing Grofinan). See also Lucas v.
Colorado Gen.Assembly, 377 U.S. 713,749 (1964) (Stewart,J, dissenting) ("I do not pretend
to any specialized knowledge of the myriad of individual characteristics of the several
States.... I do know enough to be aware of the great variations among the several States in
their historic manner of distributing legislative power"). For a comprehensive list of
districting criteria used by the states for congressional and legislative districting, see NATIONAL
CON. ST. LEGIs., REDIsTRICTING TAsK FORCE, REDISTRICTING LAW 2000 ch. 4, Table 5 and
app. G (1999), available at http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/
red2000/Ch3part2.htrn [hereinafter REDISTRICTING LAW].
124. See Holder, 512 U.S. at 894 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Vote dilution cases have re-
quired the federal courts to make decisions based on highly political judgments-judgments
that courts are inherently ill-equipped to make."); Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 160 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (criticizing the plurality for making "a political judgment-in this instance, that
district-based elections must be taken as a given"); id. at 184-85 (Powell, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) ("federal judges are ill equipped generally to review legislative deci-
sions respecting redistricting"); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 620 (Harlan,J., dissenting) (denouncing
the "one person, one vote" cases because "[t]hey present a jarring picture of courts threaten-
ing to take action in an area which they have no business entering, inevitably on the basis of
political judgments which they are incompetent to make."); Baker, 369 U.S. at 328 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) (asserting that "the choice of elections at large as opposed to elections by
district, however unequal the districts, is a matter of sweeping political judgment having
enormous political implications, the nature and reach of which are certainly beyond the
informed understanding of, and capacity for appraisal by, courts."); Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 552
(plurality opinion) (rejecting voting claim challenging lack of compactness and unequal
population of reapportionment plan because it was "of a peculiarly political nature and there-
fore not meet for judicial determination"). Cf DIXON, supra note 46, at 19 ("The courts are
in the political thicket whenever they adjudicate and make any order relevant to apportion-
ment. All apportionment being fully political, any order made by a court has a significant
political impact."). The reticence of some Justices to address so-called "political judgments" is
"little more than a fatal misapprehension of the important role that judges must play in regu-
lating the political process under the consent model of democracy." Tyranny of the Judiciary,
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the Court has been confronted with the question of how to identify an
improper purpose in its racial gerrymandering cases, it has failed "to
provide a sound analytical distinction between those actions based on race
and those resulting from purely political motives."' 
2
The difficulty of fashioning a workable standard to examine
geographically based districts is understandable. As Robert Dixon
has noted, "all districting is gerrymandering' 1 26  Reliance of some
commentators 127 and the Court on "traditional districting principles such as
compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions" as "objective
factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerryman-
dered ' ' 121 cannot resolve the question.These criteria are far from neutral.
1 29
The contours of political subdivisions often have resulted from past efforts
to disenfranchise minorities or otherwise exclude them from receipt of
supra note 13, at 489. See also id. at 487-505 (describing the role ofjudges as referees in regu-
lating the right to vote). When a Court declines to act when a violation of consent has
occurred, it has made a substantive decision-the "majoritarian default" position "which says
that the decision of the majority wins" Id. at 502.
125. Deconstructing the Obstructionist Vision, supra note 7, at 445.
126. DIXON, supra note 46, at 462; TAYLOR & JOHNSTON, supra note 60, at 454 (concluding
that it is "almost impossible to avoid" gerrymanders in the districting process). See also Gaff-
ney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), where the Supreme Court reached a similar
conclusion:
It would be idle, we think, to contend that any political consideration taken
into account in fashioning a reapportionment plan is sufficient to invalidate
it.... Politics and political considerations are inseparable from districting and
apportionment.The political profile of a State, its party registration, and vot-
ing records are available precinct by precinct, ward by ward. These
subdivisions may not be identical with census tracts, but, when overlaid on a
census map, it requires no special genius to recognize the political conse-
quences of drawing a district line along one street rather than another. It is
not only obvious, but absolutely unavoidable, that the location and shape of
districts may well determine the political complexion of the area. District
lines are rarely neutral phenomena.
Id. at 752-53.
127. See, e.g., POLITICAL REDISTRICTING, supra note 60, at 21; Michael E. Lewyn, How to
Limit Gerrymandering, 45 FLA. L. REy. 403, 464-67 (1993); Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D.
Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymander-
ing, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y RE. 301 (1991).
128. Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 647. In Cromartie II, the Court again emphasized the import of
districting criteria in determining whether a district constitutes an unconstitutional racial
gerrymander. See 121 S. Ct. at 1466 (holding that "the party attacking the legislatively drawn
boundaries must show at the least that the legislature could have achieved its legitimate po-
litical objectives in alternative ways that are comparably consistent with traditional districting
principles").
129. See Deconstructing the Obstructionist Vision, supra note 7, at 440-49, 453-55; Daniel H.
Lowenstein & Jonathan Steinberg, The Quest for Legislative Districting in the Public Interest: Elu-
sive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1, 3-5 (1985); Richard T Ford, Geography and Sovereignty:
Jurisdictional Formation and Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1365, 1409-10 (1997).
[VOL. 7:357
Redefining American Democracy
governmental services.130 The "myth of compactness" also overlooks the
effect that mandating geographically compact districts can advance the po-
litical interests of one party over another.' Furthermore, the selection of
particular "objective" geographical criteria over others itself is subjective.' 2
Different geographical features and values usually are traded off with one
another to maximize the consent of one group at the expense of another.33
Geographical districting criteria simply cannot be applied neutrally or im-
partially.3 4
Moreover, the strict use of geographical criteria such as compactness
completely ignores the interests of voters, both individually and collec-
tively. "Area-based" measures, which are "concerned only with the shape
of a district' are the most common ways of assessing compactness."' Two
130. See Deconstructing the Obstructionist Vision, supra note 7, at 441 n.227; J. MORGAN
KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SEC-
OND RECONSTRUCTION (1999). Frequently, cities and towns are themselves non-compact as a
result of annexation efforts that result in increased taxes and less demand for services. Under
these circumstances, Butler and Cain have found it ironic "that manipulation for gain at one
level is treated sacredly by [redistricting] reformers at another." BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 3,
at 86-87.
131. DIXON, supra note 46, at 460-61. The categorical use of compactness as a "neutral"
districting criteria may lead to the "packing" of geographically concentrated groups of racial
and ethnic minorities into a small number of districts. See Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note
129, at 21-27.
132. See BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 3, at 65-90 (describing the values and trade-offs of
various districting factors including geographic criteria).
133. See generally Baker, 369 U.S. at 324 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (positing that "in every
strand of this complicated, intricate web of values [in the redistricting process] meet the con-
tending forces of partisan politics"); Deconstructing the Obstruaionist Vision, supra note 7, at 445
(arguing that color-conscious districting-"which merely recognizes that so-called 'neutral'
political factors often operate in anything but a color-blind manner--in most cases is com-
pletely subsumed by the overarching goal of allowing the majority to maintain its political
dominance by the appropriate manipulation of these factors"); Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra
note 129, at 8 (describing redistricting as "a political life-or-death issue" for elected officials).
134. See generally DIXON, supra note 46, at 18 ("[A]U district lines drawn on an appor-
tionment map are political lines in the sense that they group or separate partisans of one
persuasion from fellow partisans in the same area. This grouping and separation occurs
whether or not the reapportioner is aware of what he is doing."). So-called "neutral" and
"non-partisan" reapportionment commissions cannot eliminate these problems. See Grofinan,
supra note 12, at 124-26; Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 129; Bruce E. Cain, Perspectives
on Davis v. Bandemer: Views of the Practitioner, Theorist, and Reformer, in POLITICAL
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 120, at 117, 137; R.J.Johnston, Redistricting by
Neutral Commissions: A Perspective from Britain, 72 ANNALS Ass'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 457-70
(1982). Of course, some political scientists have indicated that problems posed by districting
should not discourage attempts to reform the districting process. See Baker, supra note 120, at
24; Grofinan, supra note 12, at 88-92; Lee Papayanopoulos, Compromise Districting, in
REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES 59 (Bernard Grofiran et al. eds., 1982).
135. BUriLER & CAIN, supra note 3, at 62-63. A host of geographical tests of compactness
are available. See, e.g., T. Goldstein, Unpacking and Applying Shaw v. Reno, 43 AM. U. L. REv
1135 (1994); Schwartzenberg, Reapportionment, Gerrymanders, and the Notion of Compactness, 50
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methods of quantitatively analyzing compactness that have been used in
recent years are described in the following manner:
[A] "dispersion" measure, which captures how tightly packed
or spread out a district is by calculating the ratio of the dis-
trict's area to the area of the minimum circle that could
circumscribe it, and a "perimeter" measure, which captures
the irregularity or jaggedness of the district's border by cal-
culating the ratio of the district's area to the square of the
district's perimeter.
36
In other words, compactness is not seen as a means of obtaining con-
sent, but instead is viewed purely from a standpoint of mathematical and
geometrical precision that is ill suited for the political arena. 37 Even alter-
native non-mathematical standards such as "functional compactness" rely
on physical geography to a certain extent, albeit with some emphasis on
MINN. L. REV. 443 (1966); E. Roeck,Jr., Measuring Compactness as a Requirement of Legislative
Apportionment, 5 MIDWEST J. PoL. Sci. 70, 71 (1961). See also Karcher, 462 U.S. at 756-58, 756
n.19 (Stevens,J., concurring); infira notes 137, 139 (collecting additional citations). Population
based measures of compactness are used less frequently. BUTLER & CAN, supra note 3, at 63.
These measures rest on the premise "that compactness is important only where there are
people" and therefore treats oddly shaped lines caused by geography differently from oddly
shaped lines caused by populated areas. Id. at 63-64.
136. J. Gerald Hebert et al., The Realist' Guide to Redistricting:Avoiding the Legal Pilfalls, in
REDISTRICTING AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION 144 (D. Bositis ed., 1998). Some political
scientists have used these measures to numerically calculate the relative compactness of every
congressional district drawn during the 1990 round of redistricting. See Richard H. Pildes &
Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-
District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. RE. 483 (1993) (listing the twenty-
eight least compact congressional districts under various measures); DAVID C. HUCKABEE,
CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV., CONGRESsIONAL DISTRICTS: OBJECTIVELY EVALUATING SHAPES
(1994) (ranking the compactness of congressional districts). The Supreme Court and other
federal courts have, at times, relied upon the findings of these reports in determining
whether particular districts constitute unconstitutional "gerrymanders." See, e.g., Vera, 517
U.S. at 959-60, 973 (plurality opinion) (citing Pildes & Niemi in sustaining Shaw chal-
lenge to Texas congressional districts); Diaz v. Silver, 978 F Supp. 96, 113-15 (E.D.N.Y)
(three-judge court) (citing Pildes & Niemi in sustaining equal protection challenge by
Hispanics and African Americans to New York's congressional districting plan), aff'd, 522
U.S. 801 (1997);Johnson v. Mortham, 926 E Supp. 1460, 1472-73 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (three-
judge court) (citing HUCKABEE in sustaining Shaw challenge to Florida congressional dis-
trict). Federal courts struck down five of the seven majority-Black districts and three of
the four majority-Hispanic districts included on the Pildes and Niemi list. MARK MON-
MONIER, BUSHMANDERS & BULLWINKLES: How POLITICIANS MANIPULATE ELECTRONIC MAPS
AND CENSUS DATA TO WIN ELECTIONS 68 (2001) [hereinafter BUSHMANDERS & BULLWIN-
KLES].
137. See BUSHMANDERS & BuLLWINKLES, supra note 136, at 75-76. Low measures of
compactness also can obscure contorted boundaries resulting from physical features or
borders of a jurisdiction over which a redistricting body has no control. See id. at 71-73.
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how that geography actually affects representation.'38 Elevation of geo-
graphical criteria such as compactness provides little guidance about the
effect district lines have on the ability of voters to elect candidates of their
choice and to receive fair and effective representation.' 39 Ironically, the
tremendous weight that has been placed on compactness undercuts the
Reynolds Court's admonition that representation must be based upon the
choices of individual voters, and not mere geography.' In short, despite
attempts to reform discriminatory districting practices, representation
continues to be driven by trees or acres, not people."'
D. Alternatives to Geographical Representation
This discussion has shown that territorial representation in the
United States frequently is at odds with the fundamental premise upon
which our Republic was built: that all powers of government must be
derived from the consent of the governed. That does not mean that geo-
graphically based methods of election never can be employed effectively
to elect a truly representative government. In many cases, they can be.'42
For example, New Hampshire has the largest elected representative
body in the world after the British House of Commons and the United
States House of Representatives.'43 Four hundred state representatives are
elected from a mixture of single-member and multimember districts,
some with as few as 2,800 people.'" The resulting legislature is very
138. "Functional" compactness analyzes the distribution of a district's population in
relation to such features as topography (mountain ranges, rivers, bays, etc.), lines of com-
munication and transportation, recognized neighborhoods, and local government
boundaries, asks whether candidates or legislators could explain to their constituents the
boundaries of their districts in simple, common-sense terms, based on recognizable geo-
graphic referents. Hebert et al., supra note 136, at 128. See also Bernard Grofinan & Lisa
Handley, Identifying and Remedying Racial Gerrymandering, 8 J.L. & POLITICS 345, 389 (1992)
(suggesting that functional compactness is the preferable way to determine if a proposed
majority-minority district is geographically compact); infia notes 209-10, 251-63 and
accompanying text (discussing the related concept of"communities of interest").
139. See generally Karcher, 462 U.S. at 751, 756 (Stevens,J., concurring) (asserting that
state compactness requirements are not "judicially manageable" and "have been of limited
utility because they have not been defined and applied with rigor and precision"); Grof-
man, supra note 12, at 85 ("There are many different ways of applying a compactness
requirement but none is generally accepted as definitive").
140. See supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
141. See generally DIXON, supra note 46, at 460 ("[A] rigid compactness-contiguity rule
shifts attention from the realities of party voting to mere physical geography. Indeed, it
would undercut the spirit of Chief Justice Earl Warren's oft-quoted statement about,'peo-
pie, not trees or acres: being the representational concern... ").
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representative of the state's demographics, with "many seats ... held by
women, students, and senior citizens."14 ' As a general rule, however, it is
difficult-if not impossible-for an interest-driven majority to avoid
adopting a districting plan or other system of geographical representation
that does not disproportionately enhance its own political power at the
expense of some political, racial, or ethnic minority group.146
Consequently, proportional and semi-proportional methods of elec-
tion have been proposed as a solution to the failings of geographical
representation. 147 Alternative voting systems using modified at-large meth-
ods of election14 8 eliminate difficulties posed by the "one person, one
vote" mandate because the entire legislative body is elected from what
amounts to a single, multimember district.1 49 By the same token, gerry-
mandering becomes irrelevant under all proportional systems, making it
unnecessary to engage in a standardless inquiry about whether districts are
"compact" enough or sufficiently preserve political subdivisions and other
geographical features.5 In this manner, electoral results are said to reflect
a choice by all voters, rather than the pre-determined decisions of the
"majority" which may be a simple plurality, or even a select few"' Al-
though each of these reasons has some merit, they do not respond fully to
145. Id.
146. See supra notes 63-78 and accompanying text; infra notes 322-38 and accompany-
ing text.
147. See supra note 8; infra notes 210-21,352-58 and accompanying text.
148. That is, at-large elections conducted by using proportional or semi-proportional
methods of election, such as cumulative voting, limited voting, and the single transferable
vote. See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
149. See AMy, supra note 8, at 52-53. See also Anthony Lewis, Legislative Apportionment
and the Federal Courts, 71 HAsv. L. REv. 1057, 1057 n.3 (1958) ("The only system based
entirely on population, without regard to geography, would be one of proportional repre-
sentation."). Justice Stewart explained how this result is consistent with the one person,
one vote cases:
Those cases established that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees the
right of each voter to "have his vote weighted equally with those of all
other citizens." The Court recognized that a voter's right to "have an
equally effective voice" in the election of representatives is impaired
where representation is not apportioned substantially on a population ba-
sis. In such cases, the votes of persons in more populous districts carry less
weight than do those of persons in smaller districts. There can be, of
course, no claim that the "one person, one vote" principle has been vio-
lated in this case, because the city ... is a unitary electoral district and the
... elections are conducted at large. It is therefore obvious that nobody's
vote has been "diluted" in the sense that word was used in the Reynolds
case.
Bolden, 446 U.S. at 77-78 (plurality opinion) (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 576).
150. See, e.g., AMY, supra note 8, at 42-54; Robert Richie & Steven Hill, The Case for
Proportional Representation, in REFLECTING ALL OF Us, supra note 8, at 3, 17-18.
151. See infia Part IV
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the question of whether it is desirable to attempt to reconcile departures
from geographical representation with the integral role that geography has
played-and continues to play-in the relationship between elected offi-
cials and their constituents.That issue is addressed in the next Part.
III. R-ELATIONAL REPRESENTATION: CONSENT DEFINED
BY CONSTITUENT SERVICE
The relationship between elected officials and their constituents is an
important element of representation in this country.The basic premise for
"relational representation" rests on consent defined by service to
constituents: voters agree to elect a representative, in exchange for a
reciprocal agreement by that representative to address their individual and
collective needs."5 2 Historically, this form of representation was tied closely
to geography because an agent of the people was believed to represent the
interests of individual voters at the same time that agent was responding
to the demands of the community 5 3 Moreover, people who were unable
to elect a representative still had an official to whom they could send
instructions and petition for relief from their grievances."' As the
foundation for representation by "trees or acres" has been uprooted,
however, the conceptual basis for relational representation increasingly has
been called into question. s  Nevertheless, the relationship between
representatives and their constituents continues to shape the meaning of
consent.
A. Representing Communities of Interest:
The Origins of Relational Representation
Like geographical representation, relational representation in the
United States traces its origins to Great Britain. This aspect of consent
152. See BRUCE CAIN ET AL., THE PERSONAL VOTE: CONSTITUENCY SERVICE AND ELEC-
TORAL INDEPENDENCE 2 (1987) (explaining that contemporary state representatives are
rewarded for ombudsman-like service) [hereinafter THE PERSONAL VOTE]. See also PITtIN,
supra note 35, at 112-43 (describing one aspect of representation as "acting for" the per-
sons who are represented). The compact between residents of a particular area and their
representative also requires the elected official to represent the interests of persons who did
not or could not vote for her. See infra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 37, 39-43 and accompanying text.
154. See generally JOHN PHILLIP REID,THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 96-109 (1989); infa notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
American colonials did not have relational representation because their inability to directly
elect officials to the British Parliament deprived them of representatives who could receive
their instructions and petitions for redressing their grievances. REID, supra, at 134-35.
155. See infa notes 210-21 and accompanying text.
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initially was derived from the doctrines of "shared interests"15 6 "shared
burdens,"157 and "virtual representation."15 "Shared interests" allowed an
individual to be represented if there was an elected member who shared
the same economic, political, or social interest, and would protect it-
regardless of whether or not the individual actually elected that mem-
ber. 59 "Shared burdens" required that elected officials be burdened by the
same laws they imposed on their constituents (including persons who did
not elect them), "sharing with them the consequences, costs, and hard-
ships of the statutes they enacted, the taxes they imposed, and the
penalties they decreed."'" The doctrine of "virtual representation" says
that persons who did not or could not elect a representative nevertheless
still are represented indirectly by representatives in the legislative body
who share the same interests and burdens.16 1 Virtual representation was
tied closely to the British doctrine of "universal representation."'
162
The American colonists modified these doctrines by tying them
to "actual representation:' which requires that each voter have "an
equal voice in or ability to affect the decision-making process."1 63 In this
manner, colonial views on relational representation marked a revolution-
ary departure from the prevailing British conception of how consent
was to be obtained to protect the interests of the people. Americans re-
turned to the "medieval forms of attorneyship in representation"
previously used in Britain.1" Instead of representing the entire
nation16 1 or colony, 66 American officials were expected to address the in-
terests of the local regions that had elected them.
67
156. R-EID, supra note 154, at 45-48.
157. Id. at 48-50.
158. Id. at 50-53.
159. Id. at 45-48.
160. Id. at 48-50.
161. Id. at 50-53.
162 See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
163. Tyranny of the Judiciary, supra note 13, at 499; See id. at 460-61,498-500.
164. BAILYN, supra note 41, at 164. Under attorneyship,
[Liocal communities bound their representatives to local interests in every
way possible: by requiring local residency or the ownership of local prop-
erty as a qualification for election, by closely controlling the payment of
wages for official services performed, by instructing representatives mi-
nutely as to their powers and the limits of permissible concessions, and by
making them strictly accountable for all actions taken in the name of the
constituents.
Id. at 162-63.
165. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
166. See WooD, supra note 60, at 179-80.
167. See id. at 188-96; See also R.EID,supra note 154, at 96-109.
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Americans also believed that resolution of parochial concerns re-
quired representatives who understood local needs."" Elected officials
were supposed to reside in the communities or districts that elected them
so they would be "connected" with their constituents and have "particular
knowledge of their affairs. ' '169 The Constitutional Framers agreed that a
similar requirement was essential for representatives to the new national
government, though to a much lesser extent than what was required for
state and local governments. 70 As a result, the United States Constitution
incorporates a mandate that each Representative and Senator "be an In-
habitant of that State in which he shall be chosen." ''
To a certain degree, departures from purely corporate forms of rep-
resentation undermined the impetus to keep representatives close to
their constituents.' Nevertheless, many Americans were convinced that
even if the interests of individuals no longer were seen as identical to
the interests of their communities, districts still could be used to facili-
tate the relationship between federal representatives and their
168. See WooD, supra note 60, at 188-96; REID, supra note 154, at 56-57, 63-65, 82-84,
133-36; ZAGARRI, supra note 36, at 19-21, 37-39, 112. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 56,
supra note 25, at 346 (James Madison) ("It is a sound and important principle that the
representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constitu-
ents.").
169. ThE FEDERALIST No. 56, supra note 25, at 349-50 (James Madison) (criticizing the
British House of Commons because many of its members cannot "add anything either to
the security of the people against the government, or to the knowledge of their circum-
stances and interests" because they "do not reside among their constituents, are very faintly
connected with them, and have very little particular knowledge of their affairs"); See supra
note 57.
170. The Anti-Federalists argued that residency requirements included in the Constitu-
tion did not go far enough to protect the relationship between representatives and their
constituents. They were concerned that the number of Representatives was too small to
ensure adequate knowledge of local affairs and a sufficient connection with their constitu-
ents, and would result in the over-representation of wealthier interests at the expense of
the "middling" classes. See generally BERNARD MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 108-31 (1997); HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR
17-18 (1981); George Mason, Objections to the Constitution of Government Formed by the
Convention, reprinted in ORIGINS, supra note 55, at 255-56; Essays of "Brutus" supra note 57,
at 322-24, 328-29. The Federalists responded to such criticism by arguing that it was
unnecessary for federal representatives to have the "intimate" sort of local knowledge
required of state and local representatives. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 25, at 83
(James Madison); MANIN, supra, at 108-31; ZAGARRI, supra note 36, at 101-03.
171. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; id. at art. I, § 3, cl. 3. Of course, the recent election of
former First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton as a United States Senator from New York
demonstrates that the constitutional provision for residency of federal candidates is not a
very onerous requirement to meet.
172. See generally MANIN, supra note 170, at 129 ("From the very beginning, it was clear
that in America representative government would not be based on resemblance and prox-
imity between representatives and represented."). See also supra note 37 and accompanying
text (describing "purely corporate" forms of representation).
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constituents.173 Five of the seven states that divided themselves into dis-
tricts for the first congressional election in 1788 required that
representatives be residents of the districts that elected them, with three
of those states also including durational residency requirements of one
to three years.1 71 Of course, residency requirements no longer are permis-
sible in congressional elections17  and representatives sometimes live
outside of their districts (usually as a result of redistricting). 76 On the
other hand, durational residency requirements are widely used for local
and state offices. 177 In addition, some jurisdictions with at-large methods
of election have residency districts, whereby candidates run for a num-
bered seat determined by their residence.17 ' Reliance on residency
requirements to foster relational representation remains a distinctly
American quality of democracy that few nations share.
17 9
B. Representing Communities of Interest:
The Contemporary American System
The contemporary use of district-based representation provides
many advantages for securing relational representation. Its strongest
attribute is that it creates certainty-constituents and representatives easily
173. See ZAGARRL, supra note 36, at 112, 129-30.
174. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 905 (1995) (Thomas J.,
dissenting) (citing 2 ThE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, 1788-
1790 293,294 (G. DenBoer ed. 1984)).
175. See, e.g., Dillon v. Fiorina, 340 F Supp. 729, 731 (D.N.M. 1972); Exon v.Tiemann,
279 F Supp. 609, 613 (D. Neb. 1968); State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 446 P.2d 445, 448
(N.M. 1968); Hellman v. Collier, 141 A.2d 908,911-12 (Md. 1958).
176. See Deconstructing the Obstructionist Vision, supra note 7, at 453 n.294 (discussing
various instances of congressional and state legislators excluded from their districts as a
result of partisan gerrymandering).
177. See BoTT, supra note 123, at 59-67. Many of the interests asserted by state and
local jurisdictions to support durational residency requirements for candidates are the same
as those relied upon by the Constitutional Framers. Compare id. at 60-61 (summarizing
reasons including candidate awareness of constituent needs, voters' need for knowledge
about candidates, and that a "candidate's knowledge of the community and his/her expo-
sure to the voters can be satisfied only if there is personal contact between the voters and
the candidate"), with supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text (offering similar reasons
for satisfying relational representation).
178. See Alternative Ways Out, supra note 8, at 1920 n.2 48; The Way Out, supra note 8, at
337 n.15. The Court has found that residency requirements for at-large elections do not
violate the "one person, one vote" requirement. Cf Dallas County v. Reese, 421 U.S. 477
(1975); Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967). For examples of residency districts, see, e.g.,
Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 495 (1992); McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S.
236,239-40 (1984).
179. See POLITICAL REDISTRICTING, supra note 60, at 2.
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can identify one another by determining their respective districts.' s°
Districts also allow everyone to be technically (if not actually) represented,
including non-voters and losing voters. ' Even persons belonging to
marginal groups that are too small to elect a representative under any
method of election' have a representative who is responsible for
servicing their needs and considering their views.18 3  Finally, district
180. Justice Powell described the rationale for linking "voter identity" with political
geography in the following manner:
"Most voters know what city and county they live in, but fewer are likely
to know what congressional district they live in if the districts split coun-
ties and cities. If a voter knows his congressional district, he is more likely
to know who his representative is. This presumably would lead to more
informed voting." It also is likely to lead to a representative who knows
the needs of his district and is more responsive to them.
Karcher, 462 U.S. at 787 n.3 (Powell,J., dissenting) (quoting Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F Supp.
68, 98 n.78 (D. Colo. 1982)). However, "voter identity" in the context of congressional
elections "may be largely mythical," as studies show that as little as one-third of all sampled
persons could identify their congressional representative or their representatives' political
party, and many constituents are uninformed about their representatives' positions on im-
portant policy issues. See AMY, supra note 8, at 178; See generally, Tha PERSONAL VOTE, supra
note 152, at 1-2, 28-30.
181. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text. Of course, fair representation in
the form of equal outcomes does not make up for the consistent denial of actual represen-
tation to minority groups. See Tyranny of the Judiciary, supra note 13, at 499-500;
Deconstructing the Obstructionist Vision, supra note 7, at 480-81. See also Reclaiming the Civil
Rights Vision, supra note 27, at 386-87 (describing the Civil Rights Movement's denuncia-
tions of fair outcomes at the expense of actual representation as "tokenism").
182. For example, a fringe group comprising less than five percent of the voting popu-
lation would rarely, if ever, elect a candidate supported only by that group to a seven-
member legislative body, even under proportional and semi-proportional methods of elec-
tion. See infra notes 322-26 and accompanying text (discussing thresholds of exclusion and
thresholds of representation). See also Paul L. McKaskle, Of Wasted Votes and No Influence:An
Essay on Voting Systems in the United States, 35 Hous. L. RE. 1119, 1154-55 (1998) (de-
scribing an example of how under-representation is possible under cumulative voting).
183. See supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text. Bruce Cain et al., have explained
the advantage of single-member districts over proportional or semi-proportional systems
for providing relational representation:
Candidates who run at large or on national party lists in proportional
representation systems are not formally responsible for representing a
specific geographical area; they have no particular district to represent. By
comparison, in single-member district systems representatives have
geographical areas to call their own. These systems present an opportunity
and create a motivation for relationships between represented and
representatives that are more personal, particularistic, and idiosyncratic
than in other kinds of systems.
TMi PERSONAL VOTE, supra note 152, at 8. Consequently, it is necessary to create some sort
of electoral incentive under proportional or semi-proportional systems to encourage rep-
resentatives to provide constituency service. See id. at 219-24.
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elections have the added benefit of being simple to understand and to
administer.8 4
The mechanics of district-based relational representation may be illus-
trated through the example of the United States House of Representatives.
Congressional districts provide each Representative with a geographic con-
stituency comprised of all the people in the district' and a political
constituency within the district that actually supports and votes for the
Representative. 8 6 Every member of Congress has two primary roles (in
addition to getting reelected): legislator and representative. 7 The legisla-
tive role requires the elected official to consult with her constituents
about their views and to explain her ultimate choices on particular pieces
of legislation." The representative role entails "constituency service" by
assisting individual constituents through casework and helping private and
local governments in "coping with the federal government" in such areas
as government benefits and obtaining information about agency proce-
dures and the status of federally funded projects."9 Constituents apprise
their Representatives of their views and needs either directly or indirectly
through news stories and opinion polls. 9° The Representative then is ex-
184. See Choosing an Electoral System, supra note 118, at 7. In contrast, alternative voting
systems are inherently more complex. See generally Daniel R. Ortiz, Note, Alternative Voting
Systems As Remedies for Unlawful At-Large Systems, 92 YALE L.J. 144, 155-56 (1982) (ex-
plaining some of the problems that the complexities of cumulative voting might pose for
minority voters); BUSHMANDERS & BULLWINKLES, supra note 136, at 138-39 (outlining
some of the complexities in reallocating surplus votes under the preference voting system
used in Cambridge, Massachusetts); supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text (describing
different alternative voting systems). For this reason, Representative Cynthia McKinney
has urged other proponents of proportional representation to "keep it simple." See Cynthia
McKinney, Keep It Simple, in REFLECTING ALL OF Us, supra note 8, at 35-39.
185. See ROGER H. DAVIDSON &WALTE J. OLESZEK, CONREss AND ITS MEMBERS 124-
27 (2d ed. 1985).
186. Id. at 127-29.
187. Id. at 6.
188. Id. at 122-23.
189. See id. at 134-35; THE PERSONALVOTE, supra note 152, at 50-76; Bruce Cain et al.,
Constituency Service in the United States and Great Britain, in CONGRESs RECONSIDERED 109-
30 (3d ed., Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 1985).
190. Most constituent inquiries come to Representatives by letters, with others coming
by phone calls, walk-ins at the Representative's offices, or from in-person meetings. See
DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 185, at 134. An increasing number of constituents com-
municate with their Representatives through electronic mail, facsimiles, and other
electronic media. See generally Thomas B. Edsall, In Congress, They've Got Mail--Far Too
Much of It, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2001, at A5 (reporting that "Senators get as many as
55,000 e-mails a month, and House members get up to 8,000, placing a tremendous bur-
den on aides assigned to respond to a much smaller flow of regular mail"); James Rosen,
House Hears from the People, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERER, Dec. 16, 1998, at Al; John
Hughes, Delivering US. From E-Mail; Agencies Struggle to Filter Publics Electric Comments,
WASH. PosT, Apr. 6, 1999, at A21 (describing how Congress has looked for ways to restrict
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pected to consider the needs and political opinions of all her constitu-
ents.
191
For this reason, the Supreme Court often has cited relational repre-
sentation as its basis for rejecting claims by disfavored minority groups
alleging that they have been deprived of their consent under particular
districting plans. In Ihitcomb v. Chavis, 92 the Court denied a challenge by
Black voters to Indiana's statewide legislative apportionment plan, resting
its judgment on the winner-take-all feature of American elections and its
effect on relational representation:
As the trial court saw it, ghetto voters could not be ade-
quately and equally represented unless some of Marion
County's general assembly seats were reserved for ghetto
residents serving the interests of the ghetto majority. But are
poor Negroes of the ghetto any more underrepresented
than poor ghetto [W]hites who also voted Democratic and
lost, or any more discriminated against than other interest
groups or voters in Marion County with allegiance to the
Democratic Party, or, conversely, any less represented than
Republican areas or voters in years of Republican defeat?
We think not.
193
the flow of constituent e-mails and faxes, which overwhelm their phone lines and com-
puter systems).
191. See TiE PERSONAL VOTE, supra note 152, at 85. Political constituencies tend to re-
ceive a disproportionate amount of a Representative's attention, especially on legislative
matters. See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 185, at 127-29, 388-95. However, electoral
motivations create a powerful incentive to address the needs of all constituents because
even voters who support a representative's opponents will be more inclined to vote for the
representative and become members of her political constituency if the representative is
responsive to their requests for constituent service. See THE PERSONAL VoTE, supra note 152,
at 77-84, 95-96, 213. Constituent service to all voters, irrespective of their partisan affilia-
tions, also can provide representatives with electoral independence from her party and
allow her to take unpopular positions on many issues. See id. at 9, 87, 197-98 (describing
this quality of American government as the "personal vote" in which a "candidate's elec-
toral support ... originates in his or her personal qualifications, activities, and record").
192. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
193. Id. at 154. The Court elaborated on its reasoning by describing the effect of rela-
tional representation on losing voters under single and multimember district elections:
As our system has it, one candidate wins, the others lose. Arguably the
losing candidates' supporters are without representation since the men
they voted for have been defeated; arguably they have been denied equal
protection of the laws since they have no legislative voice of their own.
This is true of both single-member and multimember districts. But we
have not yet deemed it a denial of equal protection to deny legislative
seats to losing candidates, even in those so-called "safe" districts where the
same party wins year after year.
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Similar reasoning was applied to deny a racial gerrymandering claim
brought by Hasidic Jews in UJO v. Carey.194 In Davis v. Bandemer, a plural-
ity of four Justices provided the Court's most unequivocal statement of
relational representation. 9 According to Justice White,"[a]n individual or
a group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is usually deemed
to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and to have as
much opportunity to influence the candidate as other voters in the dis-
trict. '
But even the Court's "adequate representation" theory' 97 has its
limits. A cohesive majority-or even a simple plurality-can manipulate
relational representation in a manner that disfavors political, racial, ethnic,
and other minority groups. Frequently, this type of systemic malfunction
occurs when a racially or politically driven group exploits election rules
or geographical representation (Whether through at-large or district
elections) to obtain favorable legislative outcomes exclusively for
themselves. 98 For voters in the minority, the conventional methods of
resolving these problems-recalling the representative or turning them
out of office at the next election-are unavailable. When this happens,
relational representation no longer exists. The Supreme Court
acknowledged as much in Gingles, observing that "[n]ot only does 'voting
along racial lines' deprive minority voters of their preferred representative
in these circumstances, it also 'allows those elected to ignore [minority]
interests without fear of political consequences,' leaving the minority
effectively unrepresented."' 9
The Court has responded to violations of relational representation in
two ways. One approach comes under established equal protection doc-
trine, which requires that "individuals be treated in a manner similar to
others ... [in] all governmental actions which classify individuals for dif-
ferent benefits or burdens under the law."2°° Clear evidence of substantial
disparities in government services supports a claim under the Fourteenth
Id. at 153 (emphasis in original).
194. See generally United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburg, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166
(1977) (plurality opinion) ("the individual voter in the district with a nonwhite majority
has no constitutional complaint merely because his candidate has lost out at the polls and
his district is represented by a person for whom he did not vote").
195. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132 (plurality opinion).
196. Id.
197. Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting is Different, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1201,
1209 (1996).
198. See supra notes 62-78, 95-101 and accompanying text; infra notes 321-38 and
accompanying text.
199. 478 U.S. at 48 n.14 (quoting Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613,623 (1982)).
200. JOHN E. NOWAx & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 568 (4th ed.
1991) [hereinafter NowAK & ROTUNDA].
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Amendment."1 A challenge to the method of election is another available
avenue of relief. Unequal relational representation may be considered in
vote dilution claims brought under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 2
and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments2 3 because of the negative
impact that racial bloc voting has on the quality of representation that
minorities receive. 20 4 After all, "in a representative democracy, meaningful
participation by minority groups in the electoral process is essential to
ensure that representative bodies are responsive to the entire electorate."
20 5
The denial of equal political opportunities and relational representa-
tion to disfavored racial and ethnic minorities, raises the question of how
to remedy such violations. Advocates of a narrow definition of the right
to vote endorse the Shaw approach and argue that an offending jurisdic-
tion should be required to adopt a new election system that excludes
racial considerations altogether.206 Certain commentators and members of
201. See Tyranny of the Judiciary, supra note 13, at 537-46. 1 have referred to this type of
representational problem as a "parliamentary process" claim, which can include "specific
instances in which a voter's voice in government either is not present or not loud enough
to prevent the legislative body from passing a law which discriminates against that voter
and her group." Id. at 537-38. Because claims of disparate levels of services are outcome-
oriented and implicate the political policy-making functions of government, courts are
reluctant to grant relief absent the most compelling evidence of representational neglect.
See id. at 541-43. See also Smith v.Winter, 717 E2d 191, 198 (5th Cir. 1983) (reasoning
that "the right to an 'effective' vote refers to the citizen's right to make his voice heard in
the electoral process, and not to the ability to command results in the public office").
202. See generally S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207 (one of the factors that may be considered in assessing a vote dilu-
tion claim is "whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected
officials to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group"); Gingles, 478
U.S. at 36-37 (citing the Senate Judiciary Committee Majority Report factors for viola-
tion of § 2). The Senate Report also provides that "[u]nresponsiveness is not an essential
part of a plaintiff's case." S. REP. No. 417, at 29 n.116, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
207 n.116.The reason for this caveat is that lack of responsiveness often can be difficult to
prove. See Lee County Branch of NAACP v. City of Opelika, 748 F.2d 1473, 1480 n.l
(11th Cir. 1984) (noting the plaintiffi estimated that "80 percent of their time spent in
developing and trying this case originally was devoted to the issue of responsiveness").
203. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 625-26. Like Section 2 claims, unresponsiveness is not an
essential element of a constitutional vote dilution claim. See id. at 625 n.9.
204. Breakdowns in relational representation can deprive minorities of benefits such as
government jobs, adequate services, and responsive officials available to address their com-
plaints. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 625-27. For additional examples of how majority bloc
voting can increase the lack of responsiveness by elected officials, see, e.g., White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769 (1973); Bolden, 446 U.S. at 98 (WhiteJ., dissenting); id. at 139
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Goosby v. Town Bd. of Hempstead, 180 F.3d 476, 495 (2d Cit.
1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1138 (2000);Jenkins v. Manning, 116 F.3d 685, 698 (3d Cir.
1997); Buckanaga v. Sisseton Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 54-5, 804 F.2d 469, 477 (8th Cir. 1986);
Perkins v. City ofWest Helena, 675 F2d 201,210-11 (8th Cir.), aff'd, 459 U.S. 801 (1982).
205. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 640 n.21 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
206. See Deconstructing the Obstructionist Vision, supra note 7, at 419-52. As I have argued
elsewhere, this approach poses significant problems and "is much more likely to support
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the Supreme Court urge scrupulous application of "traditional districting
criteria" particularly geographical compactness and maintenance of po-
litical subdivisions.25 7 Others support a more flexible view of districting
parameters, including departures from strict views of compactness in favor
of "communities of interest"'  or interest "enclaves." '° Finally, some pro-
ponents of alternative voting suggest that election systems that may not be
geographically based at all should be used to facilitate individual voting
choices.21 The remainder of this discussion focuses on the latter two ap-
proaches.
C. Representing Communities of Interest: The Utility of
Proportional and Semi-Proportional Representation Models
Supporters of election reform take stock of the many weaknesses of
geographical districting and the negative effects it has on actual and rela-
tional representation. If the use of geography as a proxy for consent had
questionable legitimacy over two hundred years ago,"' it has even less
validity toda. 21 2 In addition, relational representation in districts uses what
Lani Guinier has referred to as a "top-down view of representation": the
representative/constituent relationship is viewed strictly from the stand-
point of the representative who services the needs of constituents,
regardless of whether particular constituents ever are able to elect the rep-
resentatives of their choice.21 3 Furthermore, districting de-emphasizes
actual representation as the source of relational representation in favor of
the very sort of political subordination that mandated the passage of the Reconstruction
Amendments and theVoting Rights Act in the first place" Id. at 440.
207. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. However, this approach has many
problems of its own, not the least of which is its tendency to elevate mathematical preci-
sion and geography at the expense of actual representation of constituents. See supra notes
136-42 and accompanying text.
208. E.g., Stephen J. Malone, Recognizing Communities of Interest in a Legislative Appor-
tionment Plan, 83 VA. L. RE. 461 (1997); Lisa A. Kelly, Race and Place: Geographic and
Transcendent Community in the Post-Shaw Era, 49 VANr. L. REv. 227 (1996).
209. Henry L. Chambers,Jr., Enclave Districting, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.J. 135 (1999).
210. See, e.g., LMNi GUINIER, TYRANNY OF THE MAjoRITy: FuNnAmENA FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATr,rE DEMOcRAcY 71-156 (1994) [hereinafter TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY];
Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 1, at 251-56; Richie & Hill, supra note 150, at 9-29; The
Way Out, supra note 8. See also McKaskle, supra note 182, at 1201-03 (discussing the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of proportional representation systems over geographically
based single-member districts).
211. See supra notes 58--60 and accompanying text.
212. See TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, supra note 210, at 127-30; Alternative Ways Out,
supra note 8, at 1900. See also BUSHMANDERS & BuLLWINKLES, supra note 136, at 71 (assert-
ing that "because of modern telecommunications, mass media, and the Internet, shape
indexes say very little about how effectively candidates can campaign and serve constitu-
ents").
213. TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, supra note 210, at 131, 145-46.
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virtual representation, contrary to our Republic's most cherished democ-
ratic principles."' Under districting, the interests of non-voters and losing
voters are deemed adequately represented by representatives elected by
voters who share those same interests.
2 1 5
Proportional and semi-proportional representation systems make
significant departures from district-based relational representation. On the
one hand, proportional representation systems can eliminate the use of
geographical representation completely through at-large elections .216 On
the other hand, semi-proportional systems still may be geographically
based by using modified election rules in multimember districts. 217 Both
systems allow "self-aggregation at the ballot box" 218 in place of politically
defined districts, thereby permitting each individual voter "to choose, by
the way she casts her votes, who represents her "' 21 9 In this manner, the
quality of relational representation actually may be increased for all voters
through a "bottom-up view of representation" in which voters-not
politicians-choose the persons who best represent their self-identified
interests. 22° As a result, each voter is able to define the nature of the
representative/constituent relationship on his or her own terms.
Replacing anachronistic methods of geographical representation with
voter-centered alternative voting systems ultimately might provide greater
substance to the meaning of relational representation.
Local governments are the strongest candidates for alternative voting
systems because they are least likely to have any substantial interest in
214. See Tyranny of the Judiciary, supra note 13, at 459-61,498-500.
215. See TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, supra note 210, at 130-37.
216. See Still, supra note 12, at 253.
217. See id.
218. Supreme Court Destabilization, supra note 8, at 223-24.
219. TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, supra note 210, at 122. Therefore, alternative voting
systems have the added benefit of moving away from the group-based approach criticized
by the Supreme Court towards individual-oriented elections. See generally Deconstructing the
Obstructionist Vision, supra note 7, at 452-69 (discussing and criticizing the Court's emphasis
on individual approaches to remedy group harms).
220. TRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, supra note 210, at 152. Guinier explains how cumula-
tive voting may improve relational representation for voters:
The principle of one vote, one value ... restores the link between repre-
sentation and voting by ensuring that legislators represent unanimous, not
divided, constituencies. Representation becomes the process of bottom-
up empowerment based on self-defined expressions of interest.... The
legislative body can reflect fairly the range of options and interests within
the public at large, including racial minorities who can be represented
based on their electoral strength.... [Liocal political organizations may be
given the space and the possibility of success. Such parties can fill the
needs for political mobilization, voter education, and legislative monitor-
ing that largely go unfilled in our current system.
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using geographical methods of representation.22 In fact, at-large voting
remains the most dominant method of election in American cities.222
Many municipalities long ago abolished geographical district or ward vot-
ing purportedly "as a praiseworthy and progressive reform of corrupt ...
government."22 3 Some municipalities and counties either presently employ
proportional or semi-proportional systems,224 or have used them in the
recent past.22 Similarly, school boards frequently conduct elections at-
221. See, e.g., Amy, supra note 8, at 187.
222. See generally HEYWOOD T. SANDERS, ThF GOVERNMENT OF AMERICAN CITIES: CON-
TINUITY AND CHANGE IN STRUCTURE, 1982 MUN.YB. 178, 179-80 (1982) (more than 66%
of American cities elect city council members at-large and another 19% pair members at-
large with district voting); Richard L. Engstrom & Michael D. McDonald, The Effect ofAt-
Large Elections on Racial Representation in US. Municipalities, in ELECTORAL LAWS, supra note
62, at 203, 204 (describing the results of a survey indicating that in 83.6% of the largest
central cities, "some of the members of the council are elected at large, and in 47.0% all of
the members are elected at large") (emphasis in original).
223. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 70 n.15 (plurality opinion). The "corruption" identified by
reformers often was the specific representation of local or neighborhood interests. See
Samuel P Hays, The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era, in 2
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE AMERICAN PAST 148, 157 (S. Katz & S. Kutler eds. 1969); ED-
wARD C. BANFIELD & JAMES Q. WILSON, CITY POLITICS 151 (1963). Cf supra notes 43-58,
170 and accompanying text (describing how the Constitutional Framers championed
representation of local interests). Of course, the Progressive Movement's reform of city
government was not always intended to advance such benign purposes. In the southern
states, it was used to subordinate Black political participation. See Randall Kennedy, Com-
mentary, Persuasion and Distrust:A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARv. L. REv.
1327, 1341 n.50 (1986); Engstrom & McDonald, supra note 222, at 206.
224. Cambridge, Massachusetts presently is the only major city that elects its council by
single transferable voting. Grofinan, supra note 12, at 163. Hartford, Connecticut and other
Connecticut municipalities use limited voting, along with Philadelphia, most counties in
Pennsylvania (which cast votes for two out of a possible three open seats), and Washington,
D.C. Id. at 164; BUSHMANDERS & BULLWINKLES, supra note 136, at 140-41. The Chilton
County, Alabama commission is a frequently cited example of a cumulative voting system.
See Limited and Cumulative Voting in Alabama, supra note 18. More than 75 jurisdictions have
adopted alternative voting systems to settle voting rights cases. Richie & Hill, supra note
150, at 14. For a discussion of some of these jurisdictions, see, e.g., Robert R. Brischetto &
Richard L. Engstrom, Cumulative Voting and Latino Representation: Exit Surveys in Fifteen
Texas Communities, 78 Soc. ScI. Q. 973 (1997) [hereinafter Latino Representation] (Texas city
and school boards).
225. See Grofinan, supra note 12, at 162-70; Richie & Hill, supra note 150, at 14-16;
Leon Weaver, The Rise, Decline, and Resurrection of Proportional Representation in Local Gov-
ernments in the United States, in ELECTORAL LAWS, supra note 62, at 139-53. Cincinnati,
which used the single transferable vote from 1925 until 1957 (when it was repudiated
because of racial hostility towards Blacks, who fared well under the system), is one well
known example of a major American city that has used an alternative voting system. See
Robert J. Kolesar, PR in Cincinnati: From "Good Government" to the Politics of Inclusion?, in
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND ELECTORAL REFORM IN OHIO 160-208 (Kathleen L.
Barber ed., 1995); AMY, supra note 8, at 133-36. Over two dozen cities have used the single
transferable vote for at least a short period of time. Grofinan, supra note 12, at 163. Several
other cities, including New York, Indianapolis, Boston, and Philadelphia have elected
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large, 26 making it easier for them to employ modified election rules un-
der either a proportional or semi-proportional system. The advantages of
allowing individual voters in local government to elect representatives
who are directly accountable to them likely would increase the quality of
relational representation that they receive.
27
State legislatures and the House of Representatives pose a much
more vexing problem. Both have a longstanding history of geographical
representation, particularly through district elections. 228 The vast major-
ity of federal Representatives has been elected from single-member
districts, which have been mandatory since 1967.29 States derive their
representation from districts as well. Illinois, the one state that elected its
state legislators under an alternative voting system, did so in combination
with three-member districts. 23" Today, every state uses some form of geo-
graphically based districts to elect their legislators.23' Thirty-eight states
elect all of their representatives from single-member districts and forty-six
states elect all of their senators from single-member districts. 232 The re-
maining states use multimember districts to elect at least some of their
legislators.233 The firmly entrenched nature of geographical representation
for state and federal legislators, while not controlling, should not be dis-
missed out of hand. Use of multimember districts under modified
councils by limited vote in the past. Id. at 163-64. Alamogordo, New Mexico used cumu-
lative voting between 1987 and 1997. See Richard L. Engstrom et al., Cumulative Voting as a
Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution: The Case of Alamogordo, New Mexico, 5 J.L. & POL. 469
(1989); The Way Out, supra note 8, at 341 n.34.
226. See James S. McClain, Note, The Voting Rights Act and Local School Boards:An Argu-
mentfor Deference to Educational Policy in Remedies for Vote Dilution, 67 TEx. L. Rav. 139, 167-
69 (1988).
227. This is not to say that single-member districts cannot secure actual representation
at the local level for all voters, including racial and ethnic minority groups. Proportional or
semi-proportional systems are a viable alternative, however, especially where certain groups
of voters have an unequal voice in electing officials and securing relational representation.
228. See supra notes 43-96 and accompanying text.
229. See HIsToRicAL ATLAs, supra note 38, at 4-6, 50-215; supra note 90 and accompa-
nying text.
230. See Grofman, supra note 12, at 164. See also infra notes 448-59 and accompanying
text (describing Illinois' experience using cumulative voting for legislative elections). Illi-
nois presently elects all of its state representatives and senators from single-member
districts. See BAONE Er AL., supra note 142, at 96.
231. See BAorONE Er A.., supra note 142, at 96; Grofman, supra note 12, at 177-83.
232. See REDISTRICTING LAW 2000, supra note 123, at ch. 5,Table 7, available at http://
www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/red2000/Ch4multi.htm.
233. See id.; Grofman, supra note 12, at 177-83. Six states (Arizona, Idaho, New Jersey,
North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington) presently elect all of their state representa-
tives from two-member districts. See BARoNE Er AL., supra note 142, at 18-22, 92-95,244-
47, 274-78, 328-32, 378-82. Maryland and New Hampshire elect most of their represen-
tatives from multimember districts. See infra note 235. West Virginia is the only state that
elects all of its Senators from multimember districts, using seventeen two-member districts.
See BARoNE Er AL., supra note 142, at 384-85.
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election rules would be the most consistent way to reconcile continued
use of geographical representation with the adoption of alternative voting
systems.
2 34
Of course, past experience also cautions against approaches that allow
large constituencies to cast ballots for every legislator or representative of an
elected body Two examples will suffice to demonstrate this point. Between
1937 and 1947, the boroughs of NewYork City used the single transferable
vote to elect members of its city council.2 35 In the first election under this
system in 1937, the ballot in Brooklyn was over four feet long and included
the names of 99 candidates. 236 Thirty-one percent of all ballots in Brooklyn
either were invalid or "exhausted" because "all designated candidates were
either already elected or already eliminated." Many voters cast uninformed
ballots, voting for a few candidates they knew and choosing other candi-
dates grouped next to them.237 Although the single transferable vote was
intended to allow all people to have a voice in city government, problems
caused in the administration of elections ultimately allowed political parties
to retain much of their power. 23
The defects of jurisdiction-wide elections are magnified when all
voters of a state are allowed to cast ballots for every state legislator or
Representative. In 1964, Illinois was forced to conduct at-large elections
for the 177 members of its lower house after state officials were unable to
adopt a reapportionment plan based upon population, as required by the
234. A mixture of single-member and multimember districts presents another viable
option. See Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965) (rejecting equal protection challenge to
Georgia's use of a mixed plan for its state senators in which smaller counties were grouped
together into single-member districts and larger counties elected candidates from multi-
member districts). Two states presently make extensive use of a mixed districting plan.
Most Maryland districts elect two or three representatives per district. See BARONE Er AL.,
supra note 142, at 153-60. New Hampshire elects its four hundred representatives primar-
ily from multimember districts: forty-one two-member districts, thirty-seven three-
member districts, eleven four-member districts, four five-member districts, two six-
member districts, and one district each containing seven, eight, nine, and eleven represen-
tatives. Id. at 228.
235. Ferdinand A. Hermens, Representation and Proportional Representation, in CHOOSING
AN ELECTORAL SYsTEM, supra note 22, at 15, 20.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 21.
238. Id. According to Lani Guinier, the Democratic Party continued to control most of
the seats on the city council, but "those elected were a different breed of Democrat" who
were "beholden to the voters rather than to party bosses." LANI GUINIER, LIFT EVERYVOICE:
TURNING A CIVIL RIGHTS SETBACK INTO A NEW VISION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 264 (1998)
[hereinafter LIFT EvERYVOiCE].The party bosses subsequently succeeded in eliminating the
single transferable vote by capitalizing on anti-communist sentiments and characterizing
proportional representation as "'un-American' undemocratic, and a threat to the two party
system" Id. at 265. Similar criticism has been leveled by opponents of broad protection for
minority voting rights. See Deconstructing the Obstructionist Vision, supra note 7, at 409.
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state constitution. 39 A statute limited parties to nominations for no more
than two-thirds of the seats (118 of the total) to ensure at least some rep-
resentation from the minority party.2 ° The state used a "bed sheet ballot"
that was up to one foot wide and three feet long to list the names and
parties of all 236 candidates. 2 1 Election results showed that eighty-five
percent of voters only voted a single-party ticket, ten percent voted for a
single party plus some others, and only five percent voted for individuals
from both parties. 24 2 The election resulted in a lower house with 118 De-
mocrats and 59 Republicans. 4 3 The 1964 election did not employ
proportional or semi-proportional election rules.241 Nevertheless, it dem-
onstrates the potential loss of relational representation under statewide
elections, regardless of the particular voting rules that are employed. Un-
informed voters had trouble identifying the names of their representatives,
and could not establish any viable sort of constituent/representative rela-
tionship with officials who were responsible for servicing the needs and
eliciting the views of every person in the state.
245
Similar problems might occur in congressional elections. In any
single state, general-ticket elections have not involved elections for more
than thirteen congressional seats at one time.216 One can well imagine the
problems that would be created today under a general-ticket or at-large
239. See DIXON, supra note 46,at 165, 302.
240. Id. at 303; TAYLOR & JOHNSTON, supra note 60, at 45. This has been described as a
"winner-take-all-but-one-third" approach. HACKER, supra note 61, at 38.
241. See DIXON, supra note 46, at 302-03; C. Anthony Broh, Utility Theory and Partisan
Decision-Making: Cumulative Voting in Illinois, 55 Soc. Sci. Q. 65,67 n.8 (1974).
242. TAYLOR & JOHNSTON, supra note 60, at 45. Voters essentially were given three
choices: vote only for a single-party's 118 candidates; vote a single-party ticket and up to
59 other individual selections; or make up to 177 individual selections. Id.
243. DIXON, supra note 46, at 303.
244. The use of proportional or semi-proportional election rules do not necessarily
prevent party collusion that may result in the overrepresentation of party interests. See infra
notes 448-59 and accompanying text.
245. See DIXON, supra note 46, at 165; HACKER, supra note 61, at 38. In Chapman v.
Meier, the Supreme Court raised similar concerns about the potential problems created by
use of multimember districts:
First, as the number of legislative seats within the district increases, the
difficulty for the voter in making intelligent choices among candidates
also increases. Ballots tend to become unwieldy, confusing, and too
lengthy to allow thoughtful consideration. Second, when candidates are
elected at large, residents of particular areas within the district may feel
that they have no representative specially responsible to them.
420 U.S. at 15-16 (citing Lucas, 377 U.S. at 731). For a contrary view, see generally Lakeman,
supra note 22, at 41, 49-50 (asserting that multimember constituencies do not destroy
relational representation, but enhance it by allowing individuals to chose their representa-
tives who will actually represent their interests).
246. See HisTocAL. ATLAs, supra note 38, at 4-5.
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system in a state such as California, where nearly thirty-four million
people will elect fifty-three Representatives.24 7 Shortcomings of pure
forms of proportional representation for congressional elections also
might include higher campaign costs that would have a disparate impact
on the candidates of poorer constituencies, as well as depriving many
voters of representatives who live close to them and understand their
needs.2  Alternative voting systems probably would minimize some of the
negative effects of statewide voting, by limiting the total universe of
candidates to a smaller field of representatives who share the same interests
as individual voters. Nevertheless, multimember districting appears to be
better suited than statewide voting for the use of alternative systems in
congressional elections, especially in more populated states like California.
It may be possible to rectify some of the representational problems
created by geographical districting short of adopting an alternative vot-
ing system. In Miller v. Johnson,49 the Supreme Court recognized that
"communities defined by actual shared interests" could be a legitimate
districting criterion.25 Unfortunately, federal courts251 and some com-
mentators2 2 have construed the term "communities of interest" narrowly,
247. SeeYochi J. Dreazen, Census Shows Gains in South and West, Population Shifts Also
Pare The Congressional Seats Of Midwest, Northeast, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2000, at A2 (noting
that the ideal district under the 2000 Census will contain 625,000 people).
248. See Pamela S. Karlan, A Bigger Picture, in REFLECTING ALL OF Us, supra note 8, at
76-77.
249. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
250. Id. at 916.
251. See generally Abrams, 521 U.S. at 100 (indicating that Georgia's "small counties
represent communities of interest" and therefore provided a good foundation for districts
to remedy Shaw violation); Vera, 517 U.S. at 964 (plurality opinion) (maintaining that
"manifestations of community of interest" include "shared broadcast and print media, pub-
lic transport infrastructure, and institutions such as schools and churches"); Id. at 977
(plurality opinion) (finding that a section 2 district "that is reasonably compact and regular,
taking into account traditional districting principles such as maintaining communities of
interest and traditional boundaries, may pass strict scrutiny"). See also Prosser v. Elections
Bd., 793 F Supp. 859, 863 (WD.Wis. 1992) (three-judge court) (per curiam) (asserting that
"[t]here is some although of course not a complete correlation between geographical
propinquity and community of interests"). For an interesting discussion of the manner in
which the Supreme Court has narrowed its definition of "communities of interest:' see
generally Nancy Maveety, Representation Rights and the Rehnquist Years: The Viability of the
"Communities of Interest"Approach, in ThE U.S. SuPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROC-
ESS 19-39 (David K. Ryden ed., 2000) (discussing various group based representations and
a move away from a "community of interests").
252. E.g. Timothy G. O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, in AF-
FIRMATIVE ACTION AND REPRESENTATION: SHAW v RENO AND THE FUTURE OF VOTING
RIGHTS 43, 83 (Anthony A. Peacock ed., 1997) (defining the term as "roughly synony-
mous with 'recognition and maintenance of patterns of geography, social interaction, trade,
political ties, and common interests:" as well as "unique or prevailing characteristics of
places or regions ... or in terms of patterns of social or economic intercourse that are
geographically identifiable") (quoting Grofrnan, supra note 12, at 87); Katharine I. Butler,
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stressing physical proximity. As a result, the Miller Court indicated that a
"State is free to recognize communities that have a particular racial
makeup, provided its action is directed toward some common thread of
relevant interests" such as "'liv[ing] together in one community! "253 In
contrast, when a racial group is geographically dispersed a majority of the
Court considers districting based upon political interests arising from the
group's racial identity and collective experiences as inherently improper."4
Like geographical representation, relational representation has become
defined by trees or acres, not people.
An approach more consistent with the meaning of consent is to
regard "communities" not just as physical places, but also as "transcendent"
groups tied together by race, interest, or both.25 1 Several Justices have
emphasized the merits of such an approach, which enhances
representational knowledge and responsiveness. 256  Justice Souter
acknowledged that relational representation often can be better obtained
on the basis of racial identity instead of geography because "racial groups,
like all other groups, play a real and legitimate role in political
decisionmaking "' 257 Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg has observed that "[t]o
Affirmative Racial Gerrymandering: Rhetoric and Reality, 26 CUMB. L. RIE. 313,344 (1995-96)
(contending that communities of interest, including racial communities, may be recog-
nized if the communities are geographically compact).
253. Miller, 515 U.S. at 920 (quoting Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 646).
254. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 965-68 (plurality opinion); See also Miller, 515 U.S. at 920.
255. Kelly, supra note 208. As Kelly explains:
the importance of race also transcends place, creating a community that
has little to do with geography but everything to do with the larger po-
litical and cultural community of color. This larger community generally
recognizes the reality of racism, the pleasure of a common culture, and the
need to act together to effectuate common interests and to remedy com-
mon problems that repeat themselves across geographical divides.
Id. at 234-35. For further discussion of racial and ethnic communities of interest, see
Malone, supra note 208; TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, supra note 210, at 119-56; Lani
Guinier, (E)racing Democracy:The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HAv. L. REV. 109, 125-37 (1994);
Kim Forde-Mazrui,Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community Representa-
tion, 52 VAND. L. REv. 353, 382-88 (1999); Arend Lijphart, Proportionality by Non-PR
Methods: Ethnic Representation in Belgium, Cyprus, Lebanon, New Zealand, West Germany, and
Zimbabwe, in ELEcToRAL LAws, supra note 62, at 116-23 [hereinafter Proportionality by Non-
PR Methods].
256. By ensuring that voters who aggregate themselves by their own interests elect
someone who is directly accountable to their group, there is a greater likelihood that their
elected representative will understand their collective needs and be responsive to them. Cf
supra notes 168-80 and accompanying text (describing the importance of keeping repre-
sentatives close to their constituents to foster their knowledge and improve the quality of
representation).
257. Vera, 517 U.S. at 1051-52 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting). As Justice Souter explained,
"[it involves nothing more than an acknowledgement of the reality that our concepts of
common interest, geography, and personal allegiances are in many places simply too bound
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accommodate the reality of ethnic bonds, legislatures have long drawn
voting districts along ethnic lines" because "ethnicity itself can tie people
together" even if they have "divergent economic interests."2 ' Therefore,
Justice Ginsburg asserted that ethnicity often is a better foundation for
representation than geographical proximity."9 Even Justice Kennedy, who
wrote the majority opinion in Miller, conceded that race or ethnicity
could serve as the basis for a community of interest if a minority group
has been subject to residential segregation.2" Of course, districting based
upon communities of interest might lead to districts that lack
compactness or contiguity.26' This result is not particularly troubling
because relational representation requires recognition of actual
community interests loosely associated with, but not driven by,
geography.
262
For many elected offices, districting remains the method of represen-
tation most consistent with our traditional conceptions of consent. By the
up with race to deny some room for a theory of representative democracy allowing for
the consideration of racially conceived interests." Id.
258. Miller, 515 U.S. at 944-45 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting). Accord Abrams, 521 U.S. at 112
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (concluding that "it seems clear that rural and urban African Ameri-
can voters who live near each other might share important common interests"). Justice
Ginsburg further noted the disparate treatment of Hispanics and African Americans arising
from Shaw's failure to recognize the connection between race and interest. See generally
Miller, 515 U.S. at 947 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("If Chinese-Americans and Russian
Americans may seek and secure group recognition in the delineation of voting districts,
then African Americans should not be dissimilarly treated.").
259. See U.S. Tr. Oral Arguments, 2000 WL 1742700, at *39-40, Cromartie II, No. 99-
1864 & 99-1865 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2000) (responding to counsel's assertion that splitting cities
is "irreconcilable" with "communities of interest:' Justice Ginsburg observed that "I can
think of some areas of this city that might have more in common with areas of, say, Boston
than with each other. Take the difference between Anacostia and Northwest in Washing-
ton, D.C. in the same city but perhaps it's a greater commonality of interest with other
cities, with similar populations.....
260. Miller, 515 U.S. at 919-20.
261. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 555 (1999) ("Cromartie ") (StevensJ., con-
curring).
262. See Vera, 517 U.S. at 1049 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Although it is the law of the
Constitution that representatives represent people, not places or things or particular inter-
ests, the notion of representative democracy within the federalist fiamework presumes that
States may group individual voters together in a way that will let them choose a represen-
tative not only acceptable to individuals but ready to represent widely shared interests
within a district.").
A broader construction of "communities of interest" also has the salutary effect of
avoiding unprincipled attempts to separate race from politics and other interests demanded
by Shaw. See, e.g., Vera, 517 U.S. at 1060 (SouterJ., dissenting); Deconstructing the Obstruction-
ist Vision, supra note 7, at 445-48; Pildes & Niemi, supra note 136, at 578, 585-86. See also
Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose:A Comprehensive Approach to Strict Scrutiny
After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2000) (suggesting other ways in which the
Court might adjust its approach in Shaw to provide a sounder basis for applying strict
scrutiny to alleged cases of racial gerrymandering).
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same token, districts can enhance relational representation for all constitu-
ents-winning voters, losing voters, and non-voters alike-by creating a
direct tie between an individual representative and his or her constituents
that allows the representative to "serve an 'ombudsman' role ... between
their constituents and government agencies. ' '263 The continued relevance
of geography to meaningful relationships between constituents and their
representatives also dictates that the boundaries of districting be shaped by
the interests of voters. As a result, a more malleable approach to communi-
ties of interest should be adopted, permitting interest-based districting not
necessarily resulting in compact districts or strict maintenance of political
subdivisions."6 The Supreme Court followed this approach in Lawyer v.
Dep't of Justice2 6' and used evidence of communities of interest to sustain
the constitutionality of an irregularly shaped congressional district in
Cromartie II.2 Other courts have reached similar conclusions where there
they found evidence of "functional compactness." 267 However, if the
263. Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 1, at 294. See also THE PERSONAL VOTE, supra note
152, at 2, 8, 88, 101, 213; supra notes 155, 186-93 and accompanying text (describing the
"ombudsman" role of representatives).
264. See Chambers, supra note 209. The Justice Department's guidance memorandum
for the 2000 redistricting supports such an approach. See United States Dep't Just., Guid-
ance Concerning Redistricting and Retrogression Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, 66 Fed. Reg. 5,412 (2001) (proposed Jan. 18, 2001).The guidance
memorandum provides:
[C]ompliance with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act may require the
jurisdiction to depart from strict adherence to certain of its redistricting
criteria. For example, criteria which require the jurisdiction to make the
least change to the existing district boundaries, follow county, city, or pre-
cinct boundaries, protect incumbents, preserve partisan balance, or in
some cases, require a certain level of compactness of district boundaries
may need to give way to some degree to avoid retrogression.
Id. at 5,413.
265. 521 U.S. 567, 581 (1997) (upholding state senate district in which the constituents
"regard[ed] themselves as a community" and there was evidence that the district was "the
poorest of the nine districts in the Tampa Bay region and among the poorest districts in
the State, whose [W]hite and [B]lack members alike share a similarly depressed economic
condition ... and interests that reflect it"). It remains to be seen, however, whether the
Court would be willing to accept an irregularly shaped district comprised primarily of
Hispanics or African Americans. For the reasons discussed supra notes 256-63 and accom-
panying text, as long as residents of a district share common interests, the fact that they are
members of a particular racial or ethnic group should be of no moment.
266. See 121 S. Ct. at 1462 (finding that North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional Dis-
trict "joined three major cities in a manner legislators regarded as reflecting 'a real
commonality of urban interests, with inner city schools, urban health care ... problems,
public housing problems." (citation omitted)).
267. See Chen v. City of Houston, 9 F. Supp. 2d 745,755-56 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (mention-
ing Houston's redistricting plan that recognized the importance of "compactness and
contiguity"), aff'd, 206 F3d 502 (5th Cir. 2000); DeWitt v.Wilson, 856 F Supp. 1409, 1415
(E.D. Cal. 1994) (three-judge court) (holding redistricting principles conscious of race
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prevailing judicial paradigm persists in mandating scrupulous application
of geography and color-blindness at the expense of voter interests, then
departures from districting may be necessary. Only then will relational
representation continue to have any value.
IV MAJORITARIAN REPRESENTATION: CONSENT DEFINED BY NUMBERS
Majority rule is the polar star of our democratic system, resting on
the belief that popular sovereignty is satisfied by adopting those policy
decisions most preferred by the people. 268 Today, the principle of majority
rule is so firmly established that most Americans simply take it for granted
as an inevitable attribute of republican government. Of course, this as-
sumes that the will of the majority actually can be determined. This
supposition raises many questions. Who comprises the "majority"? At
what stages of the political process is the majority obtained? How long
does a majority last? How much of a majority is necessary before there is
sufficient consensus? Is it possible for something less than a majority to
determine policy? In sum, it is necessary to determine whether at any
given time, majority rule actually reflects the will of most of the people. If
it does not, then continued use of majority rule as a mechanism to obtain
consent becomes much more tenuous.
A. Majoritarian Representation: Falling Short of the Framers' Ideal
When the constitutional Framers created the new American
government, they were confronted with the question of how to best
obtain the consent of the governed. Past experience under the Articles of
Confederation made it clear that if consent meant one thing, it was not
unanimity, which would make the government unworkable. 69 Instead, the
accepted view of republican government that grew out of the
Enlightenment allowed for less support to maintain the social contract
with the people.2 7 The Founding Fathers settled on majority rule, which
constitutionally balanced traditional reapportionment principles), aff'd, 515 U.S. 1170
(1995).
268. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 37-38 (1956) [hereinaf-
ter PREFACE].
269. Article 13 of the Articles of Confederation required that any amendment to the
articles "be agreed to in a congress of the united states, and be afterwards confirmed by the
legislatures of every state." THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII (1777), reprinted in
ORIGINS, supra note 55, at 18. The effect of the unanimity requirement made it difficult, if
not impossible, to amend the Articles. No amendments were adopted because at least one
state always held out. See R. RANDALL BRIDWELL, THE POWER: GOVERNMENT BY CONSENT
AND MAJORITY RULE IN AMERICA 17 (1999).
270. John Locke explained the basis for using majority rule to obtain consent from the
people in a republic:
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already was used in the colonies." ' As James Madison argued, "in
republican government the majority however composed, ultimately give
the law."272 To the Framers, it seemed self-evident that majority rule is a
"fundamental principle of free government" 273 because they believed that
"the law of the majority is the natural law of every society of men. '274
Consequently, Thomas Jefferson concluded that the "first of all lessons in
importance" is that "the will of society enounced by the majority of a
single vote [is] as sacred as if unanimous.""27
Elections are the primary means to determine the will of the major-
ity. However, to the extent that elections measure consent, they "do not
establish it for long" because "[masses of people do not make clear-cut,
long-range decisions.''276 As a result, the Framers believed it essential to
For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual,
made a community, they have thereby made that community one body,
with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and
determination of the majority. For that which acts any community being
only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being one body must
move one way, it is necessary the body should move that way whither the
greater forces carries it, which is the consent of the majority; or else it is
impossible it should act or continue one body, one community ... and so
everyone is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority ...
[Tihe act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course
determines, as having by the law of nature and reason the power of the
whole.
JOHN LocKE,AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, ExTENT, AND END OF CIVIL Gov-
ERNMENT (1690), reprinted in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 403, 441-
42 (Edwin A. Burtt ed., 1967). Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who helped popularize the social
contract theory, agreed. According to Rousseau, "[alpart from this original contract, the
votes of the greatest number always bind the rest; and this is a consequence of the contract
itself." JEAN-JAcQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SoCIAL CONTRACT 153 (1762) (Maurice Cranston
trans., Penguin Books 1968). Rousseau suggested that consent could be derived by varying
degrees of majority rule ranging from a simple majority for elections and other "routine"
matters, to greater amounts for laws and matters of state. See JEAN-JAcQUES RoussEAu, THE
GOVERNMENT OF PoLAND 58 (1771) (Willmoore Kendall trans., Hackett Publishing 1985).
271. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVER-
EIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 40 (1988).
272. ORIGINS, supra note 55, at xiv. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 25, at
146 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing majority rule as the "fundamental maxim of repub-
lican government, which requires that the sense of the majority should prevail").
273. THE FEDERALIST No. 58, supra note 25, at 361 (James Madison).
274. THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 83 (Edward Dumbauld ed., 1985)
(emphasis in original). See also id. ("The first principle of republicanism is that the lex
majoris parties is the fundamental law of every society of individuals of equal rights.").
275. Id. at 83-84.
276. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986).
SPRNG 2002]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
obtain the consent of the people through regular and frequent elections.17
The House of Representatives, the more democratic of the two branches
of the national legislature, reflects the popular majority through biennial
elections.7 Recurring elections were a necessary means to ensure that
Representatives followed the instructions they were given by their con-
stituents and supported "an habitual recollection of their dependence on
the people."27 9 All too often, though, the regular elections of legislators at
all levels of government are less a reflection of majority rule than the
product of anti-democratic influences and the decisions of a minority of
the eligible voters.28
From the outset, the principle of majority rule that Madison and the
other Framers advanced was not as democratic as it appears.The "People"
from whom a "majority" was derived did not include every single
person.281 The "lowest and most ignorant of mankind" were excluded
277. See 1 Farrand, supra note 55, at 360-62 (June 21, 1787) (noting observations by
several delegates that "[tjhe people were attached to the frequency of elections"); THE
FEDERALIST No. 37, supra note 25, at 227 (James Madison) (positing that "[t]he genius of
republican liberty seems to demand on one side not only that all power should be derived
from the people, but that those entrusted with it should be kept in dependence on the
people by a short duration of their appointments"); TliE FEDERALIST No. 52, supra note 25,
at 327 (James Madison) (asserting that "[f]requent elections are unquestionably the only
policy by which this dependence and sympathy [of the government on the people] can be
effectually secured").
278. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 52, supra note 25, at
325-30 (James Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 53, supra note 25, at 330-36 (James Madi-
son) (outlining the reasons why Representatives were to be elected every two years). By
comparison, members of the less democratic Senate are elected to six year terms. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. The Framers adopted longer terms for the Senate to create institu-
tional stability to counterbalance the House, which was subject to a "rapid succession of
new members" who were more likely to have "a change of opinions; and from a change of
opinions, a change of measures." THE FEDERALIST No. 62, supra note 25, at 380 (James
Madison).
279. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, supra note 25, at 352 (James Madison).
280. Some pundits have suggested that non-voting really is a form of voting because it
tacitly endorses the status quo. See generally George F. Will, Op/Ed, Voting Blocks, WASH.
POST, Sept. 5, 1991, at A21 (arguing that "low turnouts are signs of social health .... When
society is not riven by deep fissures about fundamental questions, nonvoting may be pas-
sive consent, reflecting contentment"); Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in
Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STuD. 765, 785 (1998) (noting similar comments by other
political commentators). Of course, this view does not consider that electoral defects may
have caused people to stay away from the polls in the first place. See TYVRANNY OF THE MA-
josRiT, supra note 210, at 236-37 n.212. For example, sustained patterns of racially or
politically polarized voting or the present effects of past discrimination may be responsible
for voter "apathy" among members of voting minorities, who effectively are shut of the
political process. See, e.g., Teague v.Attala County, 96 F.3d 283,293-95 (5th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 807 (1997); United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F2d 1546,
1574-75 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 976 (1984).
281. See, e.g., DIXON, supra note 46, at 16, 43-45; Tyranny of the Judiciary, supra note 13, at
459-62; ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HIsTORY OF
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from the "important business" of voting. s 2 Blacks, women, men without
property, Indians, and children generally fell into this classy.2 Denial of
suffrage to these individuals was accepted because they "did not have
standing in law equal to that of freemen.""2 4 One historian has estimated
that on the eve of the Revolution, between 50 to 80 percent of adult
White males were eligible to vote, and because they comprised 20 percent
of the population "only 10 to 16 percent of the whole population" was
eligible to vote.28 Under such circumstances, if every eligible voter turned
out to cast a ballot, then the "majority" described by the Framers may
have included as little as five to eight percent of the total population.
Electoral decisions could be made by a minority, but with the imprimatur
of majority consensus.
Broader suffrage has not altered this result, though it is less extreme
today2 Voter turnout in the United States consistently is among the low-
est of the democratic nations in large part because political results often
are pre-determined in safe districts.28 7 One study showed that this country
ranked twenty-third out of twenty-four countries in the percentage of
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000); VOTING AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OFVOTING ANDVOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA (Donald
W Rogers ed., 1992). See also MORGAN, supra note 271 (positing that the Founding Fathers
invented the "American people" as the basis for the new representative government);
ELISHA P DOUGLASS, REBELS AND DEMOCRATS:THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL POLITICAL RIGHTS
AND MAJORITY RULE DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1955) (describing the struggle
of commoners for universal manhood suffrage during the American Revolution).
282. WOOD, supra note 60, at 168.
283. See Tyranny of the Judiciary, supra note 13, at 461-62; R. DARCY ET AL., WOMEN,
ELECTIONS AND REPRESENTATION 8-9 (1987) [hereinafter WOMEN, ELECTIONS AND REPRE-
SENTATION]. The denial of consent to Blacks was cured implicitly through the adoption of
the Reconstruction Amendments, although history proved that such constitutional protec-
tions were illusory when all three branches of government failed to prevent-and in some
cases even cooperated in-the continued political, social, and economic subjugation of
Blacks. See also Tyranny of the Judiciary, supra note 13, at 469-87. Similarly, the right of
women to consent to their government was recognized by ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, cl. 1 (declaring that the right to vote cannot be
denied to women).
284. FoRREST McDoNALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM:THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 54 (1985).
285. WOOD, supra note 60, at 167. This figure is only slightly higher than the approxi-
mately ten percent of the population in Great Britain eligible to vote during the same
period. See REID, supra note 154, at 52, 54-55.
286. Even today, a number of what I have referred to elsewhere as "structural process"
or "pure process" barriers effectively bar political participation by certain groups of people
in the United States, such as non-citizens, minors, insane persons, non-residents, and con-
victed felons. See Tyranny of theJudiciary, supra note 13, at 519-20.
287. See generally FRANCIS Fox PrVEN & RicHAIW A. CLOWA5RD, WHY AMERICANS STILL
DON'T VOTE (2000) (asserting that the lack of political competition has been intentionally
fostered by the two major political parties and has contributed to non-voting).
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turnout among eligible voters s.2 8 Turnout for the November 2000 Presi-
dential election was barely over fifty percent, roughly comparable to other
recent Presidential elections.2 19 President George W Bush, who lost the
popular vote and narrowly won the Electoral College, was elected by
slightly more than twenty-four percent of all eligible voters."9 Typically,
turnout for state and local elections is even lower.291 If majority rule
means anything, it is not a decision by a majority of eligible voters, a
point that even its strongest supporters acknowledge. 92 Actual majorities
simply are not required because they can be extraordinarily difficult to
produce 293 and decisions of those persons who actually vote is deemed a
sufficient measure of popular consent." As a result, true mandates of the
people rarely, if ever, materialize.
288. See id. at 189. Eligible voters refers to citizens of voting age. See id. See also Ruv A.
TEIXEiiRA,THE DISAPPEARING AMERICAN VOTER 8 (1992) (discussing findings that voter turn-
out in the United States trails that of most other democracies).
289. See Yochi J. Dreazen, Election 2000: Voter Turnout Stays Low Despite Barrage of Ads,
Close Race, WALL ST.J., Nov. 9, 2000, at A16. Turnout was 50.7 percent of 200 million eli-
gible voters, compared to 49 percent in 1996, 55 percent in 1992, and 50.1 percent in
1988. See id.; Susan Schmidt & John Mintz, Voter Turnout Up Only Slightly Despite Big Drive,
WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2000, at A35. Turnout in "off- year" general elections falls by approxi-
mately forty percent from presidential election years. See TEIxEIRA, supra note 288, at 6.
290. See John Harwood & Jeanne Cummings, Election's Legacy: How the Two Parties
Turned Into the Coke and Pepsi of Politics, WALL ST.J., Dec. 14, 2000, at A1;Albert R. Hunt,
Editorial, An Ugly Outcome With No Mandate, WALL ST.J., Nov. 9, 2000, at A27. Since 1945,
several presidents have been elected by capturing less than half of the vote. See Richard
Rose, Electoral Systems: A Question of Degree or of Principle?, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL
SYsTEM, supra note 22, at 73, 74. President Bush is the fourth president to win without
having the largest portion of the popular vote, and the first since 1888. Dan Balz, Victory
for Bush: Texan Claims Presidency After Gore Concedes Election; Both Pledge Unity and End to
'Bitterness' and 'Rancor', WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at Al. Moreover, of those who did turn
out to vote, President Bush only won a majority of male voters, capturing 53 percent,
compared to 42 percent of women, 41 percent of Asian Americans, 33 percent of His-
panic-Americans, and only 8 percent of African Americans. William Raspberry, Op-Ed;At
the Church of the Democratic Party, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2000, at A27. Of course, use of the
Electoral College to select the President, by its very nature does not ensure majority rule
for Presidential elections. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII
and U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
291. See, e.g., DAvID R. BERMAN, STATE AND LOCAL POLITIcs 21 (Donald W Rogers ed.,
1990); Donald W Rogers, Introduction: The Right to Vote in American History, in VOTING AND
THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3-4 (1992); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley,
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. RE. 903, 915 (1994). For exam-
ple, the average turnout in NewYork City's school board elections is only 7.5 percent. See
Lydia Segal, Who Really Runs the Schools?, CITY J.,Winter 1995, at 55.
292. See RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RuLE": A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST
MANIFESTO 68-69 (1994).
293. See DOUGLAS W RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS 25
(1967).
294. The Supreme Court's recent statutory construction of a majority vote require-
ment in Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250 (2000), demonstrates the conventional reasoning for
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Use of majority rule as a measure of consent is undercut further by
the failure to apply it uniformly as a rule of decision at every critical
stage of the political process. With the rise of political parties, the party
nomination process has become an indispensable part of determining
the persons who shall serve as representatives of the people. 295 However,
majority rule in candidate selections often may be rendered illegitimate
through the exclusion of racial or ethnic minorities from party
primaries 296 and non-partisan slating processes.2 97 If these problems are
not present, candidate nominations still might not reflect the views of a
majority of voters or even a majority of the party members.2 9s Consent
is not obtained from "the people" when the majority of voters are
denied the right to participate fully at the point where representatives
actually are chosen.
299
The districting process presents another key area where majority
rule is absent. Arguably, majority rule is obtained when a majority of the
members of a districting body accountable to the people adopts a par-
ticular districting plan. However, this contention is undercut by the
not requiring actual majorities.The plaintiffs argued that a reference in the Organic Act of
Guam to a "majority of the votes cast in any election" was a ballot-majority provision that
required a majority of all votes cast in the election-not for the actual offices-to be
elected. See id. at 252-53. The Court unanimously rejected this argument, finding that
such a requirement "would necessitate further action, the trouble and expense of which
would not make any apparent sense when those who expressed any preference among
candidates had already given a majority to one of them." Id. at 256-57.
295. See generally United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941) (reasoning that the
"right of participation is protected just as is the right to vote at the election, where the pri-
mary is by law made an integral part of the election machinery, whether the voter exercises
his right in a party primary which invariably, sometimes or never determines the ultimate
choice of the representative").
296. See, e.g., Terry v.Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (plurality opinion); Smith v.Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927).
297. "A nonpartisan slating group is defined as an organization whose purpose is to re-
cruit candidates, nominate them, and campaign for their election to office in a nonpartisan
election system." Chandler Davidson & Luis Ricardo Fraga, Nonpartisan Slating Groups in an
At-Large Setting, in MINorry VoTE DILUTION, supra note 12, at 119. Candidate-slating allows
local citizen groups to combine their support for a "slate" of candidates for various offices,
effectively making a nonpartisan slating group the "gatekeeper to public office." Id. at 120.
Non-partisan slating groups often have been used to select elected officials without eliciting
any support from racial and ethnic minorities. See id. at 119-43; Tyranny of the Judiciary, supra
note 13, at 523-29.
298. See infra notes 414-21 and accompanying text.
299. See Tyranny of the.Judiciary, supra note 13, at 523-29; V.O. KEY,J., SOuTERN POLmCs
IN STATE AND NATION (1949) (noting low voter turnout in the South, the "one-party system"
of Democratic Party domination and disenfranchisement of Black voters). A party nomina-
tion often is tantamount to election, making it especially important for all voters to have an
opportunity to participate in the nomination process. See Martin Shapiro, Interest Groups and
Supreme Court Appointments, 84 Nw. U. L. R. 935,938 (1990)..
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tendency of districting to enhance the political fortunes of parties and
their candidates by correspondingly limiting the choices of voters.300
Even if neutral criteria could be applied, 30' voters are constrained in
their ability to aggregate themselves according to their interests because
geographical district boundaries restrict their opportunities to do so. 30 2
And therein lies the fundamental problem with districts in most juris-
dictions. In the truest sense, majority rule is not possible because the
most important political decisions-where to draw the district lines and
how those lines will affect prospective candidates-already have been
made before a single voter casts a ballot.
3 3
Furthermore, majority rule usually is not required in elections. In the
United States, consent typically is secured through "winner-take-all"
electoral laws, in which "the person with the most votes wins."31 Winner-
take-all elections can be used under both majority and plurality-based
systems, leading to results "not necessarily based on overall majorities,
although it may produce them."'3 Under plurality-based systems, also
referred to as "first-past-the-post" and "relative majority" systems, a single
candidate must obtain more votes than her strongest single opponent, but
not necessarily a higher total than all of her opponents combined.3 The
objective of plurality winner-take-all elections only decides a winner, and
does not have to correspond with strict majority rule.307 Plurality systems
actually can submerge the popular will by permitting a politically
powerful minority to regularly elect its chosen candidates.
Majority vote requirements can correct this problem by
ensuring that the threshold of at least fifty percent plus one of the
300. See supra notes 63-78, 127-47 and accompanying text. See also Vera, 517 U.S. at 963
(plurality opinion) (describing a districting process in which "[t]he final result seems not one
in which the people select their representatives, but in which the representatives have selected
the people" (quoting Vera v. Richards, 861 F Supp. 1304, 1334 (S.D.Tex. 1994)).
301. See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 135-41,211-20 and accompanying text.
303. This problem may be minimized when there is a popular vote on a redistricting
referendum. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916); Legislature of Cal.
v. Deukmejian, 669 P2d 17 (Cal. 1983). However, a referendum does not immunize a
districting plan from constitutional defects. See Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of
Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (striking down Colorado districting referendum for violating
one person, one vote). In addition, although a majority might approve of the plan, it still can
result in districts from which a minority of voters who turn out elect most of the representa-
tives. See infia notes 335-38 and accompanying text.
304. TAYLOR & JOHNSTON, supra note 60, at 40.
305. Id.
306. RAE, supra note 293, at 25-26. The mathematical expression of a plurality-based
electoral system demonstrates that Party A has a plurality where ta > tn, with t representing
the actual party totals and n representing the strongest competition to A. Id. at 26.
307. Id. at 26-27. See also RJ. Johnston, Seats, Votes, Redistriaing, and the Allocation of Power
in Electoral Systems, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTM, supra note 22, at 60-63 [hereinafter
Allocation of Powe d (summarizing other defects of plurality win systems).
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voters turning out is met,3 usually through runoff
elections. 3°9 However, runoffs are uncommon in the United States for
most local, county, and state offices and are not used at all in general
elections for the President and members of Congress.
3 1 0
Other electoral rules sometimes guarantee the success of the ma-
jority's candidate, including prohibitions against single-shot or bullet
voting31 ' and the use of designated or numbered posts in at-large or
multimember systems. 31 Bullet or single-shot voting allows a minority
group to vote for one or a few of several candidates in a multiple-office
election and thereby have the effect of a weighted vote system by de-
priving "other candidates of votes relative to the group's preferred
candidate." 31 3 Prohibitions on bullet or "anti-single-shot voting" invali-
date ballots on which a voter has not marked a choice for every office.
314
Designated post or numbered place requirements allow "the voter only
one vote to cast per candidate per place" on the ballot."' Like anti-
single shot mechanisms, a numbered place requirement "destroys the
voter's ability to withhold votes from his candidate's competition."
31 6
Frequently, such rules have been employed to exclude racial mi-
norities from the political process because absent sufficient crossover
voting, a minority group is precluded from ever electing the candidates
of their choice.317 In Gingles, the Supreme Court recognized the poten-
tially harmful effects of majority vote requirements and similar electoral
devices and concluded that the presence of these electoral devices could
be considered in evaluating vote dilution claims under Section 2 of the
308. See RAE, supra note 293, at 23. The mathematical expression of a system using a




where t is any single party or candidate's share of the total vote and v is the total vote
returned in any district. Id. A majority vote means "that the winning party has defeated
the entire field of opposition; no combination of opponents can match its numerical
strength" Id. at 24.
309. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 160 n.22 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution:An Overview, in MINORITYVoTE DILUTION, supra
note 12, at 1,6.
310. See RAE, supra note 293, at 24; Davidson, supra note 309, at 6. Only twenty per-
cent of all cities have majority vote requirements for their council elections. Id.
311. Davidson, supra note 309, at 6-7.
312. Id. at 7.
313 Id. at 6; see City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 184 n.19 (1980) (quoting
U.S. COMM'N ON Civ. R s.,THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT:ThNYEARS AFTHR 206-08 (1975)).
314. Davidson, supra note 309, at 6-7.
315. Id. at 7.
316. Id.
317. See KouSSER, supra note 130, at 37-38, 138-242.
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Voting Rights Act.318 Furthermore, dilutive majoritarian mechanisms
have provided the foundation for successful claims by racial minorities
under the Constitution.3"9 The Supreme Court also has permitted
conditioned preclearance of election plans under Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act through elimination of a majority-vote requirement. 311 In light
of the scarce and potentially discriminatory use of electoral arrangements
to ensure the majority prevails, the interest in maintaining majority-based
electoral rules becomes much more questionable.
Plurality-based geographical districts fare little better because they
misrepresent the degree of popular support for particular candidates.32
Single-member plurality elections have the highest "threshold of exclu-
sion" of the most common types of election systems used in
democracies. 31 Under this type of system, the threshold of exclusion is
one-half, meaning that if an alliance of parties or a single strong party ob-
tains all votes not won by the prevailing party "it may fail to win such a
seat even with as much as half the vote.'1 323 Moreover, the possibility that
the two major political parties will lose seats to a strong third party creates
a tremendous incentive for them to collude in shutting the third party out
altogether.3 24 Political parties that control the districting process in a plu-
318. See 478 U.S. at 56.
319. See, e.g., Rogers, 458 U.S. at 627; White, 412 U.S. at 766-67; Louisiana v. United
States, 380 U.S. 145,147-50 (1965).
320. See City of Port Arthur, Tex. v. United States, 459 U.S. 159 (1982); See also
Deconstructing the Obstructionist Vision, supra note 7, at 435 (Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, "requires certain jurisdictions with a history of racial
discrimination to demonstrate that changes affecting voting do not have the purpose or
effect of discriminating against certain racial and language minority groups").
321. See Allocation of Power, supra note 307, at 60-63.
322. Douglas Rae et al., Thresholds of Representation and Thresholds of Exclusion, 3 COMP.
PoL. STUD. 479, 486 (1971) [hereinafter Thresholds of Representation]. "Thresholds of exclu-
sion" analysis measures "how large a share of the vote can be attained by a party which,
nevertheless, fails to win a seat." Id. at 480.This analysis reverses the basis for thresholds of
representation analysis, which asks "How little support can possibly earn a party its first
parliamentary seat?" Id. at 479 (citing Stein Rokkan, Elections: Electoral Systems, in INTENA-
TIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 16-20 (1968)). Electoral formulas
(plurality or majority, semi-proportional, or proportional) and average district magnitude
(the average number of representatives elected from each district) are the two most impor-
tant variables influencing thresholds of exclusion. See RAE, supra note 293, at 19-39;
AREND LIjPHART, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND PARTY SYSTEMS: A STUDY OF TWENTY-SEVEN DE-
MOCRACIES, 1945-1990, at 10-14 (1994).
323. Thresholds of Representation, supra note 322, at 481.
324. See generally id. at 485 ("In other words, it will 'pay' two or more established par-
ties to either form alliances or 'trade districts'-if they have a wish to exclude a small party
from representation."). Single-member districting encourages complicity between the
Democratic and Republican in evenly divided jurisdictions to maintain partisan balance,
which may lead to highly irregular districts. See generally Cromartie I, 526 U.S. at 549 (not-
ing that in redrawing its congressional districts to comply with the mandate in Shaw II,
North Carolina legislators sought "to preserve the existing partisan balance" of six De-
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rality system usually cannot refrain from using thresholds of exclusion to
increase their own political power at the expense of other parties and the
interests of individual voters.
325
The process of excluding the consent of large numbers of voters is
facilitated through the presence of wasted votes resulting from winner-
take-all elections.326 It is easy to conceive of wasted votes cast by "filler
people" included in a district solely to meet equal population require-
ments with no reasonable chance of electing their candidate of choice.
327
But the concept of wasted votes really goes much further, encompassing
any "votes that do not contribute to the actual election of a candidate'
328
As a result, even a person who has voted for the winning candidate has
wasted their vote if the candidate did not need their vote to be elected.3"9
Gerrymandering and other districting practices exploit wasted votes for
partisan advantage. 330 This flaw might be more palatable under a majori-
tarian or plurality system if it did not amplify the possibility that majority
rule would not be achieved.
Moreover, single-member plurality districts have a predilection for
defining consent solely by numbers without regard to the will of the
people. This characteristic of district elections causes dramatic distortions
to the level of voter support for each candidate. On the one hand, "the
plurality system can reward strong parties out of all proportion to the size
of their margins by giving the same reward to parties with 1 percent
margins as to those with 50 percent margins."331 When this occurs,
"exaggerated majorities" may appear.3 32 Parties with a bare majority of
mocrats and six Republicans in the State's congressional delegation). Use of regularly
shaped multimember districts may not avoid such collusion. See infra notes 448-59 and
accompanying text.
325. See GEORGE F.WILL, RESTORATION: CONGREss,ThRm LIMITS AND THE RECOVERY Or
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 83-86 (1992).
326. See Lakeman, supra note 22, at 42-43.
327. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Con-
stitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 588,630-33 (1992).
328. Pamela S. Karlan & Daniel R. Ortiz, Constitutional Elitism? Some Skepticism About
Dogmatic Assertions, 30 McGEORGE L. REv. 117, 120 (1998). See also Deconstructing the Ob-
structionist Vision, supra note 7, at 471 n.398 (citing additional sources that support this
position).
329. See TYRANNY OF THE MAjoRITY, supra note 210, at 129; The Way Out, supra note 8,
at 342. See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrn.IONAL LAW 1075 (2d ed. 1988)
("any vote in excess of a majority (or a plurality) is in a sense wasted"). This variety of
"wasted votes" for candidates commonly is referred to as "surplus votes." See Richard Brif-
fault, Lani Guinier and the Dilemmas ofAmerican Democracy, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 418,436 n.62
(1995) (book review).
330. Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 327; TYRANNY OF THE MAJORTY, supra note
210, at 135; Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regu-
lation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1325, 1341 (1987).
331. RAE, supra note 293, at 27.
332. See AMY, supra note 8, at 29-33.
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votes may capture most or all of the legislative seats, submerging a large
portion of the electorate in a manner grossly disproportionate to their
voting strength.
333
On the other hand, a plurality system can result in "manufactured
majorities" in which "election procedures give a party that receives less
than 50 percent of the vote more than 50 percent of the seats in the legis-
lature."334 When manufactured majorities appear, which has happened
quite frequently in American history, minority rule results. 3 Over two
hundred years ago, the Anti-Federalists objected to the possibility that
Congress would use its powers to regulate the election of its members
and manipulate majority rule through districting and voting precinct
placement to secure minority rule by the wealthy elite. 336 Their concerns
have not been too far off the mark. However, the plurality districting
practices and electoral rules of the state and local governments, not Con-
gress, have been responsible for these democratic failings. Manufactured
majorities undermine the premise that majority rule should at least be
present to select members of the legislative body.
33
Even when a plurality election results in an actual majority of voters
electing their representatives, majority rule still may not be achieved. The
333. See generally Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 130 (plurality opinion) (stating that "[i]f all or
most of the districts are competitive-defined ... as districts in which the anticipated split
in the party vote is within the range of 45% to 55Y--even a narrow statewide preference
for either party would produce an overwhelming majority for the winning party in the
state legislature"); Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 134 n. 11 (describing how the combined use of
multimember, winner-take-all elections in Marion County, Indiana caused Republicans to
lose all fifteen seats in the 1964 state legislative election "though they received 48.69% of
the vote").
334. AMy, supra note 8, at 33.
335. See id. at 36-39.
336. See generally Essays of"Brutus," supra note 57, at 330.
The proposed Congress may make the whole state one district, and direct,
that the capital ... shall be the place for holding the election; the conse-
quence would be, that none but men of the most elevated rank in society
would attend, and they would as certainly choose men of their own class
.... They may declare that those members who have the greatest number
of votes shall be considered as duly elected; the consequence would be
that the people, who are dispersed in the interior parts of the state, would
give their votes for a variety of candidates, while any order, or profession,
residing in populous places, by uniting their interests, might procure
whom they pleased to be chosen-and by this means the representatives
of the state may be elected by one tenth part of the people who actually
vote.This may be effected constitutionally ...
Id. See also FEDERAL FARMER LETTERS, supra note 57, at 276 (raising similar concerns).
337. See G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR., ELECTIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY: MAJORI-
TARTAN AND PROPORTIONAL VISIONS 77 (2000). See also Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 6




American conception of popular sovereignty dictates that "majority
support ought to be not only necessary but also sufficient for enacting
laws. ' '338 Nevertheless, nonmajoritarian mechanisms present in our system
of government may foster the adoption of legislation that does not reflect
the will of the people. 339 The Constitution includes a variety of
supermajority requirements that depart from simple majority rule in the
legislative process. 3' Furthermore, several parliamentary rules used in both
branches of Congress allow a minority of legislators to block bills.34' For
example, the Senate's filibuster rule requires a vote of at least three-fifths
of Senators duly chosen and sworn to close debate and force a vote on an
338. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 135 (1989) (emphasis in original).
This minimum requirement of majority rule was present from the foundation of our
country. The first rules adopted by the Constitutional Framers included a majority quo-
rum requirement and a majority vote requirement. See generally 1 Farrand, supra note 55, at
7-8 ("A House, to do business, shall consist of the Deputies of not less than seven States;
and all questions shall be decided by the greater number of these which shall be fully rep-
resented; but a less number than seven may adjourn from day to day."). The Quorum
Clause of the Constitution requires a majority of each house to be present to do business.
See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. There is no comparable constitutional requirement for
legislation to be passed by majority vote. Some of the Framers argued that such a require-
ment was implicit in the Constitution to avoid transferring power "to the minority." THE
FEDERALIST No. 58, supra note 25, at 361 (James Madison). See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 22,
supra note 25, at 147 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that to "give a minority a negative
upon the majority (Which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a
decision) is, in its tendency, to subject the sense of the greater number to that of the lesser
number."); THE FEDERALIST No. 62, supra note 25, at 378 (James Madison) (describing how
legislation cannot "be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people" in
the House of Representatives, "and then of a majority of the States" in the Senate); THE
FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 25, at 453 (Alexander Hamilton) (asserting "that all provi-
sions which require more than the majority of any body to its resolutions have a direct
tendency to embarrass the operations of the government and an indirect one to subject
the sense of the majority to that of the minority").
339. See generally Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1529, 1552 (2000) (describing nonmajoritarian components "including age
restrictions on voting and service in office, term limits for the President, the state-based
representation scheme of the Senate, and a myriad of organizing rules for the branches of
the legislature, such as committee and chairman powers and filibuster rules").
340. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (two-thirds vote of Senators present necessary for
impeachment conviction); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (two-thirds vote of the Senate or
House necessary to expel a member); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2-3 (two-thirds vote of
both houses required to override presidential veto); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (two-thirds
vote of Senators present necessary for ratification of treaties); U.S. CONST. art.V (two-thirds
vote of both houses necessary to amend Constitution, with amendments effective upon
ratification by three-quarters of the state legislatures).
341. See SARAH A. BINDER, MINORITY RIGHTS, MAJORITY RULE: PARTISANSHIP AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CONGRESS 19-42 (1997); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chermerinsky, The
Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REv. 181,221 (1997).
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issue provided that a quorum is present.342 In addition, in 1995 the House
of Representatives adopted a rule that barred passage of income tax rate
increases without approval of at least sixty percent of the voting
members.343 Many states have similar procedural rules. 344 The failure to
abide by majority rule in elected bodies does not necessarily render
legislative acts unconstitutional. 45 However, it does create a slippery slope
in which it becomes much more difficult to justify the selection of one




Other characteristics of American democracy foster legislative and
electoral decisions that do not satisfy majority rule. Representatives may
exercise their own independent judgment on issues inconsistent with the
views of most of their constituents. 347 The way issues are framed and pre-
sented to the people also can affect their views, making it possible to
derive majority support for a measure most voters actually oppose.34 Plu-
342. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO
CONGRESS, 68-A (4th ed. 1991). The House of Representatives does not have a filibuster
rule. Instead, the Rules Committee has the authority to schedule the amount of time for
debate and the dates for votes. Id. at 90.
343. See 141 CONG. Ric. 463 (1995) (enacted). A constitutional challenge to the rule
was dismissed because the federal courts found the alleged injury-in-fact to Representa-
tives bringing the lawsuit to be too speculative. See also Skaggs v. Carle, 898 F Supp. 1
(D.D.C. 1995), aft'd, 110 E3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1997). For competing opinions on whether
the House Rule is constitutional, compare Robert S. Leach, House Rule XXI and an Argu-
ment Against a Constitutional Requirement for Majority Rule in Congress, 44 UCLA L. REv.
1253 (1997) and John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legis-
lative Supermajority Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483 (1995) (supporting House
Rule XXI(5)(c)), with Benjamin Lieber & Patrick Brown, On Supermajorities and the Con-
stitution, 83 GEO. LJ. 2347 (1995) and Jed Rubenfeld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in
Congress, 46 DUKE LJ. 73 (1996) (opposing House Rule XXI(5)(c)). Much of this discus-
sion indicates that critics of the House Rule have the better of the two arguments. Further
discussion of the House Rule and similar legislative rules is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle.
344. See Max Minzner, Entrenching Interests: State Supermajority Requirements to Raise
Taxes, 14 AKRONTAX J. 43 (1999).
345. See generally Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. at n.6 ("We intimate no view on the con-
stitutionality of a provision requiring unanimity or giving a veto power to a very small
group").
346. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amend-
ment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 457, 503 (1994) ("Once majority rule is
abandoned, there is no logical stopping point between, say, a 50% plus two rule, and a
99.9% rule.") (emphasis omitted).
347. See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note 185, at 122-23. The question of whether
representatives are mere delegates who follow the mandate of a majority of their constitu-
ents or act as trustees who may exercise independent judgment has been an enduring
debate in democratic theory. See PITKIN, supra note 35, at 144-89.
348. See KENaET J. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951). For an
example of how semantics can affect popular support for a measure such as affirmative
action, see Deconstructing the Obstructionist Vision, supra note 7, at 417 n.73.
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rality electoral rules further enhance the likelihood that adopted policies
only demonstrate the views of the minority.349 Considering the many
ways in which our election system fails to reflect popular consent at all
stages of the political process, it is not surprising that public policy often
does not reflect majority rule.
3
10
B. The Limits of Proportional Representation:
Allocation of Seats vs Allocation of Power
Regular departures from majority rule demonstrate the inherent
limitations of trying to obtain majority support in a pluralistic society. For
this reason, critics of winner-take-all elections argue that proportional and
semi-proportional systems are better suited for representing the popular will
because more voters decide election results.311 Without districting and party
nominations, they contend that all voters may participate in the stage of the
electoral process where the winner actually is determined. 352  Self-
aggregation of voters under proportional election rules reduces the number
of wasted votes that occur under single-member district elections.
3 3
Furthermore, thresholds of exclusion are lowered as the number of
representatives elected from districts increases, decreasing the possibility of
exaggerated or manufactured majorities under increased party
competition.34  Generally, women and minorities fare better under
proportional electoral rules designed to better reflect the nation's diverse
population. 35 More political choices and opportunities may even lead to
greater interest and participation among all voters.35 6 Consequently,
349. See DM-L,supra note 338, at 145-46.
350. See Alan D. Monroe, Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993,62 PuB. OPINION
Q. 6, 15-16 (1998) (finding that legislative outcomes coincided with public opinion fifty-
five percent of the time).
351. See, e.g., Richie & Hill, supra note 150, at 9-13.
352. See, e.g., George H. Hallett,Jr., Proportional Representation with the Single Transferable
Vote: A Basic Requirement for Legislative Elections, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra
note 22, at 119-24.
353. See, e.g., AMY, supra note 8, at 24-26, 52; TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, supra note
210, at 119-56; Lani Guinier, More Democracy, 1995 U. CHI. LEGALF. 1 (1995).
354. See Thresholds of Representation, supra note 322, at 481-87; RAE, supra note 293, at
114-25.
355. See, e.g., Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 1, at 274-76; AMY, supra note 8, at 99-139;
Lakeman, supra note 22, at 50; Hallett, supra note 352, at 122-23; infra notes 439-40, 453,
459 and accompanying text.
356. See, e.g., AMy, supra note 8, at 144-52; GUINIER, supra note 238, at 263;TIRANNY OF
THE MAJORITY, supra note 210, at 85-86, 152-53; Richie & Hill, supra note 150, at 13-14;
Alternative Ways Out, supra note 8, at 1891-95. But see John Ferejohn, Cautionary Notes, in
REFLECTING ALL OF Us, supra note 8, at 40, 42 (rejecting the assertion that turnout is
higher in proportional systems than single-member district systems by citing the high
turnout of countries using single-member districting including the United Kingdom,
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proportional representation may increase the likelihood that an elected
body as a whole reflects the will of the majority, even if the election of its
individual members does not.
35 7
Yet, proportional and semi-proportional models cannot avoid the pos-
sibility that minority groups which achieve electoral success proportionate
to their voting strength nevertheless might have little, if any, substantive pol-
icy-making power in the legislative body.38 Fair "allocation of seats" does
not guarantee "fairness in the allocation of power" or "more responsive, ac-
countable, and representative government."39 If a particular group has a
majority of the seats in a legislature, it may have little incentive to deal with
minority groups that have achieved proportional representation.36" Likewise,
a minority group with a plurality of seats is more apt to bargain with
groups that have sufficient seats to create a coalition with a voting
majority.361 In this sense, proportional representation systems may replicate
the "token representation" that some commentators have suggested occurs
in majority-minority single-member districts. 362 This shortcoming is in-
evitable in our system of government as long as majority rule is required
in the legislative body.
Conversely, election of members of a political minority may have an
important instrumental influence. Their participation can introduce views
into the legislative body that otherwise might not be considered. If the
deliberative process is functioning properly, it may be possible to convince
France, and New Zealand and lower turnout in Poland, which uses proportional represen-
tation); Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 1, at 290-91 (observing that after cumulative
voting was adopted in Chilton County, Alabama, White turnout "remained stable" and
Black turnout initially decreased). Recent studies suggest that proportional representation
may increase turnout between 9 and 12%. See also Arend Lijphart, Unequal Participation:
Democracy's Unresolved Dilemma, 91 POL. Sci. Rav. 1,7 (Mar. 1997); Arend Lijphart, Democ-
racies: Forms, Performance, and Constitutional Engineering, 25 Eun.J. POL. Rs. 1, 4-8 (1994).
357. However, proportional representation systems do not invariably lead to more rep-
resentative government. One study of western governments found that "[t]he most
representative plurality system, the United States House of Representatives, is at least as
proportional as seven of the seventeen PR systems" Rose, supra note 290, at 74-75. Rose
also found that the most proportional PR system, Austria, achieved only slightly more
representative results than the plurality system used to elect Representatives in the United
States. See id. at 75.
358. See, e.g., Choosing an Electoral System, supra note 118, at 6-7; Allocation of Power,
supra note 307, at 65-69.
359. Allocation of Power, supra note 307, at 64.
360. Id.
361. See id. at 65.
362. See TYRANNy OF THE MAjorrY, supra note 210, at 41-70, 117-18; see also Pamela S.
Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L.
REV. 1, 41-43 (1991). Cf Deconstructing the Obstructionist Vision, supra note 7, at 478-82
(critiquing the argument that minorities inevitably must sacrifice substantive representa-
tion to secure descriptive representation in legislative bodies).
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political opponents that the minority's proposed course of action is the
best one to folow.
363
Arguably, modified parliamentary rules can avoid this problem by en-
suring that minority group representatives are able to exercise political
power commensurate with the voting strength of their constituency
These types of legislative rules have been described as "procedural advan-
tages protected from arbitrary change that enable members of the
minority party to amend, debate, or obstruct the majority agenda. A pro-
cedural advantage confers on a member or group of members preferential
access to the legislative process at a particular stage of the game.' 36 John
C. Calhoun's proposal for a "concurrent majority" in place of "numerical"
or "absolute" majorities in legislative bodies is one example of such an
approach. 35 According to Calhoun, this form of "minority veto" would
give each group "the power of self-protection" over those issues that affect
it the most.3" Similarly, Lani Guinier has proposed the use of legislative
cumulative voting or additional "supermajority voting" requirements that
"would be used to reduce to a proportionate level the disproportionate
power [W]hite voters or representatives currently enjoy."367 In this manner,
363. See Deconstructing the Obstructionist Vision, supra note 7, at 489-92; see also Tyranny of
the Judiciary, supra note 13, at 450 n.19.
364. BINDER, supra note 341, at 21 (emphasis omitted).
365. See JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DIsQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT (Richard K. Cralle ed.,
Peter Smith NewYork, 1943) (1853). Calhoun described the difference between numeri-
cal majorities and concurrent majorities in the following manner:
[Olne regards numbers only, and considers the whole community as a
unit, having but one common interest throughout; and collects the sense
of the greater number of the whole as that of the community. The other,
on the contrary, regards interests as well as numbers, considering the
community as made up of different and conflicting interests, as far as the
action of the government is concerned; and takes the sense of each,
through its majority or appropriate organ, and the united sense of all, as
the sense of the entire community. The former of these I shall call the
numerical or absolute majority; and the latter, the concurrent, or constitu-
tional majority. I call it the constitutional majority, because it is an
essential element in every constitutional government, be its form what it
may
Id. at 28.
366. Id. at 35,48-49.
367. TYRANNY oF THE MAJoRITY, supra note 210, at 260 n.119. Legislative cumulative
voting would allow all groups of representatives proportionate voting power by "plumping
votes to express the intensity of constituent preferences on some issues and trading votes
on issues of constituent indifference." Id. at 108. Alternatively, Guinier suggested requiring
"a supermajority vote on issues of importance to the majority or its equivalent, a minority
veto on critical minority issues." Id. Professor Guinier indicated that this form of legisla-
tive decision-making could mirror the jury deliberation process, in which outcomes reflect
legislative consensus rather than merely the views of the numerical majority. See id. at 107.
Guinier was subject to caustic criticism for these suggestions when she was nominated as
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modified parliamentary rules are said to be more likely to produce results
consistent with the interests of all the people.
Altering legislative rules of decision causes considerable
difficulties under our system of government. Existing supermajority rules
are used sparingly for narrow categories of extraordinary actions to
avoid regular disruptions in the legislative process and to focus public at-
tention on particular issues. When the rules are invoked they can lead
to results not only inconsistent with the will of the people, but also
antithetical to principles of good government 6 ' or even basic civil
rights. 369 Minority vetoes present the additional quandary of deciding
which minorities have a veto consistent with principles of equal protec-
tion, not to mention the difficulty of establishing when the veto may be
exercised. Moreover, minority veto or supermajority requirements in-
crease the chances that measures that do not have the support of a
majority of the people will become the rule, rather than the exception.
This creates the real possibility of a "counter-majoritarian default" which
has the potential to be equally antithetical to democratic principles as its
majoritarian counterpart.37
The perceived threat that counter-majoritarian election rules and
parliamentary procedures pose to traditional American notions of popular
sovereignty underlies many of the Supreme Court's decisions. Justice
Stewart explicitly concluded in his Bolden plurality opinion that "[t]he
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require
proportional representation as an imperative of political organization."37'
Instead, the Court has viewed districting as an acceptable "middle ground
between winner-take-all statewide elections and proportional representa-
tion for political parties."3 72 Requiring anything more than simple
assistant attorney general of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division. See Deconstruct-
ing the Obstructionist Vision, supra note 7, at 409-10. Out of fairness to Guinier, even if one
disagrees with her proposal for some type of legislative supermajority requirement to
make government inclusive for all groups of voters, it does not undercut the force of her
reasoning about the defects of single-member, winner-take-all district elections.
368. For example, although a majority of the American people support campaign fi-
nance reform, for the past decade legislation to achieve this goal has been blocked
repeatedly in the United States Senate by the minority's use of the filibuster. See Helen
Dewar & Ruth Marcus, Campaign Reform Proposals Grow, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2001, at
A10.
369. See BINDER, supra note 341, at 191-95; Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 341, at
199-200 (describing the use of filibusters by Southern Senators in the 1940s and 1950s to
prevent passage of civil rights legislation).
370. Under the "majority default" position of constitutional law, "when a court de-
clines to act at all in a particular instance, it also has made a substantive decision ... one
which says that the decision of the majority wins." Tyranny of the Judiciary, supra note 13, at
502. For criticism of this "non-approach" to constitutional law, see id. at 502-04, 507-08.
371. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 75-76 (plurality opinion).
372. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 159 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Gaffney, 412 U.S. at
753 ("The very essence of districting is to produce a different--a more 'politically fair'-
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majority rule generally is seen as anti-democratic because it provides in-
sufficient representation to the majority3 7  Chief Justice Warren's
description of the equal population principle explains this reasoning:
Logically, in a society ostensibly grounded on representative
government, it would seem reasonable that a majority of the
people of a State could elect a majority of that State's
legislators. To conclude differently, and to sanction minority
control of state legislative bodies, would appear to deny ma-
jority rights in a way that far surpasses any possible denial of
minority rights that might otherwise be thought to result.
3 74
Departures from majority rule also do not provide a rule of
decision for distinguishing between minority groups seeking representa-
tion.375 Therefore, the Court has been willing to defer to majoritarian
principles, even where it gives the majority a disproportionate share
of political power,376 or deies third parties an opportunity to
succeed.377 According to Justice Scalia, the Court must abide by the "emi-
nently democratic principle that-except where constitutional
imperatives intervene-the majority rules."
3 78
The Court's stated approach to resolving the limitations of
majoritarian government is consistent with the views of the
Constitutional Framers on the subject.379 Generally speaking, the will of
the majority must prevail. Deviations from strict majoritarianism are
permissible when voters are treated unequally in either the political
result than would be reached with elections at large, in which the winning party would
take 100% of the legislative seats.").
373. See generally Gordon, 403 U.S. at 6 ("Certainly any departure from strict majority
rule gives disproportionate power to the minority").
374. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565. See also id. at 576 (expressing apprehension at
"frustrat[ing] ... the majority will through minority veto in the house not apportioned on
a population basis"); Lucas, 377 U.S. at 751 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("so long as a State's
apportionment plan reasonably achieves ... effective and balanced representation of all
substantial interests, without sacrificing the principle of effective majority rule, that plan
cannot be considered irrational").
375. See generally Bolden, 446 U.S. at 123 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("A requirement of
proportional representation would indeed transform this Court into a 'super-legislature' ...
and would create the risk that some groups would receive an undeserved windfall of po-
litical influence.").
376. See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
377. See Timmons v.Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351,379 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the States from maintaining single-
member districts with winner-take-all voting arrangements" even though these elements
have a disparate impact on third parties); infra notes 427-36 and accompanying text.
378. Cal. Democratic Party v.Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402, 2413 (2000). See also Reynolds, 377
U.S. at 566 ("Our constitutional system amply provides for the protection of minorities by
means other than giving them majority control of state legislatures.").
379. See Tyranny of the Judiciary, supra note 13, at 465-69.
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process or outcomes determined on an unconstitutional basis. Balancing
majority rule with its discriminatory effects requires judicial
determination of whether winner-take-all rules have interact with other
election features to deny minority groups equal access to the political
process.38 0 For example, the Court may have envisaged that certain
configurations of multimember districts may be unlawful because of
"their winner-take-all aspects, their tendency to submerge minorities and
to overrepresent the winning party."38 1 Constitutionalism constrains
judicial intervention to those circumstances when majoritarian
institutions fail to provide for and respect the "'democratic' conditions-
of equal status for all citizens."
38 2
The present Court has departed from its constitutional role by sig-
nificantly altering its definition of "equality" in Shaw and its other voting
decisions. 83 Some critics of these decisions argue that the problems that
Shaw poses to representative government may be avoided by adopting
alternative voting systems that do not require geographical-based district-
ing.13 But proponents of proportional representation systems promise
more than they can deliver by seeking "to remedy inequality of consid-
eration within the legislative process" without "judicial monitoring."
35
One may disagree with the incoherent reasoning and results of the racial
gerrymandering cases-and there is a lot to disagree with-but there
simply is no way to avoid the important role that the courts must play in
the regulation of consent. 6 Majority rule, in whatever form, must be
tempered by the vigilant gaze of members of the third branch of govern-
ment.
380. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 25, at 77-84 (James Madison); THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 51, supra note 25, at 320-25 (James Madison). For further discussion of
approaches to protecting minorities from the tyranny of majority factionalism, see, e.g.,
PREFACE, supra note 268, at 4-33; TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, supra note 210;JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73-104 (1980); BICKEL,
supra note 276, at 16-23; Tyranny of theJudiciary, supra note 13.
381. Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 158-59. See also id. at 165 (Harlan,J., separate opinion) (ob-
serving that "past decisions have suggested that multi-member constituencies would be
unconstitutional if they could be shown 'under the circumstances of a particular case ... to
minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting
population' "(quoting Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439)).
382. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw:ThE MoRAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CON-
STITUTION 17-18 (1996).
383. See Deconstructing the Obstructionist Vision, supra note 7; Tyranny of the Judiciary, supra
note 13, at 561-609.
384. See supra note 8.
385. TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY, supra note 210, at 109.
386. See generally Tyranny of the Judiciary, supra note 13, at 465-69, 487-505 (describing




DEFINED BY MAJOR PARTY AFFILIATION
Two-party government is another dominant attribute of our repre-
sentational system. Political parties are not entitled to representation in
their own right. Instead, parties act as intermediaries between the people
and their representatives.31 7 In this way, they "serve as a vehicle for making
their members' voices more effective in the electoral process and in many
cases, help to shape their members' preferences." 3 Although certain quali-
ties of partisan affiliation facilitate consent, the dominance of the two
major parties over political campaigns and policy agendas also may lead to
results antithetical to the representational interests of the people. The
question remains whether the benefits of two-party government may be
achieved under alternative election rules designed to provide more equi-
table representation without unduly limiting the political choices of
individual voters.
A. The Evolution of the Two-Party System
On the surface, the Founding Fathers' decidedly negative views of
party politics made it seem unlikely that political parties would play any
role in obtaining the consent of the people. Madison described political
parties in terms of "factions" of citizens "who are united and actuated by
some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community.' '389 Alexander Hamilton similarly articulated how the "spirit
of party" would "infect all political bodies" with "persons in the national
legislature willing enough to arraign the measures and criminate the
views of the majority.' ' 39° In a like manner, George Washington decried the
"baneful effect" of parties and their "common and continual mischiefs"
which were "sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people
to discourage and restrain it.' 39' Far from providing a reliable mechanism
for securing popular sovereignty, these comments suggest parties were
more likely to corrupt it.
387. See Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA.
L.REv. 1627 (1999).
388. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE
POLITICAL PROCESS 186 (1998) [hereinafter TIE LAW OF DEMOCRACY].
389. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 25, at 78 Games Madison).
390. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, supra note 25, at 171 (Alexander Hamilton).
391. George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 213, 219 Games D. Richardson
ed., 1897).
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Yet, the Founding Fathers also were pragmatic in recognizing the in-
evitability of political parties in republican government. According to
Madison, human nature prevented the removal of the causes of faction,
making it necessary to control its effects.3 92 Minority factions were not
difficult to constrain because the principle of majority rule could limit
their influence. 393 Majority factions, however, posed significant dangers to
the "public good."39 4 Madison believed that the threat of majority faction-
alism could be removed through separating the powers of each branch of
government from one another and creating an intricate system of checks
and balances that would limit any single group from exercising unfettered
political power.399 In this way, political parties could develop and aggregate
people together to form a government without destroying its representa-
tional foundation or permanently shutting out particular groups of voters.
The utility of political parties was apparent from the earliest days of
our Republic. During the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and subse-
quent debates over ratification, Federalists and Anti-Federalists focused
attention of the people on issues that helped to shape the new national
government.396 Partisan labels such as "Federalist" and "Republican" facili-
tated the ability of voters to readily identify the respective positions of
politicians in the earliest elections. 3 7 The parties themselves actively
courted public opinion, debating important issues in the press to win
popular support for their political platforms and legislative agendas. 3 8 Po-
litical associations were formed to organize groups of supporters and
mobilize turnout for contested elections.399 Parties made determination of
consent more manageable by bringing like-minded voters together to
select their representatives.' As one historian has observed, political par-
392. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 25, at 80 (James Madison). Madison explained
that the causes of faction could only be eliminated "by destroying the liberty which is
essential to its existence" or "by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same pas-
sions, and the same interests." Id. at 78.
393. See id. at 81.
394. Id.
395. See Tyranny of theJudiciary, supra note 13, at 462-69.
396. See WOOD, supra note 60, at 471-564. See, e.g., supra notes 57-58 and accompanying
text; THEo FEDERALIST, supra note 25; ORIIGINS, supra note 55; STORING, supra note 170 (illustrating
some of the public arguments made by Federalists and Anti-Federalists regarding the Constitu-
tion and method of government to be used in the new Republic).
397. See THE LAW OF DRMOcRA CY, supra note 388, at 188.
398. SeeJohn J.Janssen, Dualist Constitutional Theory and the Republican Revolution of 1800,12
CONST. COMMENT. 381,386-92 (1995).
399. See, e.g., JAMES R. SHARP, AMERICAN PoLmcs IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 8-13 (1993);
JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN
AMERICA 68-95 (1995).
400. See, e.g., THE FIRST PARTY SYSEM: FEDERALISTS AND REPUBLICANS (William N. Cham-
bers ed., 1972); WILLIAM N. CHAMBERS, POLITICAL PARTIES IN A NEw NATION: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE, 1776-1809, 14-16 (1963); NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM,JR.,THEJEFFERSONIAN REPUB-
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ties fostered representative government by "providing orderly means of
determining the majority's will and enabling conflicting forces to settle
their differences peacefully."
401
These early political activities did not immediately result in a strong
two-party system. Political affiliations initially were much more informal
and localized, and did not evolve into the more organized form we
commonly associate with parties until the Jacksonian Era in the 1830s. 2
As these groups grew to national prominence, the widespread use of
winner-take-all plurality elections for state legislatures and the House of
Representatives produced an environment favorable to development of
two major parties. 0 3 Plurality voting creates a "tendency for a two-party
system to develop in the sense that, out of an unlimited number of parties,
only two can expect either to win a majority of seats, or to be the
strongest opposition, with a chance to win an absolute majority in the
next election. " ' This tendency is sustained by the presence of large
numbers of wasted votes under district-based plurality elections, which
LIcANs,THE FoRMATION OF PARTY ORGANIZATION, 1789-1801 (1957). Some states used nominat-
ing procedures to select party candidates as early as 1796. SeeJanssen, supra note 398, at 390. In
the election of 1800, Federalists and Republicans conducted caucuses to nominate their con-
gressional candidates. See, e.g., id.;Joanne B. Freeman, The Election of 1800:A Study in the Logic of
Political Change, 108 YALE UJ. 1959,1969 (1999).
401. Paul Goodman, The First American Party System, in TiE AMmucAN PARTy SySTEms:
STAGES OF POLmcAL DEVELOPMENT (William N. Chambers &Walter D. Burnham eds., 1967).
402. See ALDRICH, supra note 399, at 98-156;Wiliam N. Eskridge,Jr. & John Ferejohn, The
Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. RE. 1355, 1373
(1994).
403. See Lij1HARr, supra note 322, at 20. Henry Droop, an English barrister and nineteenth
century proponent of proportional representation, is credited with explaining how plurality
voting supported creation of strong two-party system in Great Britain and the United States.
See William H. Riker, Duverger's Law Revisited, in ELECTORAL LAws, supra note 62, at 19,22-23.
Maurice Durverger popularized this conclusion through what has become known as
"Duverger's law":"(1) the plurality method tends to lead to a two-party system; (2) proportional
representation tends to lead to a system of many mutually independent parties; (3) the two-
ballot majority system tends to produce multipartism tempered by alliances" Maurice Duverger,
Which is the Best Electoral System?, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSrEM, supra note 22, at 31, 35
[hereinafter Which is the Best Electoral System?] (quoting and translating MAURICE DUVERGER,
INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES Er DROIT CONsTrrUnONNEL: ToME 1, LES GRANDS SYST M POLITIQUES
144 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 16th ed. 1980)). Duverger's law does not mean that
use of a plurality win system necessarily assures a two-party government. See Arend Lijphart,
Trying to Have the Best of Both Worlds: Semi-Proportional and Mixed Systems, in CHOOSING AN
ELEcloRAL SySTEM, supra note 22, at 207, 208 [hereinafter Trying to Have the Best of Both Worlds];
Proportionality by Non-PR Methods, supra note 255, at 121 (citing Canada and Nigeria as
examples of nations using a plurality election rule without a strong two-party system).
404. Ferdinand A. Hermens, Representation and Proportional Representation, in CHOOSING AN
ELECTORAL Sysnm, supra note 22, at 15, 22.
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exaggerate political support and "maintain the impression of two widely
supported parties even when this is illusory."'4°
The interaction of these various electoral features has fostered
two-party representation at most levels of our government. With
the exception of Unionist Andrew Johnson, every American President
since 1853 has been a member of either the Democratic or Republican
Parties.4 Today, the Democratic and Republican Parties dominate the
governorships,47 state legislatures,' and Congress. 409 In contrast, local
jurisdictions tend to have less of an interest in maintaining the major
party system. The same reform movements in the early twentieth century
that led to the abolition of ward elections4 1° caused many municipalities to
distance themselves from party politics.411 As a result, most cities use
nonpartisan elections."' Nevertheless, two-party representation remains
the general rule for American politics.
405. Peter C. Fishburn, Social Choice and Pluarlitylike Electoral Systems, in ELECTORiA LAWS,
supra note 62, at 193, 201-02. See also supra notes 321-38 and accompanying text (describing
the problem of wasted votes under winner-take-all elections).
406. See GEORGE B.TINDALL,2 AmERwcA:A N~aRRATrvE HisToRw 40-43 (1st ed. 1984).
407. Of the 50 state governors currently in office, 31 are Republicans, 17 are Democrats,
and two are independents. See MICHAEL BARoNE & GRANT UJIFSA,THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN
PoLmcs 2000 1785 (1999); National Governor's Ass'n, The Governors, Political Affiliations, and
Terms of Offce, 2001, available at http://www.nga.org/cda/files/GOVLIST2001.pdf (visited Mar.
26,2001).
408. After the 2000 general election, there were 3,819 Democratic state legislators, 3,531
Republican state legislators and only 74 state legislative seats controlled by other parties, inde-
pendents, vacancies, or undecided races. News Release, Nat'l Conf. of State Legis., 2000
Elections Bring Historic Balance to State Legislatures (Nov. 15, 2000), available at
http.//www.ncsl.org/programs/press/2000/elecstte.htm. The Democratic Party holds a 2,820-
2,597 advantage in House seats and a 999-934 advantage in Senate seats. Id. For a state-by-state
breakdown of legislative seats, see Nat'l Conf. of State Legis., 2000 Partisan Composition of State
Legislatures, available at http://www.ncsl.org/ncsldb/elect98/partcomp.cfn?yearsel=2001 (last
modified Jan. 25,2001).
409. As a result of the November 2000 general election, Republicans have a 221-211 ma-
jority over Democrats in the House of Representatives with two independents and one vacancy.
JimVandeHei & Shailagh Murray, Bushs Ability to Exploit Democrats' Rifts Could Be Key to Ad-
vancing His Agenda, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 3,2001, at A16. Democrats have a narrow 50-49 plurality
in the Senate after James Jeffords ofVermont announced that he was leaving the Republi-
can Party to become an independent. John Lancaster & Helen Dewar,Jeffords Tips Senate
Power, Democrats Prepare to Take Over as Vermont Senator Quits GOP, WASH. PosT, May 25,
2001, at Al.
410. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
411. See Carol A. Cassel, The Nonpartisan Ballot in the United States, in ELECTORAL LAWS,
supra note 62, at 226.
412. See id. at 226-27; Nancy Northup, Note, Local Nonpartisan Elections, Political Parties
and the First Amendment, 87 COLUM. L. R.EV 1677, 1677-84 (1987).The usage of nonparti-
san elections in municipalities varies considerably by region. Over two-thirds of all cities
in the Northeast have nonpartisan elections, compared to fewer than ten percent of all
cities in the Western states. See Cassel, supra note 411, at 227.
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B. Inherent Conflict?: Whether Maintaining a Two-Party System and
Obtaining Majority Consent are Mutually Exclusive
The political hegemony of the two major parties at the federal and
state levels is sustained by their ability to control the entryway to legisla-
tive bodies in a manner that does not necessarily correspond with
majority rule. The party nomination process has become an indispensable
part of determining the individuals who shall serve as representatives of
the people.413 Parties are free to make the ultimate decisions about which
candidates best represent their interests and hence the interests of voters,
sometimes without any input from party members 4 The breakdown of
popular sovereignty in the nomination process is compounded by the
overwhelming power of incumbency, ' s disparate campaign finances, and
special interest groups to select the candidates who actually are presented
to the voters at elections. 46 After these anti-democratic forces have influ-
enced the candidate selection process, parties market their choices to
voters as the best options to implement policies that they favor.41 7 In this
way, parties and antidemocratic influences may define the scope of con-
sent, with elections frequently serving as litde more than instrumental and
formalistic means to arrive at seemingly preordained results.
The 2000 Presidential election demonstrates the use of nominating
procedures to curb the popular selection of party nominees.Texas Gover-
nor George W Bush widely was regarded as the Republican Party's
presumptive nominee long before the primary season began, largely due
413. See supra note 295.
414. See DENISE L. BAER & DAVID A. BOSITIS, ELITE CADRES AND PARTY COALITIONS:
REPRESENTING THE PUBLIC IN PARTY POLITICS (1988). See also The Supreme Court, 1996
Term-Leading Cases, 110 HARv. L. REV. 135, 362-65 (1996) (describing a model of electoral
behavior in which party leaders "will have incentives to.limit party members' participation
in the candidate-selection process").
415. In recent years, about two percent of all federal Representatives and ten percent of
all Senators failed to secure their party's nomination. See DAVIDSON & OLESZEK, supra note
185, at 76. Once nominated, incumbents are all but guaranteed of reelection. Between
1946 and 1984, an average of approximately 91 percent of all incumbents in the House of
Representatives and 75 percent of all incumbents in the Senate were reelected. Id. at 62.
Incumbents in state legislatures are reelected at similar rates. See WOMEN, ELECTIONS AND
REPRESENTATION, supra note 283, at 176-77.
416. See, e.g., ELIZABETH DREW, THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT WENT
WRONG AND WHY (1999); ELIZABETH DREw, POLITICS AND MONEY: THE NEW ROAD TO
CORRUPTION (1983); Russell D. Feingold, Special Interests and Soft Money, 10 STAN. L. &
POL'Y RE. 59 (1998). But see Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder, Jr., Soft Money,
Hard Money, Strong Parties, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 598 (2000) (arguing that limitations on soft
money and campaign finances of political parties will reduce voter participation).
417. See Daniel R. Ortiz, Duopoly Versus Autonomy: How the Two-Party System Harms the
Major Parties, 100 COLUM. L. Rav. 753, 759-62 (2000) (arguing that parties have departed
from their role as "superagents" of voters in the political market and become "producers"
that market their political product to the voters).
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to his fundraising success and support from the Party elite.' In contrast,
although Republican Senator John McCain captured the public imagina-
tion with his populist, dark horse candidacy and won over Democrats and
independents alike, he failed to capture his party's nomination when he
encountered closed primaries that effectively disenfranchised most of his
supporters.419 Furthermore, large numbers of the Republican faithful in
many states never had an opportunity to cast a meaningful vote because
their elections were late in the primary process after Bush already had
been anointed the nominee.42° The 2000 election shows that instead of
determining the will of the people, the party nomination process actually
is more likely to guide or even suppress it.
Paradoxically, the pernicious effects of the two-party system also are
its strongest attributes. Parties perform many valuable services for voters,
such as providing information about issues and candidates, monitoring the
performance of elected representatives, and when necessary, disciplining
representatives who do not follow the instructions of their constituency.42 '
By maintaining tight control over representatives at every stage of the
electoral process, the two major parties are able to produce "stable and
strong majorities" in legislative bodies.422 Concomitantly, both parties have
an overpowering interest in becoming"'people's parties' which appeal to
418. See Dan Balz, McCain's Rise Alters Dynamics of Race, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1999, at
Al. Many of Bush's strongest competitors, including Elizabeth Dole, Lamar Alexander, and
Dan Quayle, were eliminated several months before the first vote was cast. See id. Elizabeth
Dole cited her inability to compete with Bush's fundraising as the reason for her with-
drawal, stating that "[p]erhaps I could handle 2 to 1 [difference in campaign funds] or even
10 to 1, but not 80 to 1." Ruth Marcus, Dollars Dictate Fields Early Exits, WASH. POST, Oct.
21, 1999, atAl.
419. See Dan Balz, New Challenges Become Clear, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2000, at Al.
Closed primaries limit voter participation to "party members who have been affiliated
with the party for some specified amount of time:' typically through requirements that a
voter register with a party by a registration deadline scheduled before the primary. Charles
E. Borden, Primary Elections, 38 HAuv. J. ON LEGIs. 263, 264-65 (2001). For competing
views on the merits of open primaries as the basis for support of party candidates such as
McCain, compare George F.Will, The Hyacking of the Primaries, WASH. POST,Apr. 30, 2000, at
B7, with Dana Milbank, What the Bush Guys Don't Realize: The Open Primary Is No Threat;
It Might Empower Their Party, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2000, at B 1.
420. See David S. Broder, Coordinated Primaries? 2 Parties Conferring on Change for 2004
Presidential Race, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2000, at A7. Efforts by some Republicans to institute
a four-month progressive primary system under which smaller states would hold their
primaries first in February followed by states of increasing size in March, April, and May
failed when their proposal was defeated at the Republican National Convention in July
2000. See David S. Broder, GOP Scraps Plan to Alter Primary Schedule, WASH. POST, July 29,
2000, at A6.
421. See, e.g., Ortiz, supra note 417, at 756-59; Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss?
Imperfect Information as a Positive Influence in Political Institutions, 88 MICH. L. RE. 917, 941-
46 (1991); Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue
Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1567, 1607-09 (1988).
422. Which is the Best Electoral System?, supra note 403, at 37.
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voters with a wide range of views, the decision between them being made
by the 'floating' vote in the center.' ' 423 Over time, the two parties tend to
become more centrist, adhering to moderate positions supported by the
greatest number of people to remain in power.42 4 Transitions from one
party to another are orderly and do not result in significant disruptions in
the legislative process. Therefore, political scientists generally agree that
two-party plurality systems such as the one used by the United States
promote stable one-party rule.
425
The Supreme Court has concluded that the political stability created
by our two-party system is an important value that should be protected.
426
Many of the Court's decisions foster two-party government, even if it
comes at the expense of individual voters or third parties to participate in
the electoral process. 427 Provisions restricting ballot access to parties with
"a significant modicum of support" are permissible, although such
requirements limit the ability of minor parties to place their candidates
before the voters.4 28 Independent candidates may be denied ballot
positions if they have been registered or voting members of a political
party for a certain period prior to the general election. 429 Individual voters
likewise may be prevented from voting for a party's nominee if they fail to
register as party members a reasonable time before a primary election.
4
1
Furthermore, while the states may mandate that candidates be
selected prior to a general election through either primary elections
or party conventions,' 3 1 they cannot proscribe the role of the
423. Hermens, supra note 404, at 22.
424. See id.; THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 388, at 261--62; ALEXANDER M.
BiCKEL, REFORM AND ComNTIUrr 22 (1971).
425. See Choosing an Electoral System, supra note 118, at 6.
426. See generally Timmons, 520 U.S. at 367 ("The Constitution permits the Minnesota
Legislature to decide that political stability is best served through a healthy two-party sys-
tem."); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 107 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(describing the "stabilizing effects" of a two-party system as "obvious"); Bandemer, 478 U.S.
at 144-45 (O'ConnorJ., concurring) ("There can be little doubt that the emergence of a
strong and stable two-party system in this country has contributed enormously to sound
and effective government.").
427. See generally Burdick v.Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992) (describing voting as the
most precious right in a free country, but indicating that "the right to vote is the right to
participate in an electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the integrity of
the democratic system").
428. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431,442 (1971). For similar holdings, see, e.g., Munro
v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986); American Party ofTex. v.White, 415 U.S.
767 (1974). However, the Supreme Court has limits to how far it is willing to go to pro-
mote the two-party system to encourage political stability. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23 (1968) (striking down state election laws that made it virtually impossible for any third
party candidate to qualify on a ballot).
429. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
430. See, e.g., Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
431. See, e.g., American Party ofTex., 415 U.S. at 781; Storer, 415 U.S. at 731-35.
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parties4 32 or decide which voters actually are allowed to participate in the
selection process. 33 It is of little consequence to the Court that these
decisions constrain majority rule by offering "ambassadors" whose
"positions are predetermined."434 Instead, the Court views the need to
avoid fractures in the two major parties-and thereby promote stability-
as a paramount interest that cannot be sacrificed. 3 '
In contrast, some proponents of proportional representation
underscore "breaking the two-party monopoly" as one of their principal
objectives.436 Their disagreement with the Court therefore rests upon the
greater premium that they place on more representative government over
the stable and effective government that two-party government is said to
produce.4 37 According to this view, legislative bodies must reflect the
interests and opinions of all voters, not just those in the majority. 3 It is
widely accepted that proportional and semi-proportional systems do a
432. See Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989)
(striking down restrictions on party organization requirements and limitations on primary
endorsements by parties).
433. See Cal. Democratic Party v.Jones, 120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000) (declaring unconstitu-
tional California's blanket primary, which allowed voters to cast ballots for any candidate
regardless of their political affiliation); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208
(1986) (invalidating state law which required primary voters to be registered members of
that party, to the extent the law conflicted with Republican Party's rule permitting
independent voters to cast ballots in the Party's primary); Democratic Party of United
States v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981) (striking down Wisconsin's open
primary, which allowed voters to cast ballots for any candidate regardless of their party and
required party delegates to vote in accordance with the primary results). According to the
Court, a non-parry "voter who feels himself disenfranchised" by nomination rules
requiring party membership "should simply join the party"Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2413.
434. Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2408.
435. See generally Storer, 415 U.S. at 736 ("California apparently believes with the
Founding Fathers that splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism may do significant
damage to the fabric of government. It appears obvious to us that the one-year disaffilia-
tion provision furthers the State's interest in the stability of its political system." (citing THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 25, at 77-84 (James Madison)). The Court's protection of
the two-party system is grounded in its preference for district-based elections. See Robert
G. Dixon, Jr., Fair Criteria and Procedures for Establishing Legislative Districts, 9 PoL'Y STUD. J.
839,841 (1981); supra notes 104-18 and accompanying text.
436. Amy, supra note 8, at 76-98. See also Richie & Hill, supra note 150, at 6, 18-20
(arguing that political progressives need multiparty politics that would be fostered under
proportional representation).
437. See, e.g., Choosing an Electoral System, supra note 118, at 6; W'hich is the Best Electoral
System?, supra note 403, at 35-36;Weaver, supra note 225, at 191-95.
438. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 187 (H.B. Ac-
ton ed.,J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1972) (1861) ("The pure idea of democracy, according to
its definition, is the government of the whole people, equally represented."). As Mill ex-
plained, in "a really equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, not
disproportionately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always have a
majority of the representatives; but a minority of the electors would always have a minor-
ity of the representatives." Id. at 278.
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better job of achieving that goal than geographically based majority or
plurality systems.4 39 In the process, proportional and semi-proportional
forms of representation tend to support "the multiplication of parties" by
lowering the threshold of exclusion so that more voters with distinct
interests are able to participate in government.44 Where this occurs,
proponents of alternative methods of election concede there is a
possibility that those methods "may undermine consensus, exacerbate
tension, and destabilize the political system." '
Nevertheless, proportional representation and stable party government
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Several nations that use proportional
methods of election have been able to produce long-standing two-party
governments. 44 2 In addition, while adoption of proportional representation
systems has encouraged multiple parties in most European countries, it
does not necessarily mean that our existing two major parties would be
supplanted by a host of new ones.43 As Bernard Grofman has noted,
"generalizations about proportional representation based on European
party-list experience are of very limited applicability to understanding the
American use" of alternative voting systems.44 4 The Democratic and
Republican Parties probably would continue to dominate elected
legislative and congressional offices even under proportional or semi-
proportional election rules .44 Therefore, concluding that alternative voting
439. See, e.g., 'hich is the Best Electoral System?, supra note 403, at 36; Allocation of Power,
supra note 307, at 67-68. But see William H. Riker, Electoral Systems and Constitutional Con-
straints, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYsTEM, supra note 22, at 103, 105-06 (arguing that
plurality systems represent minorities as well as proportional representation). By the same
token, single-member districting achieves more proportional results than winner-take-all
at-large elections. See supra notes 69-102,373 and accompanying text.
440. Thresholds of Representation, supra note 322, at 482. See also supra note 403 (describ-
ing Duverger's law). Countries using proportional representation systems have an average
of eight political parties. Rose, supra note 290, at 79.
441. TvANY OF THE MAJORITY, supra note 210, at 153. At the same time, however,
Professor Guinier concludes that the "exclusiveness" fostered by winner-take-all elections
"is a greater evil." Id. According to Guinier, when all voters are allowed to have meaning-
ful participation in the political process, "everyone can win something" and "genuine
consensus is possible." Id.
442. See Maurice Duverger, Duverger's Law: Forty Years Later, in ELECTORAL LAWS, supra
note 62, at 71-76 (describing the tendency of Austria, Germany, and Ireland to have stable
two-party systems despite proportional election rules that shift governmental control be-
tween several parties).
443. See generally Note, Affirmative Action and Electoral Reform, 90 YALE L.J. 1811, 1830-
31 (1981) (observing that although most Western European nations adopted proportional
representation in the early twentieth century,"[t]he change was not followed by a marked
increase in the number of parties in any of the countries").
444. Grofman, supra note 12, at 167-68.
445. According to one commentator, this result likely will occur because of the politi-
cal differences between the United States and countries presently employing proportional
or semi-proportional methods of election:
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systems used in other countries are "contrary to most general concepts of
a democratic two-party system:' overestimates the effects of proportional
voting schemes."6
Illinois' experience with cumulative voting for elections of its lower
house between 1870 and 1980 demonstrates that a strong two-party sys-
tem can coexist with some forms of proportional or semi-proportional
methods of election.447 Illinois adopted cumulative voting to reduce sec-
tionalism and to provide representation to the minority Democrats in its
southern counties and the minority Republicans in its northern coun-
ties.4 8 To achieve these goals, Illinois maintained geographically based
representation by apportioning the state into senatorial districts that
elected one senator and three representatives. 49 Each voter was given
three votes which could be cast in a variety of ways: all three votes for a
single candidate (called a "three shooter" or "plumping"),45 0 one and one-
half votes for two candidates, one vote for three candidates, or two votes
for one candidate and one vote for a second candidate.4"' The system was
effective in fulfilling its objectives, with representation in the state House
First, two dominant parties already exist. Second, proportional representa-
tion would have no effect on electing the President, U.S. Senators,
Governors, or other single-member statewide officers. The only successful
route for election to these higher positions would remain ... by nomina-
tion by one of the two current dominant parties (i.e., Democrats or
Republicans). Any ambitious politician would likely be frozen out of any
chance to achieve one of these higher offices if associated with a third
partyThis situation would tend to discourage development of long lasting
third parties.
McKaskle, supra note 182, at 1199 n.327. See also id. at 1180 n.252 (concluding that even
under single transferable voting, "Democrats and Republicans are not likely to be dis-
lodged from their politically dominant position"); LIjPHART, supra note 322, at 15
(observing that "presidentialism tends to discourage multipartism").
446. Martin v. Mabus, 700 F Supp. 327,337 (S.D. Miss. 1988).
447. See Weaver, supra note 225, at 198-99. In 1980, Illinois voters eliminated cumula-
tive voting in favor of single-member districts after the proposal to change the method of
election was joined with a proposal to decrease the size of the lower house as part of voter
backlash for a legislative pay raise that had been enacted. Id. at 199; LIFT EvERYVOICE, supra
note 238, at 266.
448. See, e.g.,Weaver, supra note 225, at 198;Jack Sawyer & Duncan MacRae,Jr., Game
Theory and Cumulative Voting in Illinois: 1902-1954, 56 AM. POL. ScI. R. 936, 936-37 n.8
(1962); GEORGE S. BLAIR, CUMULATIVE VOTING: AN EFFECTIVE ELECTORAL DEVICE IN ItI-
NOIS POLITICS 1-11, 127 (1960). According to Blair, the aim of the plan was "minority
representation rather than proportional representation." Id. at 6. Cumulative voting was
adopted as "a device for the maintenance of a strong two-party system and a means of
reflecting the relative strength of those two parties in the General Assembly." Id.
449. BLAIR, supra note 448, at v, 6.
450. Charles W Wiggins & Janice Petty, Cumulative Voting and Electoral Competition, 7
AM. POL. Q. 345,346 (1979).
451. BLAIR, supra note 448, at v, 6, 127.
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of Representatives usually providing a better reflection of the relative
statewide strength of the two major parties than in the winner-take-all
elections held for state Senate seats."5 2 Consequently, cumulative voting in
Illinois actually led to "greater legislative stability" than in other state
legislatures because there tended to be fewer significant shifts in the party
composition of the General Assembly.
4 3
Still, if the purpose of adopting an alternative voting system is to en-
hance individual voting decisions, then the strengths of the cumulative
voting system in Illinois also were its greatest weaknesses.Tight party con-
trol over the nominating process was one price of maintaining strong
two-party rule.1 4 The real contests for legislative seats shifted to primary
elections, where the major parties colluded by having the majority party
nominate two candidates and having the minority party nominate one
candidate. 45 Although third parties fared better under this system than
earlier methods of election, in most elections they failed to elect any rep-
resentatives. ' Party discipline exercised by the party elite tended to be as
great, if not greater, than party manipulation of single-member district
elections in other states. 4 7 For this reason, proponents of proportional and




452. See id. at 75-86,130, 132,137.
453. Id. at 134-35. For this reason, Robert Dixon has described the form of cumula-
tive voting used in Illinois as "an American two-party version" of proportional
representation. DIXON, supra note 46, at 524.
454. See Wiggins & Petty, supra note 450, at 355 (finding that "[d]istrict representative
committees have put a damper on general election competition by refusing to allow full
slates [of candidates] to be nominated, even in areas where they occupy a rather dominant
status in terms of voter support" because of fear that they would lose seats through diluted
voting or due to inter-party collusion).
455. See BLAR, supra note 448, at 64-66, 106, 129, 133-34;Wiggins & Petty, supra note
450, at 345, 349-61. See also Hermens, supra note 404, at 29 (observing that a three-
member constituency "increases the chances for women and the representatives of minori-
ties" but "encourages a major party to align itself with a minor one").The collaboration of
the two major parties often caused Illinois to have a smaller average number of candidates
per seat under its cumulative voting system than states using winner-take-all single-
member districts. See BLIn, supra note 448, at 50-57. As a result, Illinois tended to have a
much higher number of uncontested elections for its state legislature than other states,
averaging 53 percent in three selected elections between 1928 and 1948. See id. at 55-56.
The Democratic Party had the greatest tendency to underestimate its voting strength or to
engage in "setups" or "elections in which voters are denied a choice among candidates"
particularly in Chicago and urban Cook County.Wiggins & Petty, supra note 450, at 355-
62.
456. See BLAIR, supra note 448, at 79-85.
457. See id. at 63-66, 106. This party control left voters in more than one-third of all
multimember districts without any meaningful decision in the selection of their represen-
tatives. See Ruth C. Silva, Relation of Representation and the Party System to the Number of
Seats Apportioned to a Legislative District, 17 W POL. Q. 742,753-55 (1964).
458. Compare AMY, supra note 8, at 186 (criticizing the cumulative voting system used
in Illinois because it ensured "representation only for the largest minority political
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The Illinois example demonstrates that some party control of the
election process may be necessary under alternative voting systems to en-
sure minority success. Political scientists recognize that the multiplicity of
minority parties under proportional systems in other countries frequently
transfers decision-making authority for selecting government leadership
from voters to party leaders. 4-9 In a similar manner, semi-proportional
election methods such as cumulative voting may require transferring the
ultimate selection of a minority group's preferred representative to an in-
formal slating organization4 ° or formal party hierarchy to limit the
number of minority candidates.461 Otherwise, "when two or more minor-
ity candidates are running and minority voters divide their votes among
them, there is a chance that no minority candidate will be elected
"'4 2
Party organization can be beneficial in helping minority groups achieve
their representational goals even in proportional or semi-proportional
systems.
Nevertheless, proportional representation may be difficult to
reconcile with two-party government elected from single-member or
even multimember districts. 463 Illinois' use of three-member districts with
cumulative voting election rules shows that it is possible for a semi-
proportional system to approximate plurality results under a two-party
system. Yet, this result "follows proportional representation methods but
not the proportional representative principle." - 4 If consent for elective
party-not the full range of minority political groups-and so tend[ed] to reinforce the
two-party system"), with Richie & Hill, supra note 150, at 26-28 (describing the "profound
impact" that a three-seat proportional representation system had on Illinois politics, allow-
ing 25 percent of voters who only supported one candidate to be able to elect that
candidate and leading to the election of "minority-backed legislators [who] played a crea-
tive role in the legislature") and Li'r EvERY VoicE, supra note 238, at 266-68 (observing
that cumulative voting led to greater representation of all parts of the state by creating a
legislative environment more favorable to coalition building and provided women with a
much better chance of being elected than they had under single-member districts).
459. See Mhich is the Best Electoral System?, supra note 403, at 32.
460. See supra note 297 and accompanying text (defining candidate slating).
461. See Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 1, at 297-300; Latino Representation, supra note
224, at 984.
462. Id.
463. See generally Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, Ugly:An Inquiry Into the Problem
of Racial Gerrymandering Under the Voting Rights Act, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 652, 670 ("Attempt-
ing to create a system of proportional representation in the context of a two-party, single-
member system is not realistic."); Trying to Have the Best of Both Worlds, supra note 403, at
207 ("Is it possible to find an electoral system that has the best of both worlds [plurality
and proportional representation]? ... My answer, unfortunately, will be a qualified no.").
See also Dieter Nohlen, Two Incompatible Principles of Representation, in CHOOSING ANELEC-
ToRAL SYsTEM, supra note 22, at 83, 85 (describing majority/plurality and proportional
systems as "two incompatible principles of representation" that are "antithetical" to one
another "politically, systematically, and with regard to the history of ideas").
464. Choosing an Electoral System, supra note 118, at 7.
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offices must continue to be based on two-party representation,
opportunities to achieve truly representative bodies under proportional or
semi-proportional systems become much more limited. Moreover,
limiting voter choices under proportional or semi-proportional methods
of election to achieve stable two-party government may replicate the very
defects of majority or plurality systems that alternative voting systems are
said to cure. When this occurs, it makes it harder to respond to arguments
by supporters of existing single-member, winner-take-all elections that




American democracy rests on the principle that government must be
derived from the consent of the people. However, the principle attributes
of our electoral system often fail to fulfill that promise. Geographical
representation uses districting criteria that may have little connection
with the actual interests of voters. Relational representation resulting from
geographically based districts permits representatives, not voters, to define
the boundaries of their relationship with constituents. Majoritarian
representation, which is supposed to promote popular sovereignty, either is
not present at all stages of the political process or exploits winner-take-all
elections from districts to overrepresent particular groups of voters. Two-
party representation fostered by majority or plurality election rules secures
stability by limiting voter choices. Elections are a means to achieve
political ends that often are inconsistent with the principle of consent.
In contrast, alternative voting systems can facilitate the ability of all
voters to give or withhold their consent to the government. But in doing
so, they may make significant departures from the methods of securing
consent traditionally used in the United States. Geographical districting
either is forsaken entirely under proportional systems or is reduced
through use of multimember districts under modified semi-proportional
election rules. While more voters are able to elect representatives who are
responsive to their needs, relational representation is altered in a manner
that may leave non-voters and losing voters without any representation at
all. There is a greater opportunity for elections to reflect the popular will
under truly proportional systems, but no guarantee that minority interests
will not be suppressed in legislative bodies absent departures from major-
ity rule.Although two-party government is possible under proportional or
semi-proportional election rules, individual voting choices cannot be ad-
vanced without reducing party control. Alternative voting systems may do
a better job of allowing more voters to elect candidates of their choice,
465. Martin Shapiro, Gerrymandering, Unfairness, and the Supreme Court, 33 UCLA L.
R.Ev. 227, 255 (1985).
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but not without sacrificing many established aspects of our representative
government.
This does not mean that alternative voting systems are to be rejected
out of hand because they depart from traditional characteristics of Ameri-
can democracy. Some jurisdictions have little if any interest in maintaining
single-member districts or at-large winner-take-all elections. Local gov-
ernments are suitable prospects for proportional or semi-proportional
elections because the majority of localities already elect their representa-
tives at-large in plurality-win, non-partisan elections./ They also are
more apt to avoid problems in the administration of elections and better
facilitate relational representation through smaller constituencies that elect
fewer representatives. 46 In addition, many places presently employ alterna-
tive voting systems or have used them in the past.4 With the exception of
the lower house of the Illinois legislature, all alternative voting systems
adopted in this country have been at the local level. Consequently, local
governments are the strongest candidates for alternative voting systems.
469
It is more difficult to reconcile proportional and semi-proportional
systems with congressional and state legislative elections, where
geographically based two-party representation is much more firmly
entrenched. Statewide at-large elections are not a viable option.47°
Alternatively, some commentators have proposed that three-member
districts like those used in Illinois could be adopted consistent with
accepted notions of geographical and two-party representation. 71 Use of
466. See supra notes 222-28, 411-13 and accompanying text.
467. There are exceptions to this rule, however. For instance, the use of the single
transferable vote in a large city such as NewYork City may face many practical problems
in the administration of elections. See supra notes 235-39 and accompanying text. The
problems that may arise illustrate the importance of assessing the specific needs and condi-
tions of a local government to determine whether alternative voting systems are viable.
See, e.g., Weaver, supra note 225, at 191-92; which is the Best Electoral System?, supra note
403, at 36; Nohlen, supra note 463, at 89.
468. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
469. Compare Karlan, supra note 248, at 77-78 (cautioning that proponents of alterna-
tive voting systems "need to be more modest in our goals," focusing on "local
experimentation" that ultimately might influence national changes to the current system),
with Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limits on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE LJ.
2505, 2555 (1997) (arguing that while "local governments in the United States are making
greater use of these alternatives ... it is unrealistic to view as promising the political pros-
pects for significant change in this direction, particularly at the state and national levels").
470. See supra notes 240-50 and accompanying text.
471. See Richie & Hill, supra note 150, at 26-29; BUSHMANDEaS & BULLWINMLES, supra
note 136, at 146-48. See also DIXON, supra note 46, at 50 (maintaining that a "modified
proportionality, leaving intact the basic two-party system would ... be more in accord
with twentieth-century pluralism than the one-party tendencies which conventional dis-
trict systems exhibit"); Rein Taagepera, The Effect of District Magnitude and Properties of Two-
Seat Districts, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM, supra note 22, at 91, 101 (asserting that
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an alternative voting system such as cumulative voting would undercut
majoritarian representation, although it might result in government that is
better able to achieve majority rule than single-member districts. '72
Presumably political parties could offset departures from current election
rules by being more receptive to recruiting candidates and obtaining
support from minority groups needed to achieve electoral success.473
Application of a more flexible "communities of interest" approach
under single-member districts can achieve the same result, without the
attendant deprivation of relational representation to some persons that may
exist under proportional or semi-proportional elections.4
74 Communities of
interest have the added advantage of being more consistent with state and
federal districting practices, and therefore are more likely to be adopted by
politically motivated legislators reticent to give greater control over the
election process to third parties or individual voters.475 Furthermore, until
federal and state laws mandating single-member district elections are
repealed or invalidated, it would be futile to attempt to adopt proportional
or semi-proportional representation. In the current political environment,
such changes seem unlikely. Interest-based districting is a happy medium
between current election systems and alternative voting systems, especially
for congressional and state elections.
Districting on the basis of communities of interest does little good,
however, if the Supreme Court is unwilling to permit it.476 Under such
circumstances, alternative voting systems arguably must be adopted if fair
and equal representation of all voters-especially racial minorities-is to
be achieved. Nevertheless, alternative systems are not a panacea for all of
the problems created by Shaw. They may resolve certain defects of our
current electoral system, while introducing some new ones of their
own.477 In addition, they cannot remedy the damage done to our system
"[c]ompared to single-seat districts, two-seat districts used with any PR allocation rule
would represent a moderate step toward more minority representation").
472. See supra notes 352-58 and accompanying text.
473. See supra notes 453, 457 and accompanying text (describing the increased electoral
success of women and minorities in cumulative elections to elect representatives to the
Illinois legislature).
474. See supra notes 251-63 and accompanying text.
475. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Lottery Voting: A Thought Experiment, 1995 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 193, 201 (1995) (observing that "cumulative voting achieves a multiparty system,
or at least opens up that possibility-and that's why it probably will not be adopted, be-
cause politicians elected under the current two-party system don't want to create that
wedge for would-be competitors").
476. The Court has given mixed signals on whether communities of interest may be
the basis for districting even where it results in irregularly shaped districts. See supra notes
251-63 and accompanying text.
477. See generally Ferejohn, supra note 356, at 47 ("There is little question that [single-
member district] systems have some real defects, especially with regard to representation of
minorities. But [proportional representation] systems have weaknesses too and it is no
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by a judiciary unwilling to fulfill its constitutional role in the political
process.' In this sense, the Supreme Court already has redefined Ameri-
can democracy in its racial gerrymandering cases.
It is unclear whether the new judicial paradigm enunciated in the
Shaw cases will persist. 479 If it does, then "the time to consider alternatives
other than race-conscious districting" may have arrived.4" But any con-
sideration of the appropriate alternatives should take into account the
specific meaning of representation in the United States. It also is impor-
tant to recognize that any model for obtaining the consent of the
governed will be imperfect. If we are willing to accept the value trade-offs
inherent in changing the method of election from a majoritarian or plu-
rality system to a proportional or semi-proportional system, then some
alternative voting systems may fit the bill.
accident that many countries have moved away from the purer forms of PR in reaction to
particular unhappy experiences."). See also Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 1, at 243 (ob-
serving that "[a]ny voting system, including the status quo of territorial districting, has
costs as well as advantages").
478. See Tyranny of theJudiciary, supra note 13.
479. The Court's recent opinion in Cromartie II indicates that there are five justices
willing to place some limits on the reach of the Shaw doctrine. See generally 121 S. Ct. at
1462 (concluding that "the Constitution does not place an affirmative obligation on the
legislature to avoid creating districts that turn out to be heavily, even majority, minority. It
simply imposes an obligation not to create such districts for predominately racial, as op-
posed to political or traditional, districting motivations"). It remains to be seen whether
the Court actually will impose a "demanding" burden of proof on all Shaw plaintiff in the
future, as the Cromartie II opinion suggests. See id. at 1458 (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 928
(O'Connor, J, concurring)).
480. Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 1,at 241.
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